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Abstract
The recommender systems help users find suitable and interesting products and contents from
the huge amount of information that are available in the internet. There are various types of
recommender systems available which have been providing recommendation services to users.
For example Collaborative Filtering (CF) based recommendations, Content based (CB) rec-
ommendations, context aware recommendations and so on. Despite the fact that these recom-
mender systems are very useful to solve the information overload problem by filtering interesting
information, they suffer from huge privacy issues. In order to generate user personalized rec-
ommendations, the recommendation service providers need to acquire the information related
to attributes, preferences, experiences as well as demands, which are related to users’ confi-
dential information. Usually the more information available to the service providers, the more
accurate recommendations can be generated. However, the service providers are not always
trustworthy to share personal information for recommendation purposes since they may cause
serious privacy threats to users’ privacy by leaking them to other parties or providing false
recommendations. Therefore the user information must be protected prior to share them to
any third party service provider to ensure the privacy of users.
To overcome the privacy issues of recommender systems several techniques have been pro-
posed which can be categorized into decentralization, randomization and secure computations
based approaches. In decentralization based approach, the central service providers are re-
moved and the main controls of recommendation services are given to participant users. The
main issue with this kind of approach is that to generate recommendations, the users need to
be dependant to other users’ availability in online services. If any user becomes oﬄine, her
information can not be used in the system. The randomization based techniques add noises to
2users data to obfuscate them from learning the true information. However the main issue is
that adding noise affects recommendation accuracy. On the contrary, the secure computations
preserve user information while providing accurate recommendations.
In this thesis we preserve user privacy by means of encrypting user information, specifically
their ratings and other related information using homomorphic encryption based techniques to
provide recommendations based on the encrypted data. The main advantage of homomorphic
encryption based technique is that it is semantically secure and computationally it is hard
to distinguish the true information from the given ciphertext. Using the homomorphic based
encryption tools and techniques we build different privacy preserving protocols for different
types of recommendation approaches by analyzing their privacy requirements and challenges.
More specifically, we focus on different key recommendation techniques and differentiate them
into centralized and partitioned dataset based recommendation techniques. From available
recommendation techniques, we found that some of the existing and popular recommendation
techniques like user based recommendation, item based recommendation and context aware
recommendation can be grouped into centralized recommendation approach. In partitioned
dataset based recommendation, the user information can be partitioned into different organi-
zations and these organizations can collaborate with each other by gathering sufficient infor-
mation in order to provide accurate recommendations without revealing their own confidential
information. After categorizing the recommendation techniques we analyze the problems and
requirements in terms of privacy preservation. Then for each type of recommendation ap-
proach, we develop the privacy preserving protocols to generate recommendations taking their
specific privacy requirements and challenges into consideration.
We also investigate the problems and limitations of existing privacy preserving recommen-
dations and found that the current solutions suffer from huge computation and communication
overhead as well as privacy of users. In the thesis we identify the related problems and solve
the issues using our proposed privacy preserving protocols. As an overall idea, our proposed
recommendation protocols work as follows. The users encrypt their ratings using homomorphic
encryption and send them to service providers. We assume the service providers are semi honest
but curious, they follow the protocol but at the same time try to find new information from the
3available data. The service provider has the ability to perform homomorphic operations and
it performs certain computations over encrypted data without learning any true information
and returns the results to the query users who ask for recommendations. The system models
of our privacy preserving protocols for different recommendation techniques differ from each
other because of their different privacy requirements.
The proposed privacy preserving protocols are tested on various real world datasets. Based
on the application areas of different recommendation approaches our gathered datasets are
also different such as movie rating, social network, checkin information for different locations
and quality of service of web services. For each proposed privacy preserving protocols we
also present the privacy analysis and describe how the system can perform the computations
without leaking the private information of users. The experimental and privacy analysis of our
proposed privacy preserving protocols for different types of recommendation techniques show
that they are private as well as practical.
Chapter 1
Introduction
The recommender systems are techniques and tools that provide suggestions for different prod-
ucts or items which can be of use to a user. The suggestions help users to select which items to
buy, what online news to read or what music to listen [1, 2, 3]. Online applications are some of
the important parts of daily life for millions of users. People consume media (Youtube, Flickr,
LastFM), do their shopping (Amazon, Ebay), and interact (Facebook, Gmail) online. Since the
amount of content that is offered to users is often huge, the automated recommender systems
are employed to make people’s life easier by helping find suitable information. In other words,
by providing personalized recommendations, these systems can help people find interesting
media, boost sales through targeted advertisements, or help people meet new friends. Because
of their automated nature, the recommender systems can meet the demands of large online
applications that operate on a global scale.
The recommender systems have proved in recent years to be a valuable means for cop-
ing with the information overload problem. Ultimately a recommender system addresses this
problem by pointing a user towards new, not-yet-experienced items that may be relevant to
the users current task. Upon a user’s request, which can be articulated, depending on the
recommendation approach, by the users context and need, the recommender systems gener-
ate recommendations using various types of knowledge and data about users, the available
items, and previous transactions stored in customized databases. The user can then browse
the recommendations. All these user actions and feedbacks can be stored in the recommender
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database and may be used for generating new recommendations in the next user-system in-
teractions. As noted above, the study of recommender systems is relatively new compared to
research into other classical information system tools and techniques (e.g., databases or search
engines). Recommender systems emerged as an independent research area in the mid-1990s
[4, 5, 2].
Usually “item” is the most general term used to represent what the recommender system
recommends to any user. A recommender system traditionally focuses on any specific type of
item such as news and CD. The recommender systems primarily focus on those users who lack
enough personal experience to evaluate the potentially overwhelming number of alternative
items that any web site may offer [3]. For example, a book recommender system, which assists
users to select a book to read. A good example is Amazon.com, where the site employs a
recommender system that assists users to personalize the online store for each customer [6].
Usually the recommendations are personalized and different users receive diverse recommen-
dations based on their past preferences or experiences. However there are also no-personalized
recommendation available which are much simpler to generate. For example, top five featured
songs, top five selections of books etc. Although they may be effective and useful in certain
cases but these no-personalized suggestions are not addressed by recommender system research.
The personalized recommendations are usually offered as list of items which is ranked based
on predicted weights or utilities of the items. To perform this ranking the recommender system
tries to find based on the users’ constraints and choices what are the most suitable items are. In
other words, the recommendation problem is reduced to the problem of predicting the missing
ratings for the items that a user has not invoked before. Usually in any online system users buy
or use any items and then provide ratings based on their experience on those items. There are
more items left which are not invoked by the users in the system. As soon as we can predict
the missing ratings on those items which are not rated before, we can recommend the items
which are predicted to receive the highest ratings.
Users’ ratings on different items can be categorized into explicit and implicit ratings. The
explicit ratings are considered as value given by the user. By the explicit ratings a user can
express how strongly he/she likes the items or how the user feel about the item. The explicit
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ratings are considered as most strong source of information for recommender system. Typically
the explicit ratings are ranged between 1 to 5 or 1 to 10 etc. The implicit ratings are inferred
from observing users’ behaviours. For example, if a user has already invoked any item or
not can be considered as implicit rating no matter if he/she provides any ratings or not. For
example, a user buys any particular item several times. This means the user likes the item
even if he/she does not provide any explicit ratings [7, 8, 9, 2, 10, 11].
Usually the recommender system can be classified as (1) Content based recommendation
(CB) [12, 13, 14], where the prediction of new ratings is evaluated by finding the similarities
between the features of items which user has not invoked before and the other items. The
highest predicted item is recommended. (2) Collaborative filtering (CF) based recommendation
[15, 16, 17, 18], where the ratings are predicted based on the similarity between either users or
items ratings (unlike the content based). There are some hybrid methods [19, 20, 21] available
where the CB and CF are combined together to generate composite recommendations.
1.1 Types of Recommender Systems
Although [7] provided an overview of the state of the art recommender system types as CF
based recommender system, content based recommender system and hybrid, we found that
all the basic types of recommender systems can be grouped into two main clusters: (1) cen-
tralized dataset based recommendations (2) partitioned dataset based recommendations. The
centralized dataset based recommendation can be categorized as user based recommender sys-
tem, item based recommender system and context aware recommender system. In below we
describe all types of recommendations system in detail.
1.1.1 Centralized Dataset based Recommendations
1.1.1.1 User based Recommender System
The user based recommender system [22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34], also
called as Collaborative Filtering (CF) predicts the recommendations for the user based on the
similarity among user preferences on items. The most similar user is identified to the target
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Figure 1.1: Example of (a) Item based recommendations (b) User based recommendations.
Figure 1.2: Architecture of User based recommendation.
user (whom to recommend) and based on the ratings of the similar user, recommendations are
generated for target user. Specifically the user based recommender system works as follows:
• Calculating the similarity weight of all users with the target user who wants the recom-
mendations. To do this, we need to define a similarity function similarity(u, i) where
u and i represents the target user and neighbor user respectively. Note that the users
are represented as rating vector (rating on items). The more similar a neighbor is to the
target user, the more weight to put into their similarity to influence the final recommen-
dation result.
• Filtering a subset of users from the whole set of users based on the similarity weights.
Although they can be filtered in different ways, a traditional system is to fix a threshold
value and choose k nearest neighbors whose similarity is more than the threshold value.
Although theoretically it is possible to consider all users in the system but selecting top
k similar users is more practical.
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Figure 1.3: Architecture of Item based recommendations.
• Computing the final prediction on any unrated (no invoked before) items based on the k
similar users’ weights and the available ratings on those target items from other users.
1.1.1.2 Item based Recommender System
In item based recommendation (also called as content based recommendation- CBF) [35, 35,
29, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 13, 41] the similarity between the items that the target user has rated
and all other items are identified. Based on the most similar item’s rating, recommendations
are generated for the target user. More specifically the item based recommender system works
as follows:
• Weigh all items with respect to their similarity to the active item. Define a similarity
function similarity(i, j) that measures the similarity between the active item i and an-
other item j (since items are represented using rating profiles consisting of users ratings
on the item in question, the similarity is computed based on the items rating profiles).
• Form the active items neighborhood of similar items. The neighborhood can either be
such that it consists of the most similar items out of all items, independent of whether
the active user has rated them or not, or it can be the set of the most similar items out
of those the active user has rated. Typically only a subset of the k most similar items
are selected.
• Compute a prediction on the active item for the active user using a prediction algorithm
that is based on how the active user has rated items in the active items neighborhood.
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Figure 1.4: Context aware recommender system example. (a) Recommendation based on user’s
social network. (b) Location recommendation based on distances.
Figure 1.5: Architecture of context aware recommendation.
1.1.1.3 Context-aware Recommender System
The context aware recommender systems [42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54]
facilitate the recommendations by exploiting different context information that affects or in-
fluence user preferences based on different situations. For example a user may like to watch
a horror movie alone but would like to watch an action movie with friends. Therefore the
tastes changes based on his/her company. Some of the important context information includes
time, locations, social network etc. The incorporation of these context information into rec-
ommender system [55, 56] leverages the value of these systems by improving the relevance of
possible recommendations with respect to changing user needs [57, 58].
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Context Information
As mentioned earlier the precision of recommendation results may get affected by different
contextual information. For example an user may be more or less interested in a certain
restaurant depending on the friends he/she is going with or the day of the week. For another
instance, an user would like to visit only those restaurants which were visited by his/her close
friends only [59, 60, 48, 61, 62]. The context information can be static or dynamic based on if
they get changed or not.
Incorporating Context into Recommender System
The traditional recommender system relies solely on users’ ratings on different items. On
the other side the context aware recommender system relies on not only the ratings but also
the contextual information of users. Therefore a context aware recommender system can be
formulate as a function as follows:
f : Users× Items× Context− > Ratings
There are mainly three ways to integrate the context information into recommender system.
(1) Contextual pre-filtering: where the context information are filtered before integrating them
into recommender system (2) Contextual post filtering: where the context information are
filtered after the traditional recommender system is applied into the user data (3) Contextual
modeling: where the contextual information are integrated directly into the recommendation
model.
1.1.2 Partitioned Dataset based Recommendations
One of the main purposes of recommender systems is to offer truthful and reliable referrals. To
produce precise and dependable predictions, such systems should collect ratings from enough
number of users. When online vendors own limited number of users data, it becomes a challenge
to form reliable and large enough neighborhoods; that might cause low quality CF services.
Additionally, inadequate number of users data lead to cold start problem, where e-commerce
sites can recommend predictions for limited number of items. That might cause to lose cus-
tomers due to the lack of accuracy in the recommendations received [63, 16]. Therefore, holding
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Figure 1.6: Traditional recommender system and its possible security concerns.
Figure 1.7: Partitioned dataset based recommendation.
sufficient number of users ratings is imperative for the overall success of CF systems. Some
companies, especially recently established ones, might not have enough users’ or items’ data
for recommendation purposes. Moreover, customers may prefer different online vendors for
shopping. On the other side, the users purchase different products from different companies.
Consequently, ratings of the different items collected from same users for CF purposes might
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be vertically partitioned among multiple vendors. Therefore acquiring the ratings partitioned
into different companies for better referrals [64, 65, 66].
1.2 Privacy Concerns in Recommender Systems
1.2.1 Privacy Breach and Types of Risks
The recommender systems require the datasets of users’ personal preferences which has disclo-
sure risks by malicious intruders. These privacy breaches may involve deliberate acts such as
hacking or snooping by different kinds of parties like the outsiders, fellow users or the service
providers or outsiders. Such kind of incidents might have serious consequences depending of
the sensitivity of the personal information [67, 68]. Since the recommender systems are based
on central storage of user profiles, it has been studied that three main threats may hamper
the recommender system to perform properly: exposure, bias and sabotage [69]. The exposure
is considered as privacy breach while the latter two are regarded as functional threats to the
system.
1.2.2 Users’ Privacy Risks are Proportional to Availability of Information
In a recommender system, the more personal information is available to the server the more
accurate recommendations can be generated. The information of users includes their identifi-
cations, demographic information, behaviour, purchase pattern or history, ratings and so on.
Such information are privacy sensitive and users are usually reluctant to share these informa-
tion to any third party service providers [48, 61, 62].
1.2.2.1 Types of Private Information
The type of private information mainly depends on how an user or system defines the level
of privacy which to be shared or not. However mostly any information related to user are
considered as private. For instance, the users’ behavioural information may refer to his/her
dynamic data such as activity, location, time etc. The demographic information may refer to
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users’ age gender, age etc. The ratings refer to the range of votes which interprets how much
(in a range of 1-10) an user like an item.
Providing or releasing such information to a recommendation server who is usually any
third party service provider may pose undesirable privacy risks. The data could be sold to
any other party without owners’ consent or intruder may hack and provide false recommen-
dations. Therefore it is very important to protect such information while providing accurate
recommendations.
1.3 Background and Motivation
Under the broader research context the existing privacy preserving recommendations system
can be categorized into two areas: (1) Obfuscation based solutions [70, 68, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75,
76, 10, 77] and (2) Cryptography based solutions [78, 79, 67, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 75, 85, 86, 87].
The main advantage of obfuscation based techniques are that they are efficient since they
do not incur complicated manipulations on users information in order to preserve the privacy.
However they lack rigorous privacy guarantees as well as affect the recommendation accuracy
because of adding the noise.
In contrast, the cryptographic solutions rely on different cryptographic primitives such as
homomorphic encryption, multiparty cryptographic computations, threshold encryption etc.
There are two main advantages of cryptographic based solutions. First, these types of methods
provide rigorous privacy guarantee because of secure computations, since one can perform
certain computations on encrypted data without looking at any information (the server learns
nothing except the ciphertexts). Second, there is no degradation of accuracy.
In below we briefly describe some existing privacy preserving recommender systems. The
detailed related work can be found in next chapter.
1.3.1 Anonymization
The anonymization approaches remove any identifiable information such as link between users
and the data to obfuscate the user profile. This kind of approaches has been widely studied
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to protect the privacy in recommender system. Anonymization based approaches considers
that the re-identification of individuals data is similar to the attack model where the published
tables are joined with some external tables modeling the users background knowledge. To
prevent these types of attacks Samarati et.al. [88] proposed a k-anonymity based approach
where a computational disclosure technique was introduced for releasing information from a
private table such that the identity of any individual to whom the released data refer cannot
be definitively recognized. This approach protects against linking to other data. Byun et al.
[89] proposed anonymizing relational data using clustering based techniques. A solution was
carried out in the vector forms, where each dimension represents a numerical value. Although
this work is for relational database, there is no direct application in the form of a graph.
Cormode et al. [90] proposed a privacy preserving anonymization of bipartite graph where the
main goal was to protect the association between the nodes in two partitions of the graph.
Zhifeng et al. [91] presented a distributed anonymization based techniques where the scheme
allows the users to anonymize their own data without accessing each others information.
1.3.2 Obfuscation
One type of privacy preserving recommender system is data perturbation methods where noises
are injected on users’ private data before sending to the server for generating recommendation
Zhang et al. [92] proposed two data reconstruction methods based on Singular Value De-
composition and K-means clustering, that derive original private information from disguised
data in existing perturbation collaborative filtering schemes. They also showed that the data
perturbation techniques might not able to secure the data properly. Another SVD (Singu-
lar Value Decomposition) based CF (Collaborative Filtering) with privacy has been proposed
[74] maintaining acceptable accuracy for recommendation while protecting the privacy of user
information based on randomized perturbation based schemes. A distributed mechanism for
users in collaborative filtering has been proposed where the user item connection has been
made secure so that untrusted server is not able to read it. A trade-off between privacy and
recommendation accuracy has been minimized by solving this issue [71]. Few research works
been carried out on differentially private recommender system which also took consideration of
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minimizing the trade-off between security and recommendation accuracy. A method [10] based
on differential privacy has been proposed where the algorithm has been factored into two parts:
the aggregation which guarantees the privacy and aggregation which provides the recommen-
dation learning the users information. Another example of differential private recommender
system, proposed by Machanavajjhala et al. [93] who presented a graph link based recommen-
dation and formalized the trade-off between privacy and accuracy. Extra noises are induced in
these types of methods. Tianqing et al. [94] proposed a differential privacy for neighbourhood
based CF, where the scheme is able to select private neighbor to protect the neighbors data.
Their proposed solution reduces the magnitude of the noise than the traditional approaches as
well.
1.3.3 Homomorphic Encryption
1.3.3.1 Encryption based Recommendations on Centralized Dataset
Item based Recommendations
The homomorphic encryption techniques usually adopt cryptography to hide users’ private
data. Canny [79] proposed a scheme for privacy preserving CF which reduces the filtering task
to an iterative calculation of the aggregate requiring only addition of vectors of user data using
homomorphic encryption techniques. This approach allows sums of encrypted vectors to be
computed and decrypted without exposing individual rating information. Another research
[67] has been carried out by the same author to protect individuals’ personal data only. This
approach has been conducted based on probabilistic factor analysis model. It was also suggested
for different kinds of statistical analyses purposes. Large computation and communication
overhead is a common issue in generating private recommendations using homomorphic based
techniques. Kikuchi et al. [95] addressed the large overhead in performing the cryptographical
operations, which is proportional to the number of user and items. Therefore, they came up
with reducing the computation and communication cost introducing clustering based CF where
users and items are grouped together based on their similarity. Tada et al. [96] proved that, the
computation cost for generating recommendation can be reduced using item based similarity
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instead of user based. Therefore, the issue with scalability in recommender system was handled
in their proposed work where privacy has been preserved using Paillier cryptosystem.
User based Recommendations
Erkin et al. [97] proposed a collaborative filtering based recommender system which uses
efficient protocols based on homomorphic encryption and secure multiparty communication.
They have also applied the approach in a social trust network [98] aiming similar outcomes to
previous work where the additional overhead with regard to computation and communication
is minimized by packing data. The main limitation of [97] is that, recommender server and
decryption server need to communicate each other to achieve secure multiplication between
two private message as well as intermediate decryption of private messages. Moreover, any
user is able to communicate with decryption server which might cause serious damage to the
system since the any user can be malicious and decrypt any other users’ information.
1.3.3.2 Encryption based Recommendations on Distributed Dataset
A recommender system is usually more successful and is able to provide more accurate rec-
ommendation when sufficient data are available. One of the common scenarios in applying
a recommender system involves distributing data among several different organizations. To
generate a recommendation for a specific user, ratings from only one organization might not
be adequate to predict accurate recommendations. Hence it is necessary to integrate data
held by different organizations. However, the challenges arise when different data holders are
reluctant to disclose their own data to other sites. Therefore to encourage them to take advan-
tage of each others data for the sake of quality recommendations, privacy and confidentiality
constraints for personal information have to be satisfied. The partitioning of the data can
be horizontal, vertical or arbitrary. A horizontal partitioning occurs when multiple organi-
zations contains different sets of users but the same set of attributes or items, while vertical
partitioning distributes different sets of items but the same set of users among several sites.
In arbitrary partitioning organizations hold disjoint sets of both users and items. Figure 1.7
shows an architecture of vertical partitioned dataset based recommendation [99, 100].
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Previous research has shown that vertical and arbitrary partitionings are more common and
more difficult to handle than horizontal partitioning. It remains an open problem to generate
accurate and secure recommendations for vertically partitioned data The partitioned data-
based computation with privacy is a more challenging problem, which has been addressed by
several researches. Yakut et al. proposed two privacy-preserving recommendation framework
for arbitrary partitioned datasets [72, 101]. In their techniques user information was made
secure by masking the ratings and recommendations were generated on the masked data. Rec-
ommendations were generated using Self Organizing Map (SOM) and Naive Bias Classifier
(NBC), in two different researches, respectively. Privacy-preserving weighted slope one pre-
dictor was proposed for both horizontally and vertically partitioned datasets by [99, 100].
However, [99] showed that they need all organizations to actively communicate among each
other. As a result, to generate recommendations for one user, all other organizations must
come online and collaborate. Moreover, the organizations send their ciphertexts to other orga-
nizations serially and this continues until the last organization receives. Problem arises when
the number of organizations increases. In [100], they showed that, a rating can be split into
multiple shares (which is necessary to to calculate item deviation securely). This shares can
be increased by k. Computation and communication overhead increase when the number of k
raises.
1.3.4 Motivation
The privacy concerns of recommender systems have been dealt with using various techniques
such as: anonymization, randomization and differential privacy, cryptographic protocols etc.
The anonymization based techniques remove any identifiable information from the original
data while preserving other structures of interests in the data. In real scenario it is tough to
assume which part of the data has to be removed while other parts must be kept to remain
useful. Similar to the anonymization based techniques, the randomization based methods alter
the information in the datasets to inject a degree of uncertainty. Differential privacy based
techniques add high level of noises to some particular information so that those are compu-
tationally undistinguishable from others. The main drawbacks of these techniques are that,
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they are hard to be proven and the noises make recommendation to perform less accurately.
However, anonymization based techniques often face the difficulties to decide which portion of
data need to be removed. Moreover, the privacy provided by these approaches often are not
guaranteed when the data is sparse. Perturbation based techniques induce extra noises that
affect to find similar users or items accurately.
Privacy preserving based on cryptographic protocol based techniques can be divided into
two parts: without server and with server. The cryptographic protocol without server also
called the secure multi-party computations do not trust the central server at all which result
removing it from the picture. Therefore, it protects the privacy of the users against each
other using homomorphic based techniques. These techniques overcome the issue with afore-
mentioned methods however, since such schemes with decentralized structures works strongly
taking power away from the service providers, the existing companies are not likely to agree
with adopting.
The cryptographic protocols with a central server overcome the issues with multi-party
based methods without server, where the server is offered to make use of centralization. The
main challenge of these methods is that, because of adding a layer of encryption the efficiency
degrades extensively. The cryptographic based protocols with secure two party computations
are always more expensive to generate recommendations for users than the unprotected ones.
To obfuscate the messages using these techniques, they need big size of keys as bigger the key,
more difficult to crack the messages.
The main motivation of this thesis work has been summarized below.
• User information are sensitive, however potential threats to user privacy in both user and
item based CF are often underestimated.
• Most of the current approaches fail to perform secured collaborative filtering efficiently
while maintaining the balance between privacy and recommendation accuracy.
– Cryptographic based protocols introduce homomorphic cryptosystem for item based
CF which requires huge number of iterative calculation, therefore, suffers from in-
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tensive computation cost [96].
– Due to the large number of potential users in most of the systems, it has been a
bottleneck to find the similarity among the users efficiently in user based CF. This
issue adds another dimension of barrier to secure the system in reasonable amount
of computation and communication costs [102].
– The required amount of bandwidth to exchange the ciphertexts among the parties
is extensive in current solutions[95, 103].
1.4 Research Challenges
In this thesis we aim to address key challenges in different areas of recommendations system
while preserving users privacy.
As mentioned earlier, to get personalized recommendation from the recommender server, it
requires to learn users’ past preferences on different products as well as their personal informa-
tion which may lead to data privacy and security issues. For this reason users are reluctant to
share their personal information to the server. One very straightforward way is to add noise to
user ratings so that the server is not able to find the true ratings. However only adding noise
is not enough if they become useless to compute the recommendations. Specifically we need
to hide the ratings such a way so that their preserve some features which is helpful to be used
while perform the rating predictions. To address this challenge we use homomorphic based
encryptions to preserve users privacy so that the encrypted ratings can be used to perform
rating predictions.
1.4.1 Privacy Challenges in Item based Recommendation
The homomorphic based encryption techniques are useful to perform certain operations on
encrypted data, mostly addition and multiplications. The process of generating item based
recommendation consists of two steps: calculating similarity among the items and then pre-
dicting the missing ratings based on the target users ratings on other similar items and the
similarity weights. The main challenge is building such similarity computation protocol where
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ratings are encrypted and one central party or a recommender server can perform a set of
homomorphic operations so that the similarity and prediction function can be achieved at the
end of the protocol. Because of using homomorphic based encryptions, someone should hold
the private key to decrypt the results. This raises another challenge since one central party
may act maliciously and decrypt all encrypted information. Therefore it would be an effective
idea to distribute the secret keys so that no central authority can have the power to decrypt
the results, instead all the secret key holders agree and contribute to decrypt the results. The
main issue of some existing privacy preserving item based recommendation [79, 67, 95, 96] is
that they suffer from huge computation and communication overhead as well as suffers from
privacy threats.
1.4.2 Privacy Challenges in User based Recommendation
The main difference between the item and user based recommender system is that, unlike item
based recommendation, in user based recommendation, we calculate the similarity between
the users instead of items. Moreover, while predicting, other users’ ratings are used with
the similarity weight. Although in terms of the similarity function its same to compute item
and used based similarity, however, in terms of privacy preserving computation, its different.
In private item based similarity computation, a single user can perform certain computations
locally, for example multiplication of the ratings for different items. Moreover, while calculating
the prediction, the multiplication between user ratings and user similarity, where both of
them are private. The existing homomorphic tool based protocols propose to collaborate
among the users and intermediate decryptions to facilitate such computations which raise huge
communication bandwidth as well as privacy concerns. Therefore, our main challenge is how to
build such protocol where one central authority can perform most of the required homomorphic
computations while generating recommendation without learning any private information. Also
we do not want to compromise minimum privacy and recommendation accuracy. Among some
of the existing privacy preserving user based recommendation [97, 98] one common issue is
that the decryption server and recommendation server have to communicate with each other
significantly to achieve certain computation results by doing decryptions. This raises huge
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privacy threats to users’ private information.
1.4.3 Privacy Challenges in Context Aware Recommendation
Another very common and useful recommendation area is context aware recommendation where
the users’ preferences/ ratings, recommendations depend on different contextual information.
Although the user and item based recommendation are straightforward way to generate rec-
ommendations, it would be useful to integrate the context information such as social network,
locations of users into the recommender system. However, similar to users’ ratings the loca-
tions and social network are also private information. Therefore, while encrypting the users
preferences, it is also necessary to encrypt the contextual information so that the users’ private
information are not leaked. The main challenge lies in how to integrate the context information
prior or after the recommendation model in privacy preserving manner. For another exam-
ple, an user wants recommendations based on close-by located users experiences. To facilitate
such recommendation, the server has to find the close-by users based on the location first
without knowing anything about their locations, then find the similarity among the filtered
users without learning their ratings. Therefore, it is challenging to integrate the contextual
information into the recommendation model without actually having any knowledge about the
users’ contexts and performing privacy preserving predictions.
1.4.4 Privacy Challenges in Partitioned Dataset based Recommendations
To produce accurate recommendations, the recommendation service providers need sufficient
data since more data that are available, the more accurate recommendation can be generated.
As the amount of online vendors and customers are increasing day by day the users’ preferences
can be distributed among multiple organizations or competing vendors. The problem is due to
the privacy issues, companies are also reluctant to share their users’ confidential information to
other companies which could help to provide more accurate recommendations. Furthermore,
it is not legal disclosing users preferences; nevertheless, if privacy is protected, they can col-
laborate to produce correct predictions. Therefore the main challenge lies in how to collect all
users’ information by companies and then share the confidential information with other com-
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panies without actually harming the confidentiality of users and at the same time generating
recommendation to users. Another challenge is how to deal with sharing information among
the huge number of organizations if they share similar set of users’ information. Sharing any
company’s information to all others may increase the communication overhead and also may
take long time to finish the process. One of the common issues of existing privacy preserving
recommendation on partitioned datasets [72, 101, 99, 100, 99, 100] is that they require all
parties to communicate with each other which raises huge communication overhead.
1.5 Research Questions
To address the aforementioned challenges, we aim to answer the following four main research
questions.
R.Q-1. How to model a secure protocol for privacy preserving item-based recommender sys-
tem where users’ privacy are preserved while generating without any loss of recommendation
accuracy.
To answer this question we address the research challenges in terms of privacy issues of item
based recommender system. We preserve users privacy by means of homomorphic encryption
and the third party service provider is able to generate recommendation without learning any
private information. To facilitate the private recommendation, the server calculates the simi-
larities among the items based on the ratings provided by the users homomorphically and use
the similarity value to recommend new items to the target user.
R.Q-2 How to model secure protocol for user based recommender system which can hide user
ratings from all parties in the recommender system and generate recommendation privately to
users.
This research question is designed to address the research challenges in user based recommender
system which is different than RQ-1 where the recommendations are generated based on the
similarities among the users instead of the items. More specifically, we answer the question by
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building a secure protocol where both user ratings and similarity are private while generating
recommendations by server. The existing privacy preserving protocol require to make any one
of the private information public or the parties in the recommender system need to collabo-
rate each other to facilitate these types of computations. Our proposed protocol address these
challenges by improving the privacy as well as efficiency.
R.Q-3 How to model a secure recommendation protocol for partitioned datasets where the
user ratings are shared among multiple organizations and any user can get recommendations
by combining the ratings of the organizations without revealing any private information.
We design this research question to address the challenges and privacy issues in distributed
dataset based recommendations. There are such practical scenarios where different organiza-
tions hold different set of products but same set of users. In this case merging all of ratings
would generate more accurate recommendation, however the organizations are reluctant to
share their users’ information to other organizations. By answering this research question,
we show an effective protocol where different organization can collaborate with each other to
generate more accurate recommendations for their users without compromising any privacy.
R.Q-4 How to model secure context aware recommendation protocol where the recommenda-
tions can be generated by integrating different contextual information of users privately, which
influence their preferences as well as the recommendation results.
We answer this question by addressing the challenges in the recommender system where con-
text information are to be integrated to generate suitable recommendations for users. For
example, users may want to visit those locations which are visited by his/her close friends.
Therefore, it is necessary that the recommendations results are influenced by user’s social
friendship network. Similarly, there are certain areas where users’ preferences depends on their
locations. Specifically we investigate two types of context information: social network of users
and locations and analyze how these context information influence users’ preferences and their
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Figure 1.8: A summary of research questions, research contributions and thesis organizations
recommendations and how to incorporate these context information into recommender system
in privacy preserving manner.
1.6 Research Contribution
To address the research questions defined previously and to overcome the challenges discussed
in last section, extensive studies have been performed using different privacy preservation tools
and cryptography based techniques. A summary of the organization of the novel contributions
corresponding to the aforementioned research questions is presented in figure 1.8. Concretely
the main contributions of this thesis are presented as follows.
1. Privacy Preserving Item based Recommendation
We propose a new privacy preserving item based recommender system, which allows the
computations required for recommendations in a distributed manner and preserves user
privacy without compromising recommendation accuracy and efficiency. We introduce
the privacy protocol based on ElGamal encryption [104] which is based on public key
cryptosystem. The main advantage of this cryptosystem is that, it is semantically secure
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and allows certain types of computations on the ciphertexts. Based on this cryptosystem,
we are able to split the secret keys among the users so that no single authority holds the
full power to have the secret key and decrypt. When the computation on encrypted data
is complete, all users in the system can share the secret keys to decrypt the results. Our
recommender server is assumed to be semi honest and does not collude with any party in
the system. We also propose different privacy protocols on item average and similarity
computations as well as recommendations generations by which the privacy of users are
preserved. Specifically our main contributions are:
a) An efficient privacy preserving item-based recommender system to protect user pri-
vacy during recommendation process by sharing the secret keys.
b) Privacy preserving item average and similarity computation protocols to calculate
averages and similarities among the items without compromising user ratings. More-
over, which items have been rated are also hidden during these processes.
2. Privacy Preserving User based Recommendation
In relation to the first contribution we further investigate the privacy preserving recom-
mendation protocol based on the similarity among the users and their ratings on items.
We mainly investigate the requirements of privacy protocols in terms of user based simi-
larity computations followed by recommendation generations with the encrypted weights,
which are user similarities. Based on our investigation we found that the existing works
suffer from certain privacy issues (they require to decrypt intermediate results by the
decryption server) and communication overhead on how they perform secure multipli-
cation operation (which is one of the intermediate steps in generating recommendation)
homomorphically under multiparty settings. To overcome these limitations, we propose
a new privacy preserving protocol using Boneh Goah Nissim cryptosystem [105] where
secure multiplication can be performed by a single server and overcomes the limitation
of communication overhead as well as the privacy issues (we do not require to decrypt
the intermediate results). To model the protocol, we set two servers, where one acts as
recommendation server and another as decryption server who are semi honest but curi-
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ous to find the information. The proposed protocol leverage the recommender server to
perform private recommendations without disclosing any private information.
3. Privacy Preserving Context Aware Recommendation
To facilitate the privacy preserving context aware recommender system, we explore the
influence of different contextual information in recommendation. Among various con-
textual information based recommendation, we limit our study and contribution among
two specific contextual information: users friendship network and locations. These two
information are equally sensitive as other user information such as ratings or prefer-
ences on different products. More specifically we investigate users’ friendship network
into point of interest recommendation and locations into web service recommendation
as an application in privacy preserving manner. In point of interest recommendation,
we propose a new privacy preserving protocol where users are able to select only few
friends of him/her based on whom the users wants the recommendation results to be
influenced without disclosing any private information. Similarly, in location aware web
service recommendation, we propose a new privacy preserving protocol where the users
are able to filter a set of users who are located nearby, since users locations usually effect
in web service experience/preferences. The recommendation server can use the set of
nearby users’ experiences to facilitate the recommendation on unobserved web services
for target/ query user without disclosing or learning any private information.
In both scenarios we use real world datasets to conduct extensive experimental analysis
and prove that the proposed protocols are practical as well as private.
4. Privacy Preserving Recommendation based on Partitioned Datasets
There is such scenario where the users’ information/ ratings are distributed among mul-
tiple organizations and to generate satisfactory recommendations, these data need to be
integrated. However, data related to user preferences are usually confidential and it is
unlikely that any organization will agree to share its own data with other entities. To
provide advanced facilities for securing privacy of data in distributed recommender sys-
tems, we propose a new system called Privacy-preserving Weighted Slope One Predictor
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for Vertically Partitioned Data. In this protocol we encrypt users’ confidential rating
information by means of BGN cryptosystem [105] also propose a novel privacy preserv-
ing item deviation protocol which is one of the important intermediate steps to generate
recommendations in this scenario. More specifically, the proposed protocol generates
recommendations in a privacy preserving manner by integrating users data distributed
among several different organizations by means of encrypting user information. The
proposed protocol is examined using a real world dataset and shows that the proposed
method is secure and outperforms previous solutions interms of computation and com-
munication costs.
1.7 Thesis Organization
The remaining chapters of this thesis is organized as follows.
• Chapter 2: Background and Related Work This chapter describes the underlying
cryptographic algorithms that are used to encrypt confidential information related to
recommender system and the homomorphic properties of those cryptosystem which are
used as building blocks to build the privacy preserving recommender system in different
application scenarios. We also describe the related work separately in terms of research
questions and research contributions.
• Chapter 3: Privacy Preserving Item based Recommendation
This chapter describes the solutions to RQ-1. Here we present the solution of privacy
issues while generating recommendation based on item similarity. Specifically we present
the privacy preserving protocol for item based similarity and average rating computations.
Moreover we present two different types of privacy preserving protocol for recommenda-
tions: weighted sum and adjusted weighted sum. We enhance the traditional ElGamal
cryptosystem so that the users in the system can share the secret keys and collaborate
with each other to decrypt the final results. We also present another protocol where
user can generate its own key pairs to facilitate homomorphic encryptions in order to get
encrypted recommendations. The main contribution of this chapter corresponds to [106]
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• Chapter 4: Privacy Preserving User based Recommendation
This chapter describes the solution to RQ-2. The user based recommendation is different
than the item based one in terms of privacy requirements. Therefore the challenges to
solve privacy issues while generating recommendations are also different. As discussed in
research challenges, while computing the similarity between users and generating recom-
mendations the existing approaches fail to meet the privacy and communication overhead
simultaneously. To address this challenge we present a new privacy preserving protocol
where a central server can perform the homomorphic operations to generate recommen-
dations reducing the communication bandwidth and providing better privacy than the
existing ones. We also provide an extended solution where we improve the computation
overhead of privacy preserving user based recommendation by reducing the total user
space prior to generating recommendations. Specifically the first approach is shown in
the application of movie recommendation and the second approach is shown in the ap-
plication of web service recommendations. The contributions of this chapter appear in
[107]
• Chapter 5: Privacy Preserving Context Aware Recommendation
This chapter describes the solution to RQ-3. In this chapter we present privacy preserving
protocols for context aware recommender system where we show the solutions to integrate
the contextual information into recommender system in privacy preserving manner. We
present two applications on privacy preserving context aware recommendations in this
chapter divided into sections.
– 5.1: Privacy Preserving Friendship Aware Location Recommendations.
This section presents how to integrate friendship network into a location recom-
mender system since social network influences the user preferences and how to facil-
itate this recommendation in privacy preserving manner since users’ social network
and checkin into different locations are private. The main contribution of this section
appear in [108].
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– 5.2: Privacy Preserving Location Aware Web Service Recommendation.
This section provides the privacy preserving protocol for web service recommenda-
tions where users’ locations influence the quality of service experience. Therefore the
proposed protocol shows how to filter a set of users based on their location privately
and use the set of users’ preferences to generate recommendation for query user who
is within the same region in privacy preserving manner. The main contributions of
this section also appear in [109].
• Chapter 6: Privacy Preserving Recommendations on Partitioned Datasets
This chapter provides the solution of challenges described correspond to RQ-4. There
are such scenarios where the users use products from different organizations. Another
scenario is different users registered with different organizations invoke same type of
products, which is called horizontally partitioned datasets where the former is called
vertically partitioned dataset. Usually the organizations holding its own users’ informa-
tion are reluctant to share its information to other organization where by sharing them
would increase the recommendation accuracy. To facilitate this sharing and generating
recommendations, in this chapter we investigate the privacy requirements of vertically
partitioned dataset based recommendations where organizations holds same set of users
but different set of items. We present privacy preserving protocol based on weighted
slope one predictor where a central party can collect the information and generate the
recommendations for different organizations without disclosing any private information.
Our proposed protocol addresses the challenges and limitations of existing protocols on
partitioned dataset based recommendation in terms of computation and communication
overhead. The main contributions of this chapter appear in [110]
• Chapter 7: Conclusion. This chapter concludes the thesis by summarizing the main
contributions and key findings. In addition, the significance of this research and potential
future directions along with some limitations of the developed methods are discussed.
Note The related work and backgrounds for all core chapters (3-6) are described in
chapter 2 to avoid any overlapping discussions. However, relevant context, description
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of architecture, model, dataset and evaluation metrics are presented in each of these
chapters separately.
Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
In this chapter we present the underlying cryptographic algorithms which are used as building
blocks of privacy preserving recommendations in different application scenarios. Then we
present different techniques to generate recommendations and similarity computations. And
finally we describe the related work on different privacy preserving recommendation systems.
In related work we focus on mainly homomorphic encryption based recommendation systems
with few other different privacy preserving systems using perturbation and anonymization
based techniques.
2.1 Underlying Crypographic Algorithms
2.1.1 ElGamal Cryptosystem
The ElGamal cryptosystem presented in [111] is additively and multiplicatively homomorphic.
This means that there exist two operations over the ciphertexts E(M1) and E(M2) such that
the results of those operations correspond to new ciphertexts whose decryption yield the sum
and multiplication of the plain texts M1 and M2.
E(M1)E(M2) = E(M1 +M2)
E(M1)
M2 = E(M1 ·M2)
(2.1)
The ElGamal encryption scheme is a homomorphic and probabilistic public key encryption
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based on Diffie-Hellman key exchange. The ElGamal encryption scheme can be defined over
any cyclic group G. Its security depends upon the difficulty of a certain problem in G related to
computing discrete logarithms. The ElGamal encryption scheme consists of three algorithms:
the key generation, the encryption algorithm, and the decryption algorithm.
Key Generation: The private and the public keys are x ∈ Zq and y = gx respectively, where
G is a cyclic group of order q and x = {1, ..., q − 1}.
Encryption: A message m is encrypted as follows.
(C1, C2) = (g
r,m · yr) (2.2)
where r is an arbitrary random number chosen by the encrypter. C1 and C2 are represented
as ciphertexts.
Decryption: The ciphertexts are decrypted by computing with the private key x as follows.
C2
(C1)x
=
m · yr
(gr)x
=
m · yr
yr
= m (2.3)
Homomorphic Property: Given two encryptions,
(C11, C12) = (g
r
1,m1 · yr1)
(C21, C22) = (g
r
2,m2 · yr2)
(2.4)
the computation of multiplication for two ciphertexts is as follows.
(C11, C12)(C21, C22) = (C11C21, C12C22)
= (gr1g
r
2, (m1y
r
1)(m2y
r
2))
= (gr1+r2 , (m1m2)y
r1+r2)
(2.5)
The resulting ciphertext is the encryption of m1m2 which is a multiplication of two plain-
texts. It has been shown that ElGamal is semantically secure, i.e., it is computationally
infeasible to distinguish between the encryptions of any two given messages, if the decisional
Diffie-Hellman problem is intractable [111]
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2.1.1.1 Distributed ElGamal Cryptosystem
We assume there are n users in the system. Each i-th user has its own public key yi and secret
key xi. The distributed ElGamal cryptosystem consists of the following algorithms.
Key generation: A common public key
PK =
n∏
i=1
yi = g
x1+···+xn
is used in the distributed ElGamal cryptosystem.
Encryption: To encrypt a plaintext message m ∈ G:
• Randomly choose an integer r from Z∗q ;
• Computes c1 = gr;
• Computes c2 = gm · PKr.
The encrypted message is E(m) = (c1, c2).
Decryption: A common decryption key is not computed. Each user computes and broad-
casts a partially decrypted value, and the final plaintext is revealed by combining all partially
decrypted values. For the ciphertext (c1, c2), decryption proceeds as follows:
• Each i-th user computes c1xi ;
• All users broadcast commitment of computed values H(c1xi);
• Each i-th user broadcasts c1xi and checks if each cxi1 matches with H(cxi1 );
• Each user computes c2∏n
i=1 c1
xi
=
c2
cx1+···+xn1
= gm.
Finally, m can be revealed by computing a discrete logarithm.
Homomorphic Property ElGamal encryption has an inherited homomorphic property [111],
which allows multiplication and exponentiation to be performed on a set of ciphertexts without
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decrypting them, such as addition homomorphic computatiion
E(m1)× E(m2) = (gr1 , gm1 · pkr1)× (gr2 , gm2 · pkr2)
= (gr1+r2 , gm1+m2 · pkr1+r2)
= E(m1 +m2)
and multiplication homomorphic computation:
E(m1)
m2 = (gr1 , gm1 · pkr1)m2
= (gr1·m2 , gm1·m2 · pkr1·m2)
= E(m1 ·m2)
2.1.2 Boneh Goh Nissim (BGN) Cryptosystem
The BGN scheme [105] was the first to support both additions and multiplications with a
constant-size ciphertext. The multiplication is possible due to the fact that pairings can be
defined for elliptic curves. Let G be an additive group and GT a multiplicative group, all of
prime order p.
Key generation: Given a security parameter λ ∈ Z+, generate a tuple (q1, q2, G,GT , e), where
q1 and q2 are distinct large two primes, G is a cyclic group of order q1q2 and e is pairing map
e : G×G→ GT . Let N = q1q2. Pick up two random generators g, u from G and set h = uq2 .
Then h is a random generator of the subgroup of G of order q1. The public key and the private
keys are defined by PK = {N,G,GT , e, g, h} and SK = q1 respectively.
Encryption: Assume the message space consists of integers in the set {0, 1, · · · , T} with
T << q2. To encrypt a message m using the public key PK, a random number r is chosen
from {1, 2, · · · , N} and compute the ciphertext as,
C = gmhr ∈ G (2.6)
Decryption: The decryption of C using the private key SK is defined by,
Cq1 = (gmhr)q1 = (gq1)m (2.7)
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To recover the message m, it suffices to compute the discrete logarithm of Cq1 to the base gq1 .
Since 0 ≤ m ≤ T , this takes expected time O(√T ) using Pollard’s lambda method [112].
Homomorphic Property of Addition: The BGN scheme is clearly additively homomorphic. Let
PK = {N,G,G1, e, g, h} be a public key. Given two ciphertexts of messages m1 and m2,
the ciphertexts can be computed as C1 = g
m1hr1 ∈ G and C2 = gm2hr2 ∈ G respectively,
where m1m2 ∈ {0, 1, · · · , T} respectively. One can create a uniformly distributed encryption
of m1 +m2(modN) by computing the product
C = C1C2h
r (2.8)
where r ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N − 1}, because
C1C2h
r = (gm1hr1)(gm2hr2)hr = gm1+m2hr1+r2+r
is an encryption of m1 +m2.
Homomorphic Property of Multiplication: The most important property of the BGN cryp-
tosystem is that it is possible to obtain the multiplication of two plaintexts from the operating
on the ciphertexts using bilinear maps. Consider two ciphertexts C1 = g
m1hr1 ∈ G and
C2 = g
m2hr2 ∈ G. To build and encryption of the product m1m2 ∈ {0, 1, ..., T}, pick a random
number r ∈ Z and let C = e(C1, C2)hr1 ∈ GT . Therefore we have:
C = e(C1, C2)h
r
1
= e(gm1hr1 , gm2hr2)hr1
= e(gm1+αq2r1 , gm2+αq2r2)hr1
= e(g, g)(m1+αq2r1)(m2+αq2r2)hr1
= e(g, g)m1m2hr+m1r2+m2r1+αq2r1r21
(2.9)
where r + m1r2 + m2r1 + αq2r1r2 is distributed uniformly in ZN . Thus C is a uniformly
distributed encryption of m1m2.
2.1.3 Paillier Public-Key Cryptosystem
The Paillier encryption scheme [113], named after and invented by Pascal Paillier in 1999, is
a probabilistic public key encryption algorithm. It is composed of key generation, encryption
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and decryption algorithms as follows.
Key generation: The key generation algorithm works as follows.
• Choose two large prime numbers p and q randomly and independently of each other such
that gcd(pq, (p− 1)(q − 1)) = 1
• Compute N = pq, λ = lcm(p−1, q−1), where lcm stands for the least common multiple.
• Select random integer g where g ∈ Z∗N2 and ensure N divides the order of g by checking
the existence of the following modular multiplicative inverse: µ = (L(gλ(modN2)))−1(mod N),
where function L is defined as L(u) = u−1N
Note that the notation a/b does not denote the modular multiplication of a times the
modular multiplicative inverse of b but rather the quotient of a divided by b. The public
(encryption) key pk is (N, g) and the private (decryption) key sk is (λ, µ). If using p, q of
equivalent length, one can simply choose g = N + 1, λ = ϕ(N), µ = ϕ(N)−1(mod N), where
N = pq and ϕ(N) = (p− 1)(q − 1).
Encryption: The encryption algorithm works as follows.
• Let m be a message to encrypt, where m ∈ ZN .
• Select random r where r ∈ Z∗N .
• Compute ciphertext as: c = gm · rN (mod N2)
Decryption: The decryption algorithm works as follows.
• Let c be the ciphertext to decrypt, where the ciphertext c ∈ Z∗N2 .
• Compute the plaintext message as: m = L(cλ(mod N2)) · µ(mod N)
Homomorphic Properties: A notable feature of the Paillier cryptosystem is its homo-
morphic properties. Given two ciphertexts E(m1, pk) = g
m1rN1 (mod N
2) and E(m2, pk) =
gm2rN2 (mod N
2), where r1, r2 are randomly chosen for Z∗N , we have the following homomor-
phic properties.
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Table 2.1: User-item rating matrix.
users/items i1 i2 · · · · · · · · · · · · im
u1 r1,1 · · · r1,j · · · r1,k · · · r1,m
u2 r2,1 · · · r2,j · · · r2,k · · · r2,m
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
ui ri,1 · · · ri,j · · · ri,k · · · ri,m
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
un rn,1 · · · rn,j · · · rn,k · · · rn,m
The product of two ciphertexts will decrypt to the sum of their corresponding plaintexts,
D(E(m1, pk1) · E(m2, pk2)) = m1 +m2(mod N)
An encrypted plaintext raised to a constant k will decrypt to the product of the plaintext
and the constant, D(E(m1, pk1)
k) = km1(mod N)
However, given the Paillier encryptions of two messages, there is no known way to compute
an encryption of the product of these messages without knowing the private key.
2.2 Underlying Recommendation Algorithms
There are two basic entities that drive a recommender system: users who use the recommender
system to provide opinions as well as receive recommendations and items that are rated by
users. The inputs to a recommender system are usually arithmetic rating values, which express
the users opinions of items and follow a specified numerical scale (example: 1: bad to 5: ex-
cellent). The outputs of a recommender system can be either predictions or recommendations.
Let U = u1, u2, ..., un be the set of all n users in a recommender system and I = i1, i2, ..., im
be the set of items where m is the total number of items. Let R be a rating matrix where
rij is a rating provided by user ui on item ij . Usually the rating matrix is sparse because of
missing values as it is not possible to rate all items nominated by all users in a system. The
missing rating is denoted by rij = 0. Hence the primary goal of a recommender system is to
predict the rating for a user ui on item ij which the user has not previously rated. Depending
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on different scenarios the types of recommendations for users may vary. In this thesis we have
used weighted sum and adjusted weighted sum approach to predict the missing ratings in item
based recommendation system.
2.2.1 Item based Recommendation
2.2.1.1 Similarity Calculation
To generate recommendations, one of the key steps is to calculate similarities/correlations
among the item pairs. Cosine similarity is one of the commonly adopted similarity measures
to determine the nearest neighbour in recommendation generation. Recalling the notations
mentioned previously, the similarity between two items is defined as
s(ij , ik) =
∑n
i=1 ri,jri,k√
r21,j + · · ·+ r2n,j
√
r21,k + · · ·+ r2n,k
(2.10)
where, ij and ik represent two individual items. ri,j and ri,k represent the ratings provided by
the user ui on those two items and n represents the total number of users.
2.2.1.2 Recommendation Generation
Weighted Sum based Prediction
In weighted sum approach based recommendation first, the similarity between items are cal-
culated. Then based on the similarity weight and other available ratings the missing ratings
are predicted as follows:
Pi,k =
∑m
j=1 ri,j · s(ij , ik)∑m
j=1 s(ij , ik)
(2.11)
where, Pi,k denotes the rating prediction for user ui. k = {1, 2, ...,m} is the number of items
that the target user has requested for the recommendation. ri,j and s(ij , ik) denote the rating
vector of user ui and similarity between item ij and ik respectively.
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Adjusted Weighted Sum based Prediction
Given similarities among the items, the adjusted weighted sum based rating prediction of user
ui for item ik can be represented by
Pi,k =
Rk ·
∑m
j=1 s(ik, ij) +
∑m
j=1(ri,j −Rj) · s(ik, ij)∑m
j=1 s(ik, ij))
(2.12)
where Pi,k denotes the prediction for user ui on item ik. ri,j and s(ik, ij) represent the rating
provided on item ij by user ui and the similarity between items ik and ij respectively. Rk and
Rj represent the average ratings of items ik and ij respectively. Note that the average rating
of a particular item is computed as dividing the total rating by the total number of users who
have actually rated that item.
2.2.2 User based Recommendation
The main difference between user and item based recommendations in terms of weighted sum
and adjusted weighted sum based approached is that, the technique finds the similarity between
users where in item based prediction, the technique finds the similarity between items. So the
prediction formula for user based recommendation (weighted sum) can be written as,
Pi,j =
∑
1≤k≤n,k 6=i rk,j · s(ui, uk)∑
1≤k≤n,k 6=i s(ui, uk)
(2.13)
where s(ui, uk) denotes the similarity between users ui and uk and rk,j denotes the ratings of
user uk with k 6= i. The similarity function s(ui, uk) between users ui and uk using Cosine
distance can be represented as follows:
s(ui, uk) =
∑m
j=1 ri,jrk,j√
r2i,1 + · · ·+ r2i,m
√
r2k,1 + · · ·+ r2k,m
=
m∑
j=1
Ri,j ·Rk,j
(2.14)
where ui 6= uk, Ri,j = ri,j√
r2i,1+···+r2i,m
, and
Rk,j =
rk,j√
r2k,1+···+r2k,m
.
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2.2.3 Weighted Slope One Predictor
Let u = 1, 2, ..., n be the set of users, and let j = 1, 2, ...,m be the set of items in a recommender
system, where n and m denote the total number of users and items, respectively. A rating
provided by user u on item j denoted as ru,j . Let Pu,j the prediction for target user u, on item
j and Ru the set of items which are actually rated by the target user. The weighted slope one
predictor for recommendation generation can be presented as,
Pu,j =
∑
k∈Ru
(∑
k∈Rj,k(ru,j − ru,k) + |Rj,k| · ru,k
)
∑
k∈Ru |Rj,k|
(2.15)
where k ∈ Rj,k(ru,j − ru,k) denotes deviation between two items j and k (j 6= k), |Rj,k| denotes
the cardinality or the total number of users who have co-rated both items j and k.
2.3 Related Work
In this section we describe the related work relevant to the contribution of this thesis. To make
it clear we present the related work in different sections in terms of our research questions. In
below the subsection 2.3.1 describes the related work of user and item based recommendations
which are related to research questions RQ1 and RQ2. Then the subsection 2.3.2 and 2.3.3
describe the related work on context aware recommendation and partitioned dataset based
recommendations which are related with RQ3 and RQ4 respectively. Table 2.2 shows a brief
overview of existing privacy preserving recommendation systems in terms of centralized/ par-
titioned and semi-honest/ malicious model. In our description of existing works we describe
the literature with respect to our thesis and chapter organizations for better understanding.
2.3.1 Related Work on Privacy Preserving User and Item based
Recommendations
Several approaches have been proposed that apply various kinds of techniques to ensure user
privacy while generating recommendations. Some of those approaches are summarized below.
Obfuscation and perturbation: Obfuscation and data perturbation techniques in recommender
systems use similar approaches. Among the perturbation approaches, Polat and Du et al.
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Table 2.2: Summarized classification of existing work.
Types Homomorphic Encryption SMC
Centralized Model [96, 114, 99, 86, 115, 106, 108] [97, 116, 117, 118]
Partitioned Model [119, 120, 100, 121, 95, 82, 114, 122, 123, 124] [125, 78, 126, 127, 128]
Semi honest [119, 120, 96, 100, 121, 95, 82, 114, 99, 86, 115, 106, 108, 122, 123, 124] [126, 97, 116, 80, 127, 128, 118]
Malicious [125, 78, 117]
[68, 129] proposed hiding personal data statistically while generating recommendations, which
were later proved insecure [92]. Shokri et al. [71] proposed a distributed obfuscation-based
CF technique by allowing local user profile modifications while hiding the real profile from
an untrusted central server. However, this approach requires trading-off between privacy and
recommendation accuracy [116].
Differential privacy: Mcsherry et al. [10] and Machanavajjhala et al. [93] proposed dif-
ferentially private recommender systems. Both such systems induce extra noises to hide user
ratings. Moreover, those systems are unable to hide similar neighbours, which makes CF
vulnerable to KNN attack [130]. To solve this issue, Tianqing et al. [94] proposed another dif-
ferential privacy scheme for neighbourhood-based CF. Such scheme is able to select neighbour
privately; however fails to maintain a good trade-off between privacy and accuracy.
Homomorphic Encryption: Approaches based on homomorphic encryption can be cate-
gorized into two types: item-based CF ([114, 106]) and user-based CF ([97, 95, 116]). Among
them, the approach based on Erkin et al. [114] secures the information used by the CF by using
Paillier encryption. Canny [79] proposed a scheme for privacy preserving CF which reduces
the filtering task to an iterative calculation of the aggregate, requiring only the addition of
vectors of user data using homomorphic encryption techniques. This approach allows sums
of encrypted vectors to be computed without exposing individual rating information of users.
Another research [67] was conducted by the same author to protect an individual’s personal
data only. This approach was conducted based on a probabilistic factor analysis model. Its
use was also suggested for different kinds of statistical analyses. Another privacy-preserving
item-based CF is by Badsha et al. [106] which uses the ElGamal cryptosystem to secure users’
information. This approach shows how individual public and secret keys from different users
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can be combined to encrypt and decrypt any messages without compromising user privacy.
On the other hand, among the privacy preserving user-based CF, Erkin et al. [97] proposed a
CF-based recommender system which uses secure multi-party computation and homomorphic
encryption-based protocols. This protocol allows the users and servers to jointly compute sim-
ilarity and recommendations for target users. However, in this approach the main drawback
is that each user gets the ciphertexts of other users’ ratings during computation and privacy
threat increases if the user colludes with the decryption server sending ciphertexts to learn
extra information. They also applied the approach in a social trust network [98] aiming to
achieve similar outcomes to previous work where the additional overhead with regard to com-
putation and communication is minimized by packing data. Erkin et al. later introduced data
packing to efficiently perform the cryptographic operations on encrypted data [116] by which
the additional computation and communication overhead is minimized. However, this method
also suffers from privacy issue. For instance, the recommendation server and decryption server
continuously work together by adding random values and performing decryption to execute
multiplications between two private data. The privacy threat increases if the recommender
server colludes with the decryption server by sending the ciphertexts for decryption. Kikuchi
et al. [95] also proposed a cryptographic protocol for user-based CF where they also addressed
the problem of multiplying two private data while generating recommendations. However,
according to their protocol, users have to provide additional ciphertexts which increases the
complexity into O(n2) by each user. Tada et al. [96] proved that the cost for generating recom-
mendation can be reduced by using item-based similarity instead of user-based. Therefore, the
issue with scalability in the recommender system was handled in their proposed work where
privacy was preserved using Paillier cryptosystem .
2.3.2 Related Work for Privacy Preserving Context Aware
Recommendation System
In this section we present the related work on privacy preserving context aware recommendation
system. More specifically our related work in this section is specifically related with our main
contribution which is location aware web service recommendations and friendship aware new
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place recommendations (related with research question RQ3 ).
2.3.2.1 Privacy Preserving Location Aware Web Service Recommendaion
In this section, we discuss and analyze the existing approaches for Web service recommen-
dations, privacy issues in the area of service computing and privacy preserving Web service
recommendations.
Substantial research has been done to recommend the right web service to users based
on their personal preferences or previous experiences. Each study has used different types
of techniques to improve their performances or scalability in-terms of generating Web service
recommendations. For example [131, 132] used Content-based Filtering to find similarities
among the features of Web services. Based on those similar features, the system is able to find
suitable Web services for active users. On the other hand, [133, 134, 135] used Collaborative
Filtering-based approaches for Web service recommendations due to their simplicity and effec-
tiveness. [133] used user-based CF whereas [134, 135] used hybrid approaches by combining
user and item-based CF. To improve the accuracy of CF-based Web service recommendations,
[136, 137] proposed Matrix Factorization-based approaches to predict the missing QoS values
in a user-Web service matrix.
Recent studies [138, 139, 140] have identified that the locations of users and Web services
are also crucial in-terms of generating more accurate and meaningful recommendations. The
[140] proposed a hybrid CF-based method to recommend Web services. In their method, they
grouped the users and Web services based on their IP addresses, AS (Id of Autonomous System)
and countries to group the users and Web services and QoS-based similarities were identified
among these groups to provide more accurate recommendations. The [138] extended previous
work by adding personalized deviation of QoS in-terms of Web services and users while com-
puting the similarities between different users and different Web services. The [139] proposed
another location-aware Web service recommendations using hybrid CF-based approach where
they clustered the users and Web services based on their locations and QoS values. Finally, the
method maps the active user to a user region based on historical QoS and user location, and
predicts the missing QoS values for candidate Web services. Compared to these location-aware
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Web service recommendations, our approach filters the users based on their actual locations
(latitude and longitude). Moreover we present the privacy preserving approach of computing
the distances and filtering users to those who are near the active user.
Several studies have examined the privacy issues in the area of service computing since
users information has to be shared across the service providers to get the services. However,
most of this research considered Web service selection and compositions. The [141] presented
a privacy-conscious composite service where a consumer provides data to a service provider
and the user wants to ensure that the information provided will be used in a manner that
is consistent with the user’s privacy preferences. The [142] proposed a privacy preserving
framework for service matching according to users search queries. They proposed to use public
key encryption techniques to match the search criteria and the Web service attributes in a
privacy preserving fashion. In [143], the authors proposed a privacy formal model in order to
extend DaaS (Data as a Service) descriptions with privacy capabilities. The privacy model
allows a service to define a privacy policy and a set of privacy requirements. The authors
extended their privacy preserving web service composition framework in [144], which deals
with privacy not only at the data level (i.e. inputs and outputs) but also at the service level
(i.e. service invocation). In [145], privacy-aware access control model was proposed in Web
service environments to manage a valid access process through a trust-based decision and
ongoing access control policies. The privacy requirements were improved later in [146]. The
privacy preserving Web service recommendations were studied in [147] for the first time where
the QoS values were obfuscated before submitting them to service providers. Due to the noise,
the service providers are not able to identify accurate information. However, they are still able
to predict the missing QoS values and recommend a suitable Web service to users.
Motivating from above studies in the area of location aware Web service recommendation,
the privacy issues in service computing i.e., especially in Web service recommendations and
finally privacy preserving CF [106, 110, 108, 116, 148], we propose a new framework to preserve
users’ privacy in location aware Web service Recommendations.
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2.3.2.2 Privacy Preserving Social Network based Location Recommendation
In this section we discuss the literature on different privacy preserving location based services.
The existing works can be divided into three main categories: Spatial and temporal cloak-
ing, location transformation and private information retrieval (PIR), which actually preserves
users’ location privacy. However, these approaches do not specifically target any social appli-
cations. In spatial and temporal cloaking [149, 150, 151, 152, 153] the locations is preserved by
sending an approximate location and time to the server instead of the exact values. The main
drawback is that it hurts the accuracy and timeliness of the responses from the server, and
most importantly, there are several simple attacks on these mechanisms [154, 155, 156, 157]
that can still break user privacy. Pseudonyms and silent times [158, 159] are other mechanisms
which can achieve cloaking, where in device identifiers are changed frequently, and data are not
transmitted for long periods at regular intervals. However, this approach affects functionality
and disconnects users. The second category is location transformation, which uses transformed
location coordinates to preserve user location privacy. One subtle issue in processing nearest-
neighbor queries with this approach is to accurately find all the real neighbors. To find real
neighbors, this work keeps the proximity of transformed locations to actual locations and incre-
mentally processes nearest-neighbor queries [160], or requires trusted third parties to perform
location transformation between clients and LBSA servers. PIR [161] allows a user to retrieve
a record from a database server without revealing which record he is retrieving. PIR-based
protocols [162, 163, 164] are proposed for mainly POI queries. The approaches proposed by
[162, 163] are based on homomorphic encryption [113] while the technique of Paulet et al. is
based on oblivious transfer [165]. In another approach, trusted hardware was employed to
perform PIR for LBS queries [166].
The main similarity between our proposed work and existing techniques is preserving users’
privacy in location based services and the key difference is that we focus on social application
which is generating location recommendation while preserving users’ privacy. However, in this
work we do not take users’ location into account while generating location recommendations.
We leave that for future work.
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2.3.3 Related Work on Partitioned Dataset based Recommendation
The partitioned data-based computation with privacy is a more challenging problem, which
has been addressed by several researches. In many cases, data collected for CF purposes
might be partitioned between various parties, even competing companies. Since distributed
computations are needed by many companies to overcome the cold start problem while pre-
serving their privacy, various PPCF schemes on partitioned data have been proposed. Polat
and Du [85] present a scheme for binary ratings-based top-N recommendation on partitioned
data (horizontally or vertically) between two parties. Their scheme can offer partitioned data-
based referrals on binary ratings without disclosing confidential data to collaborating vendors.
Berkovsky et al. [167] investigate how a decentralized approach to users profiles storage might
mitigate some of the privacy concerns of CF. Kaleli and Polat [168] introduce a solution for two
different data owners for integrating their split data in order to produce NBC-based recommen-
dations without jeopardizing their privacy. They assume that data are partitioned horizontally
or vertically. Their approach is based on binary votes rather than numerical ratings. Lathia et
al. [169] propose a new measure of similarity, which can be calculated without breaking users
privacy over a distributed environment. Their new method works by estimating the number
of concordant, discordant, and tied pairs of ratings between any two users. Kaleli and Polat
[63] introduce a solution for producing SOM-based recommendations on Vertically Distributed
Data (VDD) among multiple parties. Later they proposed another privacy-preserving scheme
[121] to provide recommendations on horizontally partitioned data among multiple parties. In
order to improve online performance, the parties cluster their distributed data off-line without
greatly jeopardizing their secrecy. They then estimate predictions using k-nearest neighbor
approach while preserving their privacy.
Yakut et al. proposed two privacy-preserving recommendation framework for arbitrary par-
titioned datasets [72, 101]. In their techniques user information was made secure by masking
the ratings and recommendations were generated on the masked data. Recommendations were
generated using Self Organizing Map (SOM) and Nave Bayes Classifier (NBC), in two differ-
ent researches, respectively. Privacy-preserving WSOP was proposed for both horizontally and
vertically partitioned datasets by [170, 170]. However, [170] showed that they need all organi-
Related Work 47
zations to actively communicate among each other. As a result, to generate recommendations
for one user, all other organizations must come online and collaborate. Moreover, the organi-
zations send their ciphertexts to other organizations serially and this continues until the last
organization receives. Problem arises when the number of organizations increases. The main
reason behind this collaboration is that item deviation and cardinality require secure multipli-
cation of two private data. Using Paillier encryption scheme, this multiplication scheme can
be achieved by raising one plaintext m1 to the power of ciphertexts E(m2) as E(m2)
m1 , which
results m1×m2 in plaintexts. Note that since one data has to be in plaintexts, one organization
receives the ciphertexts and raises its plaintexts to the power of senders ciphertexts. Therefore,
collaboration was necessary for them to achieve multiplication. In another (Basu et al. 2011b)
they showed that each of the two ratings ra and rb can be shared among two parties where
ra = za1 + za2 and rb = zb1 + zb2. To achieve ra − rb the parties exchange the shares so that
they can compute za1 − zb1 + za2 − zb2 = ra − rb. It has been claimed that the ratings can
be shared among k sites, however, the communication overhead increases significantly if k is
large.
Chapter 3
Privacy Preserving Item-based
Recommendation System
As discussed in Chapter 1, the main challenge is preserving users’ privacy while generating the
recommendations. One of the main steps of generating recommendations is computing simi-
larity among the items, then performing the prediction on missing ratings. The homomorphic
based solutions have been useful in performing certain computations while the information
are encrypted. So in this chapter’s contribution, a privacy preserving protocol for similarity
computation and rating prediction are developed based on ElGamal cryptosystem. The reason
behind of using ElGamal cryptosystem is that, it has the distributed properties and users can
share the secret keys among themselves which eliminates the dependency on central server to
hold the secret keys.
More specifically in this chapter we present privacy preserving protocol for item based
recommendations where we also present privacy preserving item similarity computation and
average computation without disclosing any private information. As part of predicting missing
ratings, we present two different protocols for recommendations: weighted sum and adjusted
weighted sum approach.
This Chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 presents the motivation and contribution
of this chapter. Section 3.2 presents the privacy preserving protocol for item based recommen-
dation system where the subsection 3.2.1 presents the privacy preserving average and similarity
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Figure 3.1: Traditional recommender system and its possible security concerns.
computations and section 3.2.2 presents recommendation protocols using both weighted sum
and adjusted weighted sum based approaches. Section 3.3 discusses the privacy analysis of our
proposed method to analyze how the privacy is achieved and up to what extend the privacy
was leaked for the sake of recommendation accuracy. Section 3.4 discusses the performance
of our proposed protocol tested on real world datasets and finally Section 3.5 concludes the
chapter.
3.1 Motivation and Contribution
Recommender systems [29] provide meaningful and useful recommendations to users by mak-
ing use of explicit and implicit information about user preferences. Recommendations are also
often based on the degree of similarity between the active user and all other users, or one
particular item that the user has rated and all other items. The items can be of any type:
books, movies, web pages, restaurants, sightseeing places, online news, and even lifestyles. By
collecting information about users preferences for different items, a recommender system cre-
ates their profiles. These preferences can help the recommender system to predict other items
that might also be of interest to the user in the future. The techniques of weighted sum and ad-
justed weighted sum based approaches [7] are the most commonly used techniques that generate
recommendations for users based on their preferences. In order to run the process of recom-
mendations, users’ profiles must be available to the recommender server (or service providers).
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Therefore, there are risks that such information is leaked to malicious parties which can lead to
severe damage to the user’s privacy (e.g. exposure or generating false recommendations)[171].
Figure 3.1 shows the general architecture of a conventional recommender system and possible
ways in which privacy breaches can occur. It is thus crucial to adequately protect privacy of
information managed by recommender systems.
Our Contributions: In this chapter, we propose a new privacy preserving item based
recommender system, which allows the computations required for recommendations in a dis-
tributed manner and preserves user privacy without compromising recommendation accuracy
and efficiency. We introduce the privacy protocol based on ElGamal encryption which is
based on public key cryptosystem. The main advantage of this cryptosystem is that, it is
semantically secure and allows certain types of computations on the ciphertexts. We assume a
semi-trusted server named recommender server whose task is to perform the computations for
recommendation on encrypted data. We propose different privacy protocols for item average
and similarity computations as well as recommendations generations by which the privacy of
users are preserved. Specifically our main contributions are:
1. An efficient privacy preserving item-based recommender system to protect user privacy
during recommendation process.
2. Privacy preserving item average and similarity computation protocols to calculate av-
erages and similarities among the items without compromising user ratings. Moreover,
which items have been rated are also hidden during these processes.
3. Two different types of solutions to generate recommendations securely: weighted sum
and adjusted weighted sum based recommendations using item-item similarity.
In summary, our proposed model is able to work as follows:
• Firstly, all users participate to compute average ratings of items. Users encrypt their
rating as well as flag information to hide which items are actually rated. Specifically,
users encrypt all ratings including zeros and send the ciphertexts to the server. The
server computes averages using homomorphic properties and all users jointly decrypt the
results.
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Table 3.1: Notations.
E Encryption
(A,B) Ciphertexts
r Random number
G Cyclic group
g Group generator
y Individual public key
Y Common public key
x Individual secret key
ri,j Rating given by user i on item j
Rj Average rating of item j
M (a) ath Message
ui i
th user
ij j
th item
n Total number of users
m Total number of items
s(ij , ik) Similarity between item Ij and ik
Ci Decryption
di Results after discrete logarithm
P Rating prediction
e Modular exponentiation
div Division
mul Multiplication
l Size of the message
fi,j Flags of ratings ri,j
• Secondly, to calculate the similarity among the items, all users locally perform certain
computations and encrypt them. The server computes similarity among the items se-
curely and allows all users to decrypt the results without revealing any private informa-
tion.
• Finally, based on average ratings, similarities and target user’s encrypted rating infor-
mation, the “recommender server” computes recommendation scores homomorphically.
The target user decrypts these ciphertexts using own private key and chooses highest
recommended item from the results.
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Figure 3.2: Framework of proposed privacy preserving recommender system, divided into two
phases: (a) Average and similarity computation, all users participate and send the ciphertexts
of their ratings to the server. Server performs homomorphic operation to calculate average
and similarity, thereby stores the results in its own database (b) Recommendations generation,
only one user participates and send the ciphertexts of own ratings. The server computes the
recommendation using homomorphic properties and send the ciphertexts to the user, then
decrypts the ciphertexts using own private key.
3.2 Proposed Privacy Preserving Item based Recommender
System
According to Figure 3.2 our proposed scheme is mainly divided into two phases. Firstly, we
provide privacy-preserving item average computation and privacy preserving similarity compu-
tation as shown in Figure 3.2(a). Secondly, we represent privacy-preserving recommendations
generation as shown in Figure 3.2(b). In the first phase, users encrypt their ratings and send
the ciphertexts to the server. Server computes the averages as well as similarity among the
items using homomorphic properties and all users collaborate to decrypt these ciphertexts.
Afterwards, the similarity and averages are stored in server’s database. According to Fig-
ure 3.2(b) only one user participates to get recommendations (‘target user’) and sends the
ciphertexts of his item preferences to the server. The server computes recommendation scores
homomorphically and sends the resultant ciphertexts to the user. The target user finally de-
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crypts the ciphertexts using own private key. Two types of secure recommendation scores
generation are shown: (1) weighted sum based rating prediction and (2) adjusted weighted
sum based prediction. Table 3.1 shows the mathematical notations and symbols used in later
sections.
3.2.1 Privacy Preserving Average and Similarity Computations
Settings: Let a rating matrix consists of n users who have provided ratings on m items
where each user and item is denoted as ui and ij respectively. The rating is denoted by ri,j
meaning the user ui has given a rating on item ij . We also assume that there is a secure
channel established between the users and server to exchange any secret messages securely. To
compute averages and similarity among the items securely, the server generates a cyclic group
G, of large prime order q with generator g. Each user ui randomly chooses secret key xi where
i = {1, 2, ..., n} and xi ∈ {1, ..., q − 1}. The public key is calculated by user ui as
yi = g
xi (3.1)
Next, all users send their public keys y1, ..., yi, ..., yn to the server. For n users, the server
calculates a common public key Y and broadcast it to all users to encrypt their ratings.
Y = y1 · y2 · ... · yn =
n∏
i=1
yi = g
∑n
i=1 xi (3.2)
3.2.1.1 Average Computation
Let the users denoted as ui = {u1, u2, ..., un} have participated with the server and encrypt
their ratings ri,j as well as flags fi,j (1, if there is a rating, 0 otherwise) using common public
key Y . The server computes averages of items homomorphically and the results are decrypted
by collaboration of all users. The detailed steps are described below.
Step 1:
For all items ij = i1, i2..., im each user ui encrypts their ratings and flags as E(g
ri,j ) and E(gfi,j )
respectively. Then they create the message M
(1)
i as shown below, containing ciphertexts of
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their ratings and flags, which are sent to the server (note that, all users locally compute gm
where, m denotes any message, using ElGamal encryption and gm is within the cyclic group
G (gm ∈ G).).
M
(1)
i = {E(gri,j ), E(gfi,j )}(j=1,2,...,m) (3.3)
where, i = {1, 2, ..., n}. ri,j denotes a rating provided by user ui on item ij and flag fi,j = 1 if
there is any rating otherwise fi,j = 0.
Step 2:
Using homomorphic property, the server computes the addition of the ratings and flags as
(A1,j , B1,j) =
n∏
i=1
E(gri,j ) (3.4)
(A2,j , B2,j) =
n∏
i=1
E(gfi,j ) (3.5)
where, (A1,j , B1,j) and (A2,j , B2,j) denote the ciphertexts of ratings and flags respectively. To
decrypt these ciphertexts, server broadcasts A1,j and A2,j to all users by
M (2) = {A1,j , A2,j}(j=1,2,...,m)
Step 3:
For all users ui = {u1, u2..., un}, they compute as follows using own private keys and send the
following message to the server.
M
(3)
i = {(A1,j)xi , (A2,j)xi}(j=1,2,...,m) (3.6)
Step 4:
The server decrypts the ciphertexts from Eq. 3.4 and Eq. 3.5 by
C1,j =
B1,j∏n
i=1(A1,j)
xi
(3.7)
C2,j =
B2,j∏n
i=1(A2,j)
xi
(3.8)
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Finally, the sum of the ratings and flags are computed by the server as
d
(1)
j = loggC1,j (3.9)
d
(2)
j = loggC2,j (3.10)
where, d
(1)
j and d
(2)
j denote the sum of ratings and the sum of 1’s (flags) of item ij respectively.
Therefore, the average rating of item ij is calculated as follows.
Rj =
d
(1)
j
d
(2)
j
(3.11)
Remark: Since all users jointly decrypt the sum of ratings for each item as well as the number
of users who have actually rated on that item, the server or any users pose no threats to any
user’s private key, personal ratings and flags. Recall that, the server is semi-honest and does
not disclose d
(1)
j , d
(2)
j and Rj to anyone.
Theorem 1. If all users and server follow the protocol, we have d
(1)
j =
∑n
i=1 ri,j, d
(2)
j =∑n
i=1 fi,j.
Proof. From Eq. 3.4, the server computes the ciphertexts homomorphically as,
(A1,j , B1,j) =
n∏
i=1
E(gri,j ) = E(g
∑n
i=1 ri,j ) (3.12)
Using homomorphic property, server decrypts the above ciphertexts as follows.
C1,j =
B1,j∏n
i=1(A1,j)
xi
=
gr1,j+···+rn,j · Y r1+···+rn
(gr1+···+rn)x1+···+xn
=
gr1,j+···+rn,j · (y1 · ... · yn)r1+···+rn
(gr1+···+rn)x1+···+xn
=
gr1,j+···+rn,j · (gx1 · ... · gxn)r1+···+rn
(gr1+···+rn)x1+···+xn
=
gr1,j+···+rn,j · (gx1+···+xn)r1+···+rn
(gr1+···+rn)x1+···+xn
= gr1,j+···+rn,j = g
∑n
i=1 ri,j
(3.13)
To get
∑n
i=1 ri,j , the server computes discrete logarithm as
d
(1)
j = loggC1,j = loggg
∑n
i=1 ri,j =
n∑
i=1
ri,j
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In the same way, we can get
d
(2)
j = loggC2,j = loggg
∑n
i=1 fi,j =
n∑
i=1
fi,j
Remark:The value of
∑n
i=1 ri,j and
∑n
i=1 fi,j is not large, therefore computing discrete loga-
rithm is not hard.
3.2.1.2 Similarity Computation
To calculate similarity among the items s(ij , ik) where, ij and ik represent two different items,
we use cosine similarity measure as shown in Eq. 2.10. Similar to the average computation, this
protocol is also based on homomorphic properties of public key cryptosystem. According to the
protocol each user ui, where i = {1, 2, ..., n} locally computes pairwise multiplication ri,j · ri,k
and square r2i,j of their preferences. Then they encrypt these results using common public
key Y and send them to the server. Afterwards, the server performs similarity computation
homomorphically and allows all users to decrypt the results. The detailed steps are described
as follows.
Step 1:
To calculate the similarity among the items, all users ui, where ui = u1, u2, ..., un, locally
computes gri,j ·ri,k and gr
2
i,j , and sends the message M
(4)
i containing these ciphertexts as shown
below.
M
(4)
i = {E(gri,j ·ri,k), E(gr
2
i,j )}(j,k=1,2,...,m;k≥j) (3.14)
where, i = {1, 2, ..., n}. ri,j · ri,k and r2i,j represent pairwise multiplications of two different
items’ ratings ij and ik, square of each individual ratings on each item by user ui.
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Step 2:
The homomorphic product of the ciphertexts which are received by the server is computed as
follows.
(Aj,k, Bj,k) =
n∏
i=1
E(gri,j ·ri,k) (3.15)
(Aj , Bj) =
n∏
i=1
E(gr
2
i,j ) (3.16)
where, j, k = {1, 2, ...,m} and k ≥ j.
The server generates the message M (5) as shown below and broadcasts to all users for decryp-
tion.
M (5) = {Aj,k, Aj}(j,k=1,2,...,m;k≥j)
Step 3:
After receiving the message M (5), all users ui = {u1, u2, ..., un} create new messages M (6)i as
shown below using their individual private key xi.
M
(6)
i = {(Aj,k)xi , (Aj)xi}(j,k=1,2,...,m;k≥j) (3.17)
where i = {1, 2, ..., n}. The message M (6)i is sent back to the server.
Step 4:
Once the above message is received by the server, it starts to decrypt the ciphertexts of Eq.
3.15 and Eq. 3.16 as follows.
C3,j,k =
Bj,k∏n
i=1(Aj,k)
xi
(3.18)
C4,j =
Bj∏n
i=1(Aj)
xi
(3.19)
The server finally determine the plaintexts by computing discrete logarithm as,
d
(3)
jk = loggC3,j,k (3.20)
Proposed Privacy Preserving Item based Recommender System 58
d
(4)
j = loggC4,j (3.21)
where, j, k = {1, 2, ...,m} and k ≥ j. d(3)jk and d(4)j are represented as decryption of pairwise
product and square of ratings respectively.
After extracting the plaintexts from above equations, the server computes the similarity be-
tween two items ij and ik using Eq. 2.10 as follows.
s(ij , ik) =
d
(3)
jk√
d
(4)
j ·
√
d
(5)
k
(3.22)
where, similar to the d
(4)
j , d
(5)
k is also calculated for item ik. Thus the server generates m×m
item similarity matrix and stores it in the database. Note that, since the server is semi-honest,
it does not disclose any result from this computation.
Theorem 2. If all users and server follow the protocol, we have d
(3)
jk = g
∑n
i=1 ri,j ·ri,k and
d
(4)
j = g
∑n
i=1 r
2
i,j
Proof. From Eq. 3.15 the server computes the ciphertexts using homomorphic property as
(Aj,k, Bj,k) =
n∏
i=1
E(gri,j ·ri,k) = E(g
∑n
i=1 ri,j ·ri,k) (3.23)
Therefore from Eq. 3.18 the server decrypts the similarity by
C3,j,k =
Bj,k∏n
i=1(Aj,k)
xi
=
gr1,j ·r1,k+···+rn,j ·rn,k · Y r1+···+rn
(gr1+···+rn)x1+···+xn
=
gr1,j ·r1,k+···+rn,j ·rn,k · (y1 · ... · yn)r1+···+rn
(gr1+···+rn)x1+···+xn
=
gr1,j ·r1,k+···+rn,j ·rn,k · (gx1 · ... · gxn)r1+···+rn
(gr1+···+rn)x1+···+xn
=
gr1,j ·r1,k+···+rn,j ·rn,k · (gx1+···+xn)r1+···+rn
(gr1+···+rn)x1+···+xn
= gr1,j ·r1,k+···+rn,j ·rn,k
= g
∑n
i=1 ri,j ·ri,k
(3.24)
To find the result of
∑n
i=1 ri,j · ri,k, the server computes discrete logarithm as follows.
d
(3)
jk = loggC3,j,k = loggg
∑n
i=1 ri,j ·ri,k =
n∑
i=1
ri,j · ri,k 
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Similarly for all items ij = {i1, ..., im} we can prove d(4)j =
∑n
i=1 r
2
i,j .
3.2.2 Proposed Privacy Preserving Recommendation Generation
We provide two types of solutions for generating recommendations privately using weighted
sum and adjusted weighted sum based approach. Let the target user ui has requested the list of
recommendations for all items and sends his item preferences to the server. The server generates
ciphertexts of recommendation scores homomorphically for all items. The target user finally
decrypts these cipheretxts using own private key xi and thus gets the list of recommendations
for all items.
Settings: To generate the recommendations, we assume there is only one user ui (this could
be a new user or from the set of n users, given that he has provided ratings on same set of m
items) who has requested for recommendations. The user ui holds the public key yi to encrypt
the ratings and private key xi to decrypt the ciphertexts. The server holds item-item similarity
s(ij , ik) and averages of items’ ratings Rj where, j = {1, 2, ...,m}.1
3.2.2.1 Privacy Preserving Weighted Sum based Rating Prediction
To generate weighted sum-based recommendations, the protocol is divided into three main
steps. Firstly, the target user encrypts his personal rating vector and sends the ciphertexts to
server. Secondly, the server performs homomorphic operations and encryption to generate the
ciphertexts of numerator and denominator of Eq. 2.11 respectively. Finally, the user receives
these ciphertexts from server and decrypts them to determine recommendation scores. The
detailed steps are described below.
1While in the both recommendation processes users’ personal ratings and recommendations are privacy
sensitive, the item-item similarity matrix and averages are commercially valuable to the server. These informa-
tion can not be made public or sent to the user to generate recommendations since this will affect the service
provider’s business.
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Step 1:
For all items, where ij = i1, i2, ..., im, the target user ui encrypts his ratings
2 using the indi-
vidual public key yi and sends the message M
(7)
i containing these ciphertexts as follows.
M
(7)
i = {E(gri,j )}j=1,2,...,m
Step 2:
1. After receiving message M
(7)
i , the server performs homomorphic operation to generate
ciphertexts (numerator of Eq. 2.11) by
(A2,k, B2,k) =
m∏
j=1
E(gri,j )s(ik,ij) (3.25)
where, k = 1, 2, ...,m.
2. For all items j = {1, 2, ...,m} the server locally computes the encryption of ∑mj=1 s(ik, ij)
(denominator of Eq. 2.11) using target user ui’s public key yi (recall that similarity
among the items are already stored in server’s database). Firstly, server locally computes
g
∑m
j=1 s(ik,ij) and encrypts them as
(A3,k, B3,k) = E(g
∑m
j=1 s(ik,ij)) (3.26)
The server sends the message M (8) containing these ciphertexts to user ui as follows.
M (8) = {(A2,k, B2,k), (A3,k, B3,k)}k=1,2,...,m
Step 3:
For all k = 1, 2, ...,m, using target user’s private key xi, these ciphertexts are decrypted by
C4,k =
B2,k
(A2,k)xi
(3.27)
C5,k =
B3,k
(A3,k)xi
(3.28)
2Target user encrypts 0s while there is no rating and each of the ratings is multiplied by 100 since the
similarities and averages are multiplied by 100 by the server to cope with homomorphic operations using ElGamal
cryptosystem
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Finally the user ui computes discrete logarithm to derive the results as
d
(6)
k = loggC4,k (3.29)
d
(7)
k = loggC5,k (3.30)
Therefore the target user ui determine the recommendation by
Pi,k =
d
(6)
k
d
(7)
k
(3.31)
where, Pi,k denotes the predicted recommendation on item ik where k = 1, 2, ...,m and the
item with highest prediction is finally recommended to the user.
Theorem 3. If all users and server follow the protocol, we have d
(6)
k = g
∑m
j=1 ri,j ·s(k,j) and
d
(7)
k =
∑m
j=1 s(ik, ij).
Proof. From Eq. 3.18, the server homomorphically computes the ciphertexts by
(A2,k, B2,k) =
m∏
j=1
E(gri,j )s(k,j) = E(g
∑m
j=1 ri,js(ik,ij)) (3.32)
Using Eq. 3.27, user ui decrypts the cipheretxts using his private key xi as follows.
C4,k =
A2,k
(B2,k)xi
=
g
∑m
j=1 ri,js(ik,ij) · (gxi)
∑m
j=1 ris(ik,ij)
(g
∑m
j=1 ris(ik,ij))xi
= g
∑m
j=1 ri,js(ik,ij)
(3.33)
To get the value of
∑m
j=1 ri,js(ik, ij) , the user computes discrete logarithm as
d
(6)
k = loggC4,k = loggg
∑m
j=1 ri,js(ik,ij) =
m∑
j=1
ri,js(ik, ij) 
Similarly, we can prove d
(7)
k =
∑m
j=1 s(ik, ij) .
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3.2.2.2 Privacy Preserving Adjusted Weighted Sum-based Rating Prediction
Similar to the weighted sum-based recommendation process, the proposed private adjusted
weighted sum-based method3 also works in three main steps, which include sending target
user’s ratings to server, performing homomorphic operations as well as encryption by the
server and finally, determining the final recommendations by the target user. The detailed
steps are as follows.
Step 1:
For all items ij = i1, i2, ..., im, the target user ui encrypts his ratings and sends message M
(9)
i
as
M
(9)
i = {E(gri,j )}j=1,2,...,m
Step 2:
In this step4, server computes the ciphertexts of numerator and denominator of Eq. 2.12
homomorphically and sends them to target user.
1. Firstly, the server encrypts Rk ·
∑m
j=1 s(ik, ij)+
∑m
j=1(ri,j−Rj)·s(ik, ij) (numerator of Eq.
(3)). Before performing homomorphic operations, it locally computes gRk·
∑m
j=1 s(ik,ij),
gRj and encrypts them as E(gRk·
∑m
j=1 s(ik,ij)) and E(gRj ). Finally, the ciphertexts of
numerator are generated by the server homomorphically as
(A4,k, B4,k) = E(g
Rk·
∑m
j=1 s(ik,ij)) · (
m∏
j=1
(E(gri,j )/E(gRj ))s(ik,ij)) (3.34)
where, k = 1, 2, ...,m.
2. Secondly, to generate the ciphertexts of denominator, server locally computes g
∑m
j=1 s(ik,ij)
and encrypts them by
(A5,k, B5,k) = E(g
∑m
j=1 s(ik,ij)) (3.35)
3Note that, unlike the weighted sum, adjusted weighted sum-based method includes one additional step
which is subtracting the item’s average rating from user’s preference on that item
4 The server holds average ratings Rj and similarities among the items s(ik, ij)
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For all items k = {1, 2, ...,m}, the server sends message M (10) containing these ciphertexts to
target user ui as follows.
M (10) = {(A4,k, B4,k), (A5,k, B5,k)}k=1,2,...,m (3.36)
Step 3:
The target user ui receives this message and decrypts the ciphertexts using his own private
key xi by
C6,k =
B4,k
(A4,k)xi
(3.37)
C7,k =
B5,k
(A5,k)xi
(3.38)
User ui computes discrete logarithm to retrieve the results as
d
(8)
k = loggC6,k (3.39)
d
(9)
k = loggC7,k (3.40)
Finally the rating prediction is calculated as follows.
Pi,k =
d
(8)
k
d
(9)
k
(3.41)
where, Pi,k denotes the recommendation for user ui on item ik , where k = {1, 2, ...,m}. Once
the user ui gets the list of recommendations for all items, he chooses the highest recommended
item for him.
Theorem 4. If the target user and the server follow the protocol, we have d
(8)
k = Rk ·∑m
j=1 s(ik, ij) +
∑m
j=1(ri,j −Rj) · s(ik, ij) and d(9)k =
∑m
j=1 s(ik, ij)
Proof. Homomorphically the server computes the ciphertexts from Eq. 3.34 as
(A4,k, B4,k) = E(g
Rk·
∑m
j=1 s(ik,ij)) · (
m∏
j=1
(E(gri,j )/E(gRj ))s(ik,ij))
= E(gRk·
∑m
j=1 s(ik,ij)+
∑m
j=1(ri,j−Rj)·s(ik,ij))
(3.42)
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The target user ui decrypts the cyphertexts using his own private key xi as,
C6,k =
B4,k
(A4,k)xi
=
gRk·
∑m
j=1 s(ik,ij)+
∑m
j=1(ri,j−Rj)·s(ik,ij) · (gxi)ri+
∑m
j=1 ri·s(ik,ij)
(gri+
∑m
j=1 ri·s(ik,ij))xi
= gRk·
∑m
j=1 s(ik,ij)+
∑m
j=1(ri,j−Rj)·s(ik,ij)
(3.43)
To get Rk ·
∑m
j=1 s(ik, ij)+
∑m
j=1(ri,j −Rj)·s(ik, ij), the target user computes discrete logarithm
as
d
(8)
k = loggC6,k = loggg
Rk·
∑m
j=1 s(ik,ij)+
∑m
j=1(ri,j−Rj)·s(ik,ij)
= Rk ·
m∑
j=1
s(ik, ij) +
m∑
j=1
(ri,j −Rj) · s(ik, ij) 
In the same way we can prove d
(9)
k =
∑m
j=1 s(ik, ij).
Remark:The target user may send the indices of items for which he has not provided any
ratings. In this case, the server does not consider those items while computing the ciphertexts
of recommendations.
3.2.3 Numerical Examples of Proposed Method
To describe the processes of proposed privacy preserving average computation, item-item simi-
larity calculation and recommendations generation clearly, we provide numerical examples with
small 3× 4 matrix shown in Table 3. From this table, the users and items are represented as
ui = {u1, u2, u3} and ij = {i1, i2, i3, i4} respectively. The numerical values in this matrix are
denoted as ratings, given by the users on different items. Before starting these processes, the
server generates a cyclic group G, of a large prime order q with generator g. Users ui where
i = 1, 2, 3, randomly choose their secret keys xi, where xi ∈ {1, ..., q − 1} and calculate public
keys as yi = g
xi . In below, the detailed processes with numerical example are shown.
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Table 3.2: Rating matrix.
ui/ij i1 i2 i3 i4
u1 3 5 0 4
u2 0 1 5 0
u3 2 3 2 4
Rj 2.5 3 3.5 4
3.2.3.1 Average Computation
In this example, we show how to compute average of user ratings on item i1, denoted as R1.
Firstly, users u1, u2 and u3 send their ratings and the flags for item i1 as follows
M
(1)
1 = {E(g3), E(g1)}
M
(1)
2 = {E(g0), E(g0)}
M
(1)
3 = {E(g2), E(g1)}
Once the server receives these messages of ratings and flags, it starts to compute products of
the ciphertexts (sum of the ratings in plaintexts) by following.
(A1,1, B1,1) = E(g
3) · E(g0) · E(g2) = E(g5)
and products of the ciphertexts of flags as
(A2,1, B2,1) = E(g
1) · E(g0) · E(g1) = E(g2)
The server broadcasts the message M (2) containing a portion of the ciphertexts for all items
to all users by
M (2) = {A1,1, A2,1}
Users create the message M
(3)
i and send them to server as follows
M
(3)
i=1,2,3 = {(A1,1)xi , (A2,1)xi}
where i = 1, 2, 3.
Finally the server decrypts the ciphertexts of ratings and flags as
C1,1 =
B1,1∏3
i=1(A1,1)
xi
= g5
Proposed Privacy Preserving Item based Recommender System 66
C2,1 =
B2,1∏3
i=1(A2,1)
xi
= g2
Using discrete logarithm, the plaintexts of ratings and flags can be determined respectively as
d
(1)
1 = loggg
5 and d
(2)
1 = loggg
2. Therefore the average of item i1 is computed by
R1 =
5
2
= 2.5
Similarly, the averages are calculated for all other items as
R2 =
9
3
= 3, R3 =
7
2
= 3.5, R4 =
8
2
= 4
As ElGamal cryptosystem can not handle fraction number, the server multiplies every plain-
texts by 100. The average ratings of all items are shown in Table 3.2.
3.2.3.2 Similarity Calculation
In this example, we show how to compute similarity between item i1 and i2 securely. Firstly, all
users compute product of pairwise ratings and square of each individual rating locally, thereby
encrypt the results. For instance, all users send the message M
(4)
i containing the ciphertexts
for item i1 and i2 to the server as follows.
M
(4)
1 = {E(g3·5), E(g3
2
), E(g5
2
)}
M
(4)
2 = {E(g0·1), E(g0
2
), E(g1
2
)}
M
(4)
3 = {E(g2·3), E(g2
2
), E(g3
2
)}
Once these ciphertexts are received by the server, it computes new cipheretxts of similarity
between item i1 and i2 homomorphically as
(A1,2, B1,2) = E(g
3.5) · E(g0.1) · E(g2.3) = E(g21)
(A1, B1) = E(g
32) · E(g02) · E(g22) = E(g13)
(A2, B2) = E(g
52) · E(g12) · E(g32) = E(g35)
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where, (A1,2, B1,2) represent the numerator and, (A1, B1) and (A2, B2) represent denominator
of Eq. 2.10(similarity calculation). Similarly, the server computes similarities between other
pairs of items and sends a portion of these ciphertexts to all users as
M (5) = {A1,2, A1, A2}
All users collaborate to decrypt the ciphertexts send the message M
(6)
i to server by
M
(6)
i=1,2,3 = {(A1,2)xi , (A1)xi , (A2)xi}
where, xi represents private key of each user and i = 1, 2, 3. The server decrypts above
ciphertexts of similarities between item i1 and i2 as
C3,1,2 =
B1,2
(
∏3
i=1A1,2)
xi
= g21
C3,1 =
B1
(
∏3
i=1A1)
xi
= g13
C3,2 =
B2
(
∏3
i=1A2)
xi
= g35
Using discrete logarithm, the final results are derived as, d
(3)
1,2 = loggg
21 = 21. d
(4)
1 = loggg
13 =
13 and d
(5)
2 = loggg
35 = 35 . Finally, the similarity between items i1 and i2 is computed by the
server as follows.
s(i1, i2) =
21√
13 · √35 = 0.99
Thus the similarities among other items are calculated and the resultant matrix is stored by
the server. The range of the similarity between two items is −1 to 1, where they denote most
dissimilarity and most similarity respectively. The similarities among all items are shown in
Table 3.3, where each similarity is multiplied by 100 to cope with homomoprhic properties of
ElGamal encryption.
3.2.3.3 Recommendation Generation
We assume that user u2 (target user) has requested for recommendations over all items and
sent his encrypted ratings to the server (user multiplies his rating with 100 before sending
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Table 3.3: Similarity among the items.
i1 i2 i3 i4
i1 100 99 20 98
i2 100 35 95
i3 100 26
i4 100
the ciphertexts of ratings). In both types of recommendations, the server generates two dif-
ferent ciphertexts separately (numerator and denominator of Eq. 2.11 and 2.12) and repeats
the process for all items. Finally the target user decrypts the results and chooses the item
with highest recommendation score. The solutions to generate recommendations securely are
described numerically in below.
Weighted Sum based Recommendation
For instance, we show the process of private recommendation generation for user u2 on item
i1. Firstly, user u2 sends the message M
(7)
2 containing the ciphertexts of his ratings as follows.
M
(7)
2 = {E(g0), E(g100), E(g500), E(g0)}
The server homomorphically computes the ciphertexts (numerator and denominator of Eq.
2.11 respectively) as
(A2,1, B2,1) = E(g
100)s(i1,i2) · E(g500)s(i1,i3) · E(g0)sim(i1,i4)
= E(g100)99 · E(g500)20 · E(g0)98 = E(g19900)
(A3,1, B3,1) = E(g
s(i1,i2)+s(i1,i3)+s(i1,i4))
= E(g99+20+98) = E(g217)
Server sends the message M (8) of these ciphertexts to target user u2 by
M (8) = {(A2,k, B2,k), (A3,k, B3,k)}
User u2 locally decrypts the results using his own private key x2 as follows.
C4,1 =
B2,k
(A2,k)x
2 = g
19900
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C5,1 =
B3,k
(A3,k)x
2 = g
217
Using discrete logarithm user u2 locally retrieve the exponent of decryption results as
d
(6)
1 = loggg
19900 = 19900
d
(7)
1 = loggg
217 = 217
Finally the prediction is calculated by
P2,1 =
19900
217
= 91.71⇒ 0.91
Similarly, the predictions for all other items are calculated as P2,2 = 0.76, P2,3 = 0.43 and
P2,4 = 1.08. Since item i4 achieves highest score, it is recommended for user u2. The final
recommendations results are divided by 100 since the user ratings, similarities and averages
were multiplied by 100 to cope with the ElGamal cryptosystem.
Adjusted Weighted Sum based Recommendations
Similar to the previous method the server generates two different ciphertexts for target user
u1 (numerator and denominator of Eq. (3)). Let the server is generating recommendation for
user u1 on item i1. The detailed numerical example is described as follows. Firstly, the target
user u1 sends his encrypted ratings as
M
(9)
2 = {E(g300), E(g500), E(g0), E(g400)}
The server computes the ciphertexts of Eq. (3)’s numerator by
E(g250(99+20+98))
and
(E(g500)/E(g300))99 · ((E(g0)/E(g350))20 · (E(g400)/E(g400))98)
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Now the server computes the final ciphertexts of numerator and denominator homomorphically
as ,
(A3,1, B3,1) = E(g
250(99+20+98)) · ((E(g500)/E(g300))99 · ((E(g0)/E(g350))20 · (E(g400)/E(g400))98)
= E(g54250) · E(g12800)
= E(g67050)
(A4,1, B4,1) = E(g
99+20+98) = E(g217)
The server sends message M (10) to target user u2 as
M (10) = {(A3,1, B3,1), (A4,1, B4,1)}
User u1 receives these ciphertexts and decrypts them using his own secret key x1 by
C6,3 =
B3,1
(A3,1)x1
= g67050
C7,3 =
B4,1
(A4,1)x1
= g217
Therefore, computing discrete logarithm we find d
(8)
1 = loggg
67050 = 67050 and d
(9)
1 = loggg
217 =
217.
Finally, the prediction for user u1 on item i1 is calculated by
P1,1 =
d
(8)
1
d
(9)
1
= 308.98⇒ 3.08
Similarly, we get the predictions of other items for user u1 as P1,2 = 2.68, P1,3 = 4.48 and
P1,4 = 4.67. Since item i4 achieves highest prediction score, it is finally recommended for user
u1.
3.3 Privacy Analysis
We assume our privacy preserving recommender system protocol is based on a semi-trusted
recommender server and multiple users participated in the recommendation system. The proof
that our proposed solutions really fulfill the privacy requirements consist of three main obser-
vations:
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1. Average Computation: To calculate averages ratings of each item, users encrypt their
ratings including flags: 1 if there is any ratings, or 0 otherwise using the common public
key Y . Thus the ratings including which items have been actually rated are secure. All
users jointly decrypt the ciphertexts of total ratings and flags (shown in Eq. 3.7 and 3.8)
without revealing and individual’s ratings. Since the server is semi-trusted, it does not
collude to reveal user ratings.
2. Similarity Calculation: Users first locally compute pairwise products and square of
items’ ratings. Then they encrypt these results using common public key Y and send
to server. Therefore, user ratings are secured. Once the server receives the ciphertexts,
it homomorphically computes the similarities and allows all users to jointly decrypt the
results (Eq. 3.18 and 3.27). Being semi-trusted, the server does not pose any threat to
user ratings.
3. Recommendations Generation:
a) Recommendations using Weighted Sum: To generate recommendations usin this
approach, target user encrypts item preferences using own public key yi and sends
them to the server. The server homomorphically generates ciphertexts of recom-
mendations leveraging the item-item similarity, which is already available to it,
thereby sends the ciphertexts to target user. While generating recommendations,
the similarities among the items are encrypted using target user’s public key yi. The
ciphertexts are decrypted by the user’s own secret key xi. Therefore, during this
process target user’s personal ratings and recommendations results are not revealed
and thus secure.
b) Recommendations using Adjusted Weighted Sum: Similar to the previous method,
this method generates recommendations using ciphertexts of user’s ratings and
items’ similarities except one additional operation: subtracting item’s average from
corresponding item’s rating. In this case, the item’s rating is already encrypted by
the user and average is stored in server in plaintexts format. To overcome this situa-
tion, server encrypts the average rating using target user’s public key yi and performs
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this subtraction homomorphically. Other operations remain same with weighted
sum-based process. Therefore, user’s ratings as well as the recommendation results
are secure during adjusted weighted sum-based recommendations generation.
3.4 Performance Evaluation
3.4.1 Theoretical Analysis
According to our proposed model, the computation and communication costs are calculated by
reference to the number of items and users in the systems. Table 3.4 summarizes the costs to
perform average computation, similarity calculation and recommendation generation by users
and server, where n and m represent the number of users and items respectively. We assume all
users participate to calculate averages and similarities among the items in the system and only
one user (target user) participates in recommendation generation. According to our method,
we also assume that users encrypt their ratings and send the ciphertxts in parallel to the
server, thus the computation cost on user side can be reduced by computing for one user only
(shown in Table 3.5- average and similarity computations for user). On the server side, the
computation and communication costs are represented for all users participating in the system
since they depend on collaboration of all users with server. For the performance measurements
we consider the time required for modular exponentiations and multiplications only which are
denoted as e and mul respectively. We also assume that the communication cost is linear to the
number of ciphertexts sent and received. In our model the size of one ciphertext is considered
as l = 1024 bits.
3.4.2 Performance Analysis
The performance analysis of our proposed model is conducted in two parts. We first analyse
our method in-terms of computation and communication costs which infer the efficiency in
privacy and secondly we analyse the method in-terms of recommendation accuracy. To conduct
the experiment, we use Java 2 SE 8 platform with OS Windows 7, 64 bit and 3.6 GHz-
core i7, 8GB CPU unit. Java cryptographic based libraries are also used for our experiment.
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Table 3.4: Computation and communication cost of the proposed model.
Computations Computation Cost Communication Cost
User Server User Server
Average 4m(e) 2m(n− 1)(mul) 6m(l) bits 6mn(l) bits
Similarity 3(m(m−1)2 +m)(e)
m(m−1)
2 (n− 1)(mul) 3(m(m−1)2 +m)(l) bits 3n(m(m−1)2 +m)(l) bits+m(n− 1)(mul)
Weighted Sum (2m+ 2)(e) 2((m− 1)(mul) + (e)) 2(m+ 2)(l) bits 2(m+ 2)(l) bits
Adjusted Weighted Sum 2m(e) 6(e) +m(mul) 2(m+ 2)(l) bits 2(m+ 2)(l) bits
Table 3.5: Performance of proposed protocol in terms of average, similarity and prediction.
Computations Computation cost Communication cost
User Server User Server
Average 0.6s 2.14s 0.15 Mb 144.84 Mb
Similarity 45.2s 107.92s 7.7 Mb 7.27× 103 Mb
Weighted Sum 0.3s 0.001s 0.05 Mb .05 Mb
Adjusted Weighted Sum 0.3s .005s 0.05 Mb .05 Mb
The proposed method is evaluated using publicly available data provided by GroupLens [172]
which consists of 100,000 ratings, 1982 items provided by 943 users on a scale of 1 to 5. In
our experiments, we choose 200 items and assign 943 users who have rated on those items.
Therefore, the performance analysis of our model consists of 943 users and 200 items. Once the
items’ averages and similarities are calculated, one user (“target user”) is randomly assigned
for recommendations generation.
3.4.2.1 Computation and Communication Costs
The implementation of our proposed method is able to compute one modular exponentiation
(e) and multiplication (mul) in 7.5× 10−4 and 5.7× 10−6 seconds respectively. Table 6 shows
performance results(in seconds) required to perform each individual computation and amount
of data that exchanged between users and the server. From this table it is clear that the
performance of our proposed method is efficient and cost-effective in-terms of both computation
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and communication.
Figure 3.3: Computational cost of average calculation.
Figure 3.4: Computation cost of similarity calculation.
Figure 3.3 shows computational time in-terms of average calculation. The results in this
figure demonstrate that, our proposed privacy preserving average computation takes only 2.7
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Figure 3.5: Computational cost of recommendation generation.
Figure 3.6: Comparison in-terms of total computation cost.
seconds to calculate averages of 200 items where the number of users is 943. This confirms
high efficiency in-terms of average computation. Figure 3.4 represents computational cost
for similarity computations. Figure 3.5 shows the computation time in-terms of weighted
and adjusted weighted sum based recommendations together where both methods are highly
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efficient and take almost equal time to generate recommendations (0.3 seconds for 200 items).
From these analyses we can notice that, the similarity calculation takes higher time compared
to other results since this part includes comparatively large computations5. We assume that
this computation is done only once at the beginning of recommendation process. Therefore, the
computational cost for a similarity calculation does not affect the efficiency of recommendations
generation.
The method is compared against three well known privacy preserving collaborative filtering
algorithms. The first method is a randomized perturbation based method proposed in [173],
by which random noises are injected to users’ ratings to prevent the recommender server from
invading user privacy. Another method is a homomorphic based solution by which authors
used the Paillier cryptosystem to secure user privacy in user based CF algorithm [95]. The
last one is also based on Paillier cryptosystem by same authors where [95] was improved in-
terms of computation and communication costs by introducing privacy preserving item-based
CF algorithm [96]. Figure 3.6 shows the comparison with [173], [95] and [96] in-terms of to-
tal computation time required to perform average, similarity calculation and recommendation
generation (we consider only one type of recommendation; for instance, CF-based recommen-
dation). Note that, [95] and [96] introduced public key based cryptographic protocol and [173]
represented non-cryptographic based solutions to generate recommendations. Therefore, from
Figure 3.6 we can observer that, although our proposed method is based on public key based
cryptosystem, it outperforms other public key based cryptographic solutions to a great ex-
tent. Moreover, it outperforms the non-cryptoprahic based solution as well, which infers high
efficiency by reducing computation overhead.
3.4.2.2 Recommendation Accuracy
The proposed method does not have any accuracy loss during recommendation generation.
We carried out the experiments twice with and without the security protocol to check if there
is any effect in recommendation results. We found that, there is no loss of recommendation
5Note that, the server has to compute the averages and similarities among the items using all users’ rating
information. Since these computations depends on the number of users participated in the system, the required
time and amount of data exchanged become higher than other computations’ costs.
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accuracy while the proposed security protocol is added into recommendation process.
3.5 Summary
This chapter presents a privacy preserving recommender system based on item-item similarity,
which can protect the user profile and rating history from any third parties or even from other
users. Moreover, the server is able to compute the desired computations for recommendations
without compromising the true rating information. The experimental results of our proposed
model demonstrate high accuracy in-terms of the computation and communication costs as
well as assuring the privacy, while the existing works suffer by failing to maintain the balance
between them. Furthermore, the proposed method outperforms other cryptographic based
techniques in-terms of computational cost to generate recommendations. Our future work
includes developing more efficient and secure recommender system using user based similarity.
3.6 Epilogue
We have completed building the privacy preserving protocol for item-based recommendation
model which also solved RQ-1 and addressed the challenges described in 1.4.1. Although this
protocol is able to preserve user privacy and perform secure recommendations on encrypted
ratings, the protocol may not be suitable in case of user based recommendations based on
user-user similarity since in this case the privacy and protocol requirements are different than
item based one. Moreover the protocol described in this chapter performs recommendations
where only users ratings are encrypted and the similarity between items was made public to
server to achieve efficient computation since the item similarity does not reveal any private
information of users. However in case of user based recommendation (in next chapter), we
must preserve both the user ratings and user similarity since the similarity between users is
also equally private as users’ ratings.
Chapter 4
Privacy Preserving User-based
Recommendations
This chapter introduces a privacy preserving protocol for user based recommendation system
where both the similarity and rating prediction calculation are conducted in privacy preserving
manner. In previous chapter (Chapter 3), we have introduced privacy preserving item based
recommendation system which answered the research question RQ-1 and addressed the chal-
lenges described for item based recommendation system. In this chapter we further enhance
the recommendation protocol in terms of different computational challenges. For instance the
privacy issues and computational requirements in terms of privacy preserving building blocks
of user based recommendation is different than item based recommendation. In item based
recommendation, while computing the similarity and recommendations, certain mathematical
computation, i.e., the similarity function requires to perform addition and multiplication be-
tween two item ratings (Equation 2.10). Any user can perform such operations locally and it
is not required to perform homomorohic multiplication between two encrypted ratings. More-
over while performing the rating prediction (Equation 2.11), user ratings needs to be multiplied
with item similarity where the item similarity can be made public and does not require to be
hidden from server, since the item similarity does not reveal any user information. Therefore
we focused on preserving only user ratings and performed the privacy preserving computations
using ElGamal cryptosystem in last chapter.
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However, in case of user based recommendations, to find the similarity and generate rating
prediction, we require to perform multiplication between two users’ ratings and users can not
perform this locally since one user is not supposed to know another user’s ratings. Also in case
of recommendation generation, the user similarity needs to be multiplied with user ratings,
where both the similarity and user ratings are private. So it is clear that the protocol build in
Chapter 3 for item based recommendation is not suitable for solving the privacy issues in user
based recommendations. One of the reasons is that the ElGamal cryptosystem, introduced in
previous chapter is not a suitable to perform both addition and multiplication simultaneously
by a central server where both values are encrypted. Therefore, to address these challenges,
in this chapter we answer the RQ-2 by building a privacy preserving protocol for user based
recommendation where the addition and multiplication can be performed even if two values
are encrypted.
In this chapter, we present two different privacy preserving protocols for user based recom-
mendations. In section 4.1, we present privacy preserving item ranking based on user similarity
and investigate the protocol on Movie rating dataset to test the performance. In section 4.2
we enhance the first protocol presented in 4.1 by filtering the set of users who are similar to
the query user using an efficient encrypted search based technique prior to rating prediction
to reduce the computation overhead of the protocol.
4.1 Privacy Preserving Item Ranking based on User
Similarity
4.1.1 Motivation and Contribution
The User based recommendation systems are extensively used to help users find different items
they might like based on similarity between the users ratings. The items can be of many
types: movies, books, restaurants, web pages, sightseeing places or online news [7]. Since
millions of people use different online services, the importance of user based recommender
systems has been increasing in various application domains [174, 175, 176]. One of the most
common areas is social networks where people get recommendations for finding new friends,
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groups or events using collaborative filtering-based techniques. Another common scenario is
online shopping, where users get recommendations for unseen items based on what similar
types of users have purchased. It helps customers to find products which they are likely to
purchase, as well as increasing the profit of online services. Since collecting users’ data for
generating recommendations is an essential part of CF-based recommender systems, it may
lead to breaches of private information of users. For instance, exposing users’ data to third
parties, misusing data and, generating false recommendations etc [171]. Therefore, it is essential
to protect individual information to benefit consumers as well as service providers.
The reason for the popularity of homomorphic-based privacy preserving CF is that it is
semantically secure and therefore determining private information from ciphertexts is compu-
tationally hard for any intruders. Further, the homomorphic encryption-based solutions ensure
privacy without compromising recommendation accuracy. Due to the homomorphic property,
the cryptographic based solutions are able to compute certain operations on encrypted data
such as addition and multiplication of plaintexts without revealing any private information.
4.1.1.1 The Problem
The user-based CF approaches mainly work in two steps. First, they determine similarities
among the users based on their ratings. Second, they generate recommendations using those
similarities as weight and ratings of other users. Note that the overall process consists of
additions and multiplications on sensitive information (for example, ratings × similarity).
However, as we are interested in using public key cryptography-based techniques to secure
user ratings, the problem is that whereas computing addition between two private ratings is
easy, multiplication requires to build protocols using multiparty computation [97, 116, 95].
When using multi-party computations, users and servers need to actively communicate or
collaborate with each other. These collaborations sometimes create bottlenecks.
4.1.1.2 Limitations of Existing Solutions
The main limitation in using multi-party computation techniques to compute multiplications
between sensitive data is that it requires to disclose any of the two messages as plaintext (for
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example, E(m1)
m2 = E(m1 ·m2), here m2 is disclosed) which cannot be computed by single
server, since m2 would be disclosed to it. That is why one party (owner of m1) computes E(m1)
and sends to another party (owner of m2) who raises m2 to the power of the ciphertexts E(m1),
and finally computes E(m1)
m2 = E(m1 ·m2). However, this may lead to serious privacy issue if
the second party from above example has the authority to communicate with decryption server.
It may send E(m1) to decryption server to learn m1 (the decryption server has no clue on
whether the sender is authentic or malicious [116]). Furthermore, the communication channel
between the recommender server and the decryption server in existing protocols [97, 116] may
also cause privacy leakage, since these two servers may collude to decrypt the computation
results.
The goal of our approach is thus to build a new protocol by which the system is able to
generate accurate and secure recommendations without: (1) active collaboration among the
users and servers; (2) disclosing any information, especially while performing multiplication
between two private data; (3) establishing any communication between the recommender server
and the decryption server; (4) allowing any user to communicate with the decryption server
except the target user, who is actually active in order to obtain recommendations.
4.1.1.3 Our Contributions
We propose a privacy-preserving protocol for user-based CF using a public key cryptography-
based approach, in which recommendations are generated based on user similarity. We consider
the scenario where a user wants to find the most suitable item within a set of similar items
based on other similar users’ preferences, and the service provider directly recommends the item
instead of sending the numerical results of the recommendation. In this scenario we protect
users’ privacy by means of encrypting their private ratings and generating recommendations in
the encrypted domain. Among the various approaches we consider a weighted sum approach
to predict the item score because of its better accuracy for generating recommendations [7].
Our cryptographic protocol includes two different service providers: Recommender Server
(RS), which generates recommendations and Decryption Server (DS), which provides privacy
functions and decryption services. The DS provides required public keys to encrypt users’
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data. Once their data are encrypted, users interact with the RS to get item recommendations.
We propose a new cryptographic protocol based on the use of Boneh Goh Nissim (BGN) cryp-
tosystem [105] by which secure multiplications can be computed by single server. Moreover,
we do not require any intermediate decryption or to reveal any message. In our cryptographic
protocol, the DS is allowed to decrypt the encrypted recommendations for users without learn-
ing any private information (the idea of using DS is similar to [116]). To achieve this task, we
introduce a decryption protocol in which the list of encrypted recommendations is permuted
before sending it for decryption. In this way, the DS is unable to learn the corresponding
indices of an item. Moreover, to prevent malicious target users from sending fake ciphertexts
to the DS, we use a signature scheme by which messages are signed before sending them for
decryption.
Specifically, the main contribution of this section of the chapter is a new secure protocol
for privacy preserving user-based CF in which the privacy of ratings is preserved from all
participants in the system and intermediate computations are carried out without disclosing
any private information.
4.1.2 Proposed User based Recommendation Protocol
The main goal of our proposed privacy-preserving protocol is to hide users’ private information
from the RS, the DS and users while generating recommendations. The private information
includes user ratings, user similarity, generated recommendations or any kind of intermediate
computation results. We assume that the servers are semi-honest but curious and usually do
not collude with any other participant in the system. The proposed cryptographic protocol
consists of two main stages: initialization and recommendation generation. In the initialization
phase, all users encrypt their private information and send it to the RS for storage and further
processing. In the recommendation generation phase, the RS generates encrypted recommen-
dations for the target user and those ciphertexts are decrypted by the DS. Figure 4.1(a) shows
the overall architecture of our proposed protocol, which works more specifically as follows. In
the initialization phase (Figure 4.1(a)):
1. The DS generates public and private keys of the BGN encryption scheme and sends the
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Figure 4.1: General architecture of our proposed model. (a) Initialization (b) Recommendation
generation.
public key to all users.
2. All users encrypt their ratings and send the ciphertexts to the RS. Once the encrypted
information is received, the RS stores it in its own storage.
In the recommendation generation phase (Figure 4.1(b)):
1. One user participates in the recommendation process (target user) and sends the request
to the RS for generating recommendations. The target user receives the encrypted ratings
of the other users via the RS and locally determines the similarity in encrypted domain.
Once completed, the resultant ciphertexts are returned to the RS.
2. Based on the encrypted ratings of other users and encrypted similarities received from
the target user, the RS computes ciphertexts of recommendations. Once completed, the
RS permutes the list of recommendations and signs the messages. The reason behind
permutation is that by this process the DS is not able to identify the correct indices of
items even after decryption. Furthermore, by using the signature protocol, the DS is
able to verify that (a) the target user is not malicious nor sending any fake ratings, and
(b) the ciphertexts of recommendations from the RS are authentic. However, the correct
indices are disclosed to target user so that he/she can reorder the list after getting the
recommendations.
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3. The target user communicates with the DS for decryption and sends the permuted list
of ciphertexts with signatures.
4. The DS verifies the signatures and decrypts the ciphertexts of recommendations. Then
it determines the highest recommendation result from the permuted list and sends the
corresponding item index to the target user. The target user locally reorders the item
list and finds the original item index as a recommendation.
4.1.2.1 Initialization
Settings
First, we assume a rating matrix consisting of n users who have provided ratings on m items.
The DS generates a cyclic group G, of large prime order q1 and q2 with generator g and
N = q1q2. The server picks two random generators g, u from G and sets h = u
q2 . Then h is a
random generator of the subgroup of G of order q1. The public and private keys are defined
by PK = {N,G,G1, e, g, h} and SK = q1 respectively. Note that the DS stores the secret key
for use in decryption phase only.
Protocol description
Step 1: Each user ui locally performs the following operation for all items ij , where
j = 1, 2, ...,m.
Ri,j =
 ri,j√
r2i,1 + · · ·+ r2i,m
· t
 (4.1)
where bc represents round function to get the floor values and t represents positive integer
number such as 10 or 100. Before encrypting Ri,j , each user multiplies it with t, which could
be made public, since the BGN cryptosystem can not handle fraction numbers.
Step 2: The DS publishes the public key of BGN to all users ui. For each item ij , each
user ui encrypts Ri,j and ratings ri,j as,
Ai,j = E(Ri,j) = g
Ri,jhwi (4.2)
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Bi,j = E(ri,j) = g
ri,jhxi (4.3)
where ri,j and Ri,j are integers in the set {0, 1, ..., T}, T must not be large and T << q2.
Ai,j and Bi,j denote the ciphertexts of Ri,j and ri,j respectively. wi and xi represent two
random numbers for different encryptions. Once the encryption is done, all users ui, where
i = {1, 2, ..., n}, send the following message M1,i containing above ciphertexts to RS :
M1,i = {Ai,j , Bi,j}j=1,2,...,m
4.1.2.2 Recommendation Generation
Settings
For the recommendation process, only one user ui (target user) participates in the system (for
the rest of the section of this chapter we will denote the target user as ui and other users as
uk, where 1 ≤ k ≤ n and ui 6= uk). All other users remain off-line. The RS holds Ai,j and Bi,j
from the initialization stage which will be used to calculate similarities and recommendations.
To sign the ciphertexts of recommendations for the target user, the RS generates the public
key and secret key as PK1 and SK1 respectively.
Protocol Description
The target user ui sends a request to RS for recommendations
1. According to our proposed
model, the target user receives encrypted information of the other users uk as E(Rk,j) from the
RS, where 1 ≤ k ≤ n. Then, the user ui calculates similarities between it and other users uk
locally. Once completed, ui returns the resultant ciphertexts of similarity to the RS. The RS
computes recommendations for ui using the encrypted similarity and other users uk’s encrypted
ratings. The resultant ciphertexts of recommendations are permuted (the permutation order
is disclosed to the target user) and signed by the RS. Therefore, the DS is unable to identify
the correct indices of the recommendation list even after decryption. Furthermore, because
of the signature the DS verifies that the target user is authentic as well as the ciphertexts
1 Notice that in our proposed model all users have to be online at the initialization phase only. During the
similarity computation and recommendation phases, only the target user has to be online to get recommendations
from RS.
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Figure 4.2: Similarity computation between target user ui and other users uk.
of recommendations. After receiving recommendations (item index from the permuted list)
from the DS, the target user is able reorder the list and finds the exact recommendation. The
detailed steps are described below.
Similarity Computation: We introduce the privacy preserving version of the similarity
computation between the target user ui and another user uk. Recalling that the process of
similarity computation is defined by
s(ui, uk) =
m∑
j=1
Rk,j ·Ri,j (4.4)
where both Ri,j and Rk,j are private messages for users ui and uk respectively. Figure 4.2
shows the secure similarity computation by target user ui where s/he receives all other users’
ciphertexts E(Rk,j) (ui 6= uk) and computes encrypted similarity locally. The detailed process
is as follows.
Step 1: The target user holds Ri,j from Equation 4.1 of the initialization phase and the
RS sends encrypted Rk,j as Ak,j = E(Rk,j) from other users to target user as follows
M2 = {Ak,j}1≤k≤n; j=1,2,...,m
Step 2: The target user ui receives the ciphertexts and raises its plaintexts Ri,j to the
power of ciphertexts E(Rk,j) for all items j = 1, 2, ...,m (as shown in Figure 3) as follows:
Ci,k,j = (Ak,j)
Ri,j = E(Rk,j)
Ri,j (4.5)
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where Ci,k,j denotes the resultant ciphertexts calculated by the target user ui for each item ij .
The similarity between user ui and uk is then computed by,
Di,k =
m∏
j=1
Ci,k,j =
m∏
j=1
E(Ri,j ·Rk,j) = E(s(ui, uk)) (4.6)
where Di,k denotes the ciphertexts of similarity between user ui and uk.
Theorem 5. If all users and server follow the protocol, we have that Di,k = E(s(ui, uk)).
Proof. Using Equation 4.5, the target user ui computes
Ci,k,j = E(Rk,j)
Ri,j = (gRk,jhyi)Ri,j = (gRk,j ·Ri,jhyi·Ri,j )
= E(Rk,j ·Ri,j)
where yi is a random number and yi · Ri,j is distributed uniformly in ZN . Thus Ci,k,j is a
uniformly distributed encryption of Ri,j ·Rk,j . Using the homomorphic properties of BGN
cryptosystem, the RS computes the ciphertexts in Equation 4.6 as,
Di,k =
m∏
j=1
Ci,k,j =
m∏
j=1
E(Ri,j ·Rk,j)
=
m∏
j=1
gRi,j ·Rk,j · hr3,i·Rk,j
= g
∑m
j=1Ri,j ·Rk,j · h
∑m
j=1 r3,i·Rk,j
= E(
m∑
j=1
Ri,j ·Rk,j) = E(s(ui, uk))
where
∑m
j=1 yi · Rk,j is distributed uniformly in ZN . Thus Fi,k is also a uniformly distributed
encryption of
∑m
j=1Ri,j ·Rk,j .
Recommendation Generation: Since we are interested in finding the highest score
among all predicted recommendations (items’ ranking), the denominator part of Equation 2.13,
which is the sum of similarities, can be eliminated as it will be same for all Pi,j . Therefore we
can rewrite Equation 2.13 as
Pi,j =
∑
1≤k≤n,k 6=i
rk,j · s(ui, uk) (4.7)
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where rk,j and s(ui, uk) denote the ratings of all other users uk except the target user ui and
the similarities between the target user ui and all other users uk, respectively. The detailed
steps of our privacy preserving recommendation generation are given below.
Step 1: For all items j = 1, 2, ...,m, the RS computes the encrypted recommendations
using the bilinear pairing2 of the BGN cryptosystem as follows.
Fi,j =
∏
1≤k≤n,k 6=i
e(Bk,j , Di,k)h
zk
1
= E(
∑
1≤k≤n,k 6=i
rk,j · s(ui, uk))
(4.8)
where Fi,j denotes the encrypted recommendation of Equation 4.7, zk ∈ {1, 2, ..., N − 1} are
random numbers, and h1 = e(g, h).
Step 2: The RS permutes the list of encrypted recommendations in a random permuted
order as
{Hij}j=1,2,··· ,m = Perm{Fij}j=1,2,··· ,m (4.9)
where Perm() and {Hi,j}j=1,2,··· ,m represent the permutation function and new permuted list
of recommendations for j = 1, 2, ...,m items, respectively. Then, the RS assigns {Hi,j}j=1,2,··· ,m
in a message M3 as M3 = {Hi,j}j=1,2,...,m and signs the message using secret key SK1 for the
user ui as
δ = Sign(M3, SK1) (4.10)
where δ, Sk1 and Sign() represent signatures, secret key and signature protocol, respectively.
The RS discloses the permutation order (denoted as Perm order) to ui. Moreover the RS
sends the messages of ciphertexts and signatures to the target user as
M3 = {Hi,j}j=1,2,...,m
M4 = {δ, PK1, P erm order}
2The bilinear pairing map allows for multiplication of plaintexts in their encrypted domain. Using this
process only one multiplication is possible each time. Since this process allows for multiplication of two plaintexts
in encrypted form, unlike the similarity computation no user has to be online except the target user while
generating recommendations.
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Figure 4.3: An example of decryption protocol. (a) The ciphertexts with original index and
their permuted index in a random order. (b) The target user sends the permuted list of
ciphertexts to DS for decryption. (c) The DS decrypts the recommendation and finds the
maximum from permuted list. (d) The DS sends the index of maximum recommendation. (e)
The target user reorders the list to find recommended item.
Step 3: After receiving above messages, target user keeps the permutation order and passes
the rest of the messages to DS. The DS verifies the signature as
V erify(M3, δ, PK1) = True or False (4.11)
where V erify() represents the signature verification function. The signature is only verified
as authentic if the output is True. After running the verification protocol, for any number
of items j, the DS decrypts the ciphertexts of the encrypted recommendations by raising the
private key q1 to the power of ciphertexts as
di,j = (Hi,j)
q1 (4.12)
where di,j represents the decryption of the j’th ciphertext of recommendations. To recover the
recommendation score, the DS just needs to compute the discrete logarithm [112] of di,j to the
base gq1 .
Pi,j = loggq1 (di,j) =
∑
1≤k≤n,k 6=i
rk,j · s(ui, uk) (4.13)
where Pi,j represents the original recommendation score of item ij for user ui. The DS finds
the maximum results among all {Hi,j}j=1,2,...,m and acknowledges the corresponding index to
target user ui. Finally the target user retrieves the actual item by matching {Hi,j}j=1,2,...,m
with the original list {Fi,j}j=1,2,...,m (shown in Figure 4.3). In this way, the most suitable item
among the similar ones is recommended to the target user instead of providing the predicted
numerical ratings.
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Theorem 6. If the target user ui and all servers follow the protocol, we have that Fi,j =
E(
∑
1≤k≤n,k 6=i rk,j · s(ui, uk)).
Proof. From Equation 4.8 the RS homomorphically computes
Fi,j =
∏
1≤k≤n,k 6=i
e(Bk,j , Di,k)h
zk
1
=
∏
1≤k≤n,k 6=i
e(grk,j · hwk , gs(ui,uk) · hyi·Rk,j )hzk1
=
∏
1≤k≤n,k 6=i
e(grk,j+αq2wk , gs(ui,uk)+αq2yi·Rk,j )hzk1
=
∏
1≤k≤n,k 6=i
e(g, g)(rk,j+αq2wk)(s(ui,uk)+αq2yiRk,j)hzk1
=
∏
1≤k≤n,k 6=i
(e(g, g)rk,j ·s(ui,uk)
· hzk+s(ui,uk)wk+rk,jyiRk,j+αq2wkyiRk,j1 )
= E(
∑
1≤k≤n,k 6=in
rk,j · s(ui, uk))
where wk, yi and zk denote the random numbers under different encryptions and zk+s(ui, uk)wk+
rk,jyiRk,j + αq2wkyiRk,j is uniformly distributed in ZN. Thus Fi,j is an uniformly distributed
encryption of
∑
1≤k≤n,k 6=i rk,j · s(ui, uk).
Remark 1. The range of rk,j and s(ui, uk) is not large; therefore computing the discrete
logarithm to find
∑
1≤k≤n,k 6=i rk,j · s(ui, uk) is not hard.
4.1.3 Privacy Analysis
We assume that our privacy-preserving protocol consists of different users providing ratings
on the same set of items and two different service providers: (1) The RS generates recom-
mendations on encrypted data, and (2) the DS provides the public and private keys as well
as decrypts the ciphertexts of recommendations for the target user. We also assume that all
participants are semi-honest and there is no collusion between the users (especially the target
user), the RS and the DS. They follow the protocol; however try to gather information and
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estimate more results from it. We analyze the privacy of our protocols in-terms of privacy pro-
tection against users (all users at initialization phase, target user, and malicious target user)
and servers (RS and DS ).
4.1.3.1 Privacy Protection Against Users
Target User: The target user is the participant who asks for recommendations to the RS on
different items. In the initialization phase, such user is no different with respect to other users.
During the similarity computation, the target user receives no plaintexts; it only receives other
uk users’ ciphertexts E(Rk,j). Therefore, the target user can not learn any private information
about other users. During the recommendation phase the target user receives only the list
of encrypted recommendations from the RS. From such list it is impossible for the target
user to learn private information. In the final stage, the target user sends such encrypted list
of recommendations to the DS for decryption and only learns which item is recommended
from the set of similar items without learning the actual numerical results. One may argue
that since the target user holds E(Rk,j) and is able to communicate with the DS to decrypt
the encrypted recommendations, the target user may send E(Rk,j) to the DS for decryption
instead of sending the list of encrypted recommendations. Since the DS is only allowed to
acknowledge the index (from the permuted list) of the maximum predicted score, in the worst
case the target user may find which is the maximum among Rk,1, Rk,2, ..., Rk,m for any specific
user uk. Further, disclosing these results will not breach privacy. In our protocol, the target
user is not able to act maliciously (sending fake ratings) because by using signatures, the RS
signs the ciphertexts for the target user and the DS verifies whether the received ciphertexts
of recommendations are authentic or have been sent by a malicious user.
Other Users At the initial stage, all users compute Ri,j locally as well as encrypt ri,j and
Ri,j using the public key provided by the DS and send the results to the RS for further
computations. Therefore, it is clear that the users are not able to learn any information about
other users.
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4.1.3.2 Privacy Protection Against Servers
RS The main tasks of the RS is to generate recommendations for the target user ui using other
users uk’s ratings and their similarities with the target user. According to our protocol the
RS receives three kinds of ciphertexts from users at different stages: the encryption of ri,j , the
encryption of Ri,j and the encrypted similarities from the target user. The RS then generates
recommendations using those ciphertexts only. All these messages are encrypted under the
public key of BGN generated by the DS. Since the BGN encryption scheme is semantically
secure, all messages are computationally indistinguishable from uniformly random numbers;
therefore it is also impossible for the RS to determine the true messages. Furthermore, our pro-
tocol is built on the assumptions that there is no direct communication and collusion between
the RS and the DS. Therefore it is clear that the RS contributes in computing similarities and
the recommendations without learning any private information.
DS The only purpose of the DS is to provide public keys to users and to decrypt the ci-
phertexts of recommendations for the target user. Although the DS has decryption power, it
is prevented from learning users’ private information. First, due to the assumption that no
communication channel exists with RS, the DS is not able to get any ciphertexts from the
RS. It receives the ciphertexts of recommendations from the target user only. However, before
sending the encrypted list of recommendations, the target user permutes the list order. Once
decrypted, the DS is able to learn the recommendation values but unable to determine the
corresponding item index. Thus, the DS is prevented from breaching user privacy.
4.1.4 Performance Analysis
Table 4.1: Computation and communication cost of the proposed model.
Computations Computation Cost Communication Cost
User RS DS User RS DS
Initialization 2m(e) 2m(l) bits 2mn(l) bits
Similarity (n− 1)((m− 1)(mul) +m(e)) m(n− 1)(l) bits ((n− 1)m+ (n− 1))(l) bits
Recommendation m((n− 1)(p) + (n− 2)(mul)) √Tm(e) 2m(l) bits m(l)bits m(l) bits
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To conduct the experiments, we use Java 2 SE 8 including cryptographic libraries on a
hardware platform with OS windows 7, 64 bit and 3.6 GHz- core i7 and 8GB CPU unit. We
have evaluated our method using publicly available data by GroupLens [172]. We reduced
the data sets by choosing 200 users and 500 items randomly to test the performance of our
method. At first we check the viability of our method by analysing computation and commu-
nication costs. Then we compare our method with existing solutions in-terms of efficiency and
security. According to our model, the computation and communication costs are calculated
by reference to the number of items and users in the systems. Table 4.1 summarizes the costs
in computing similarities, generating recommendations and executing decryptions by the users
and servers, where n and m represent the number of users and items, respectively. According
to our assumptions, all users encrypt their ratings locally and send the ciphertxts in parallel to
the server. Thus the computation cost of the initialization phase can be reduced by computing
for one user only. On the server side, the computation and communication costs depend on the
number of users and items participating in the computation. For the performance measure-
ments we consider the time required for computing modular exponentiation3, multiplications
and pairing which are denoted as e (encryption), mul (multiplication of two ciphertexts) and p
(pairing of two ciphertexts, which is the multiplication of two private messages), respectively.
The size of the ciphertexts is set to l = 1024 bits in our experiments. We do not consider the
required time to perform any computation on the plaintext since it is too small compared to
any computation on ciphertexts.
4.1.4.1 Computation Costs
We present the computation costs in terms of the initialization phase, the similarity computa-
tions and the recommendation separately.
Initialization
Firstly, according to our protocol n users encrypt their rating information ri,j and Ri,j in
parallel. Therefore each user has to compute two modular exponentiations 2(e). Since this
3Note that in our experiment, the runtime of modular exponentiation is much faster in encryption than the
decryption, since in case of encryption and decryption the exponents are ratings and secret key respectively
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Table 4.2: Efficiency (m=500, n=200).
Computations Computation Cost (in seconds) Communication Cost (in MB)
User RS DS User RS DS
Initialization 0.02 0.12 25
Similarity 2.55 12.73 12.82
Recommendation 52 63 0.12 .06 .06
computation is done in parallel, all users finish the computation in 2m(e) seconds for m items.
Similarity Computation
The target user ui computes similarity with other users locally in two steps. First, it computes
E(Rk,j)
Ri,j for j = 1, 2, ...,m items, which takes m(e) seconds. Second, it computes crypto-
graphic multiplications (corresponding to addition in the plaintext) among those m results in
(m − 1)(mul) seconds. Therefore to compute similarity with all other users, the target user
takes (n− 1)(m(e) + (m− 1)(mul)) seconds in total.
Recommendation Generation
The recommendation generation process also works in two steps. First, it generates and sends
encrypted recommendations by the RS. The RS computes bilinear pairing (p) between ratings
rk,j and similarity s(ui, uk) for n − 1 users. Then these n − 1 results are multiplied together
to get an encrypted recommendation which takes (n− 1)(p) + (n− 2)(mul) seconds. Since the
recommendations are generated for m items, it takes m((n− 1)(p) + (n− 2)(mul) seconds in
total. Second, the encrypted recommendations are decrypted by raising the secret key to the
power of ciphertexts (modular exponentiation) and computing the discrete logarithm. Since
one decryption and the discrete logarithm take e and
√
T (e) seconds, the total decryption for
m items takes
√
Tm(e) seconds.
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4.1.4.2 Communication Costs
The communication costs depend on the size of data sent or received by each participant in
the system.
Initialization
Recall that all users encrypt ri,j and Ri,j and send the ciphertexts to the RS. Therefore, the
bandwidth required for all users to send the ciphertexts for all items is 2mn(l). The required
bandwidth to receive those ciphertexts for the RS is also 2mn(l).
Similarity Computation
To calculate similarity by the target user, the RS sends the ciphertexts of E(Rk,j) for m items
and (n − 1) users. Therefore, the bandwidth required for the RS to send these ciphertexts
is m(n − 1)(l) bits. The same amount of bandwidth is required for the target user to receive
the ciphertexts from the RS. After completing the similarity with all users (each similarity is l
bits), the target user sends (n− 1)(l) bits back to the RS. Therefore, the total amount of data
exchanged by the RS is ((n− 1)m+ (n− 1))(l) bits and target user is m(n− 1)(l) bits.
Recommendation Generation
After computing recommendations for m items, the RS sends a total of m(l) bits of ciphertexts
(ciphertexts of each recommendation is l bits) to the target user ui. The DS receives the same
amount of data for decryption from the target user. Therefore the total amount of data
exchanged by the RS, the target user and the DS is m(l), 2m(l) and m(l) bits
4.1.4.3 Efficiency
We present experimental results of our protocol in terms of initialization, similarity calculation,
recommendation generation and finally computing discrete logarithm for decryption. Table
4.2 shows the efficiency of our protocol in different phases conducted on the ratings data. We
reduce the dataset to test our protocol by randomly selecting n = 200 users and m = 500 items
including target user. In the initialization phase, all users are able to encrypt their ratings in
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Figure 4.4: Efficiency in-terms of computation and communication cost (n = 200, m = 500) (a)
Computation cost in-terms of similarity calculation, recommendation generation and discrete
logarithm by target user, RS and DS respectively (with parallel computation facilities) (b)
Required bandwidth in MB by target user, RS and DS (c) Comparison with [116]-without
data packing.
parallel which takes only 0.02 seconds. The similarity calculation phase takes 2.5 seconds where
the target user computes his similarity with other 199 users. To generate the recommendations
for 500 items by the RS, we deployed 20 virtual processes to perform the pairing computation
in parallel, since the pairing to execute multiplications is time consuming (takes .01 seconds for
each pairing). In our experiment, we need n−1 = 199 pairing in total and each processing unit
takes 0.1 seconds to finish around 10 pairing tasks assigned for them (except one unit which
is assigned 9 tasks). Finally, the RS takes 52 seconds to generate encrypted recommendations
which includes parallel pairing computation followed by serial multiplications of ciphertexts.
Finally, the DS decrypts (by executing one modular exponentiation and discrete logarithm
for each decryption) all ciphertexts of the recommendations to find the highest one, which
takes 63 seconds in total. In-terms of communication, the target user, the RS and the DS
exchange 13MB, 38MB and .06MB data respectively. In our experiment, the computation and
communication costs are linear to the number of users in the system which shown in Figure
4.4(a) and 4.4(b).
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4.1.4.4 Comparison with Other Protocols
Among the existing cryptographic solutions4 for user-based CF, the protocol by Kikuchi et al.
[95] has overall complexity in O(mn2), whereas the complexity of our protocol is in O(mn).
Therefore, our method clearly outperforms the protocol by Kikuchi et al. [95]. The protocols by
Erkin et al. [116, 97] are also based on privacy-preserving user-based CF and, like our protocol
they are linear in the number of users and items in the system. However, our protocol differs in
some respects. To generate recommendations, the protocols proposed by [116, 97] compute the
average rating of those users who are similar (above a threshold) to a target user, whereas we
use a weighted sum approach which is a more efficient approach to generate recommendations.
This is main reason why we adopt the BGN cryptosystem to securely multiply two different
ciphertexts.
Furthermore, we also compare our protocol with [116] in-terms of efficiency (note that
they provided two different solutions, one is ‘with data packing’ and another is ‘without data
packing’. In the comparison, we avoid their solution- ‘with data packing’ for two reasons: first,
we do not use data packing in our protocol; second, the data packing is similar to compression
which may affect the recommendation accuracy). In the comparison, we show that even in the
worst case scenario, our protocol outperforms [116] (without data packing). To create worst
case environment, we construct another synthetic datasets (since [116] used synthetic datasets)
consists of m = 1000 and n = 10000 (similar to [116] in-terms of user and item number), where
each rating is considered as 5 and there is no missing rating. As a result, any similarity between
users becomes high (possibly highest in range). Note that more weight ri,j and s(ui, uk) carry,
the size of recommendation score (using Equation 4.7) also increases and affects computation
cost to compute discrete logarithm since it depends on the size of plaintext. Also note that
we do not use parallel computation in this section to run the comparison. Despite of having
such scenario, the proposed protocol still able to outperform [116] as shown in 4.4 (c). Further
comparisons with existing solutions are discussed below.
• To enhance the security of our proposed protocol, unlike other protocols, we do not allow
4 We do not consider [114, 106] for comparison since they present different problem scenario for item-based
CF, which do not require multiplication between two private data
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the target user to get recommendations results as numerical values since the user may
try to extrapolate more information. Instead, the target user receives the highest ranked
item among the similar ones, which still serves the recommendation purpose and at the
same time preserves privacy.
• Unlike [116], our protocol does not have any intermediate decryption when multiplying
two numbers.
• Unlike [116], there is no communication between the RS and the DS, which prevents the
chance of collusion between them to reveal user ratings or recommendation results.
• Unlike [97], our protocol only allows the target user to receive other users’ encrypted
ratings during similarity computation. Furthermore, the target user is checked by the
signature verification protocol so that s/he is unable to act maliciously which also reduces
privacy threats.
4.1.5 Summary
The section 4.1 of this chapter introduces a privacy preserving protocol for user-based CF. The
protocol protects user privacy by performing the computations on encrypted data. According
to the proposed protocol, neither users nor servers can learn about any users’ ratings including
any intermediate computation results. We show that our protocol is practical and able to
provide high level of privacy assurance while hiding private information and generating recom-
mendations. Furthermore, the proposed protocol does not have any accuracy loss in-terms of
recommendation.
4.2 Privacy Preserving Item Ranking using Efficient
Encrypted Search
In this section of Chapter 4, we present another privacy preserving protocol enhancing the
protocol proposed in section 4.1. In previous protocol we considered all users’ ratings to
generate recommendations. However, it is also feasible to use only those users who are similar
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or the similarity is less than the certain threshold value. However, filtering similar users
based on their similarity privately using homomorphic methods may require huge computation
power. To address the issue, we present a light weight symmetric cryptosystem which is
also similarity/distance recoverable. That means the method is able to find similar users
without revealing user ratings or similarity efficiently. We also investigate the secret key
sharing mechanism using ElGamal cryptosystem, which was used in Chapter 3 for item based
recommendation to facilitate user based recommendation. In summary the set of filtered users
based on the symmetric distance recoverable encryption technique is used to find the similarity
and to generate recommendation privately.
4.2.1 Motivation and Contribution
One of the very important steps in generating recommendation is to find similar users based
on a certain threshold to eliminate a set of users who are actually not similar to query user.
By this way one can improve the recommendation accuracy. However since we want to achieve
users privacy against the recommender server and at the same time we want it to perform the
computations on encrypted data to generate the recommendations, we propose to eliminate
the set of users who are not similar by an encrypted search technique. It is a symmetric key
based search technique and using this, the server is able to find k nearest neighbors/ users
who are similar based on the ratings of query users without learning any private information.
Then we apply the privacy preserving recommendation protocol using Distributed ElGamal
Cryptosystem on the reduced user space to generate recommendations for query user. Another
important contribution of this work is that unlike the existing protocols [108, 116], we do not
need to rely on decryption server to decrypt the ciphertexts for query users. All users in
the system are able to share the secret keys and at the end of the protocol users collaborate
to decrypt the ciphertexts for query user. To perform secure operations while generating
recommendations, we adopt the protocols described in [116, 177] in our system by modifying
them according to our requirements. Our main contributions of proposed protocol described
in this section is similar to the one described in section 4.1 except:
1. Enhancing the proposed protocol’s efficiency where the user space can be reduced by
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eliminating a set of users who are not similar to the query user.
4.2.2 Preliminaries
4.2.2.1 Notations and Definitions
The following described notations will be used for the rest of the section of this chapter.
1. i = 1, 2, ..., n is a set of users and j = 1, 2, ...,m is a set of items, where n and m
represents total number of users and items respectively. The Query User who wants to
get recommendations on unobserved items, represented as u.
2. ri,j represents a rating which has been generated by the invocation of user i on item j.
ri,j = 0 if the rating is missing.
3. ru,. and ri,. represents the whole rating vector of user u and i respectively.
4. l = 1, 2, ..., n′ represents the set of users filtered after DRE based search scheme and n′
represents the total number.
5. Pu,j represents the prediction of missing rating for query user u on item j.
6. E()DRE and E()HE represent the encryption function by DRE based scheme and homo-
morphic scheme respectively.
7. PK represents the common public key of homomorphic encryption. {skl, pkl} and
{sku, pku} represent the individual secret and public key pairs of user l and u respectively.
8. rl and ru represent the random numbers used to encrypt the rating by user l and u
respectively using homomorphic encryption of ElGamal.
4.2.2.2 The Distance Recoverable Encryption (DRE) Scheme
In this subsection we describe the building blocks of DRE scheme [178] which is useful where
a semi trusted server can find the nearest neighbor of a query user between two users based
on their encrypted rating. The DRE scheme have been using in many applications (searching
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Figure 4.5: System model.
nearby located users in online social network, secure image search in database, crowd-sourcing
etc) to securely search the nearest data points of query point [179, 180, 148]. The DRE scheme
is composed of four functions.
Key Generation SKDRE ←− KGen(1λ, R): The symmetric key generation algorithm
KGen takes a security parameter λ ∈ N and a dimensional space R and outputs the symmetric
key.
Encryption C ←− EDRE(SKDRE , n): The encryption algorithm takes SKDRE and a m
dimentional point n ∈ Rn (R denotes the space), and outputs a ciphertext as an encrypted
rating vector.
Query generation E(ru,.)DRE ←− QGen(SKDRE , ru,.) The query generation algorithm
takes the SKDRE and query users rating values to output encrypted query vector E(ru,.)DRE
Distance Comparison: Cl ←− Cmp(E(ru,.)DRE , Ci, Ck) The comparison algorithm takes
an encrypted query vector of rating E(ru,.) and two encrypted rating vectors from two other
users Ci and Ck, outputs Cl for l ∈ {0, 1} if
dist(E(ru,.), E(ri,.)) ≤ dist(E(ru,.), E(rk,.))
4.2.3 System Model
Our proposed system model is composed of one server to generate recommendations and we
call it Recommendation Service Provider (RSP) as well as a set of users. We assume that
the RSP and users in our system are honest but curious, they follow the protocol but try to
learn the secret information. The RSP is maintained by a social networking service provider.
Figure 4.5 shows overall system model of our proposed framework in which the users send
their encrypted ratings to RSP. First the users encrypt the ratings with DRE scheme and
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send them to RSP. A query user who wants to get recommendations sends a query to RSP.
The RSP first run the DRE based search to find the set of users who are similar to the query
user based on their ratings. The RSP does not learn any private information while running
this protocol. This way the RSP reduces the user space to predict the missing ratings since
the prediction protocol depends on the number of users and recommendation accuracy can be
improved by eliminating those users who are not similar to query user. After completing the
DRE based search protocol, the RSP shares the pseudo identity of users to query user in the
system. Then the users including query user form a group and generates public and secret key
pairs of ElGamal cryptosystem. The users shares their own public keys to generate common
public key and use the common public key to encrypt their ratings. Any user from this group
can get recommendation privately anytime easily by sending query to RSP since they already
formed a group and shares their keys. They send their encrypted ratings (homomorphically)
to RSP for generating recommendation for query user. The query user performs homomorphic
computations to calculate encrypted similarity weight between her and other users. Then the
query user sends this encrypted similarity to RSP which holds the encrypted ratings by public
key encryption. The RSP performs homomorphic operations to predict the missing ratings
values for query user and sends the encrypted result to her. Finally all users shares their
secret keys to decrypt the encrypted prediction. During this secret key sharing process and
decryption, no user learns the secret key or any private information of other users. Moreover,
by sharing the secret key for decryption, we can eliminate the need of another federated server
for decryption.
4.2.4 DRE based Search Scheme
The users’ ratings are encrypted using DRE scheme to facilitate the encrypted search opera-
tions. Once another encrypted ratings are received from the query user, the RSP determines
for any two users, which one of them is more closer to the query user in terms of encrypted
ratings. A DRE scheme is symmetric key encryption scheme with three main functions:key
generation, encryption and search operation. In the key generation, the query user generates
the symmetric keys and shares them with other users via secure channel. In the encryption
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function, the users encrypt their rating vectors and send them to RSP. In the search function,
the RSP finds out which rating vector is more similar to the query user’s experience vector
among two other users. Let i = 1, 2, ..., n represents the set of users and u represents the query
user in the system initially. In below we explain the procedures in detail.
4.2.4.1 Key Generation
The query user generates the secret keys of DRE scheme as S,M1 and M2, where S is a
vector with the size of m + 1 bits, M1 and M2 are two invertiable matrices with the size of
(m+ 1)× (m+ 1) dimension. The query user broadcasts these keys to all other users via any
secure channel.
4.2.4.2 Encryption
Each user i modifies the rating vectors as r′i,. = ri,1, ri,2, ..., ri,m, ||ri,.||2 where ||ri,.|| is the
euclidean norm of ri,. of user i. Then the users split r
′
i,. into two random vectors {ria,., rib,.}
according to S. The ria,ja and rib,jb are set equal to r
′
i,j if Sj = 0, otherwise ria,ja and rib,jb
are set as two different random values where ria,ja + rib,jb = r
′
i,j . Then the users encrypt the
rating vector as E(r′i,.)DRE = {MT1 }ria,.,MT2 }rib,.. All users send their encrypted ratings to
RSP.
The query user also modifies the query vector r′u,. = (−2ru,1,−2ru,2, ...,−2ru,m, 1)T and
split the r′u,. into two random vectors as {rua,., rub,.}. The query user sets rua,ja and rub,jb
equal to r′u,j if Sj = 1, otherwise rua,ua and rub,ub are set as two different random values if
Sj = 0 where rua,ua + rub,ub = r
′
u,j .
Therefore the query vector is encrypted as E(r′u,.)DRE = {γM−11 rua,., γM−12 rub,.}. Finally
the encrypted query ratings are sent to the RSP.
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4.2.4.3 Search
The RSP performs search operations on DRE based encrypted ratings between user uq and ui,
and uq and uk as follows.
E(r′u,.)DRE · E(r′i,.)TDRE
= (γM−11 rua,.) · (MT1 ria,.)T + (γM−12 rub,.) · (MT2 rib,.)T
= (γrua,.) · (ria,.)T + (γrub,.) · (rib,.)T
= γru,. · rTi,.
= γ(||ri,.||2 − 2
j=m∑
j=1
ri,j · ru,j)
= γ(||ru,. − ri,.||2 − ||ru,.||2)
Note that the distance du,i = ||ru,. − ri,.||2 is hidden by the secret γ and ||ru,.||2 which is
unknown. Therefore, we can derive which user among i and k is more similar in terms of
ratings by below equation.
E(r′u,.)DRE · E(r′i,.)TDRE > E(r′u,.)DRE · E(r′i,.)TDRE
which means that,
||ru,. − ri,.||2 > ||ru,. − rk,.||2
where i and k are two different users in the set of n users (i 6= k, {i, k ∈ n}) and user k is
more similar to u than the user i.
After completing the search operation the RSP finds the set of users l = 1, 2, ..., n′ who are
similar to query user u based on the search results. The query user can set n′ by her choice.
In other words, the RSP ranks the list of n users based on search results and the query user
can select first n′ users, where n′ < n.
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4.2.5 Computing User Similarity Weight
4.2.5.1 System Model
Group Formation
Once the query user finds the n′ similar users, all of them including query user register with a
pseudonym and forms a group. Let l = 1, 2, ..., n′ and n′+ 1 is total number of users including
query users in the group. Then the user u can invite the other users with the help of RSP to
join the group to participate in recommendation process. The user l can accept or decline the
invitation to join in the recommendation process. If the user u believes that the total number
of users n′ is not enough, he/she can request the RSP to find more similar users and invite
them as explained.
Key Generation
The members in the group are able to generate the secret and public keys of ElGamal cryp-
tosystem. They generate their own public and secret keys ({pkl, skl}, {pku, sku})and combine
the public keys to form a shared public key (PKn′). Then any user l from set n
′ encrypts
his/her ratings rl,j and Rl,j using PKn′ . and sends E(Rl,j)HE to user u, where E(rl,j)HE is
sent to RSP. Then the query user collaborates to perform homomorphic multiplication and
additions to compute the similarity weight between her and another user l. This process is
repeated for l = 1, 2, ..., n′ users to find the similarity between u and other n′ users. The
encrypted similarity E(s(u, l))HE is sent to RSP to predict the missing ratings. In below we
show the methodology of finding the similarity between user u and user l homomorphically.
4.2.5.2 Methodology
Step 1: User u and l generate their own secret and public keys as,
skl = xl, sku = xu and yl = g
xl , yu = g
xu
They combine their public keys to form common public key as follows
Y = gxl · gxu = gxl+xu
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The shared common public key is defined as PKHE = {p, g, Y } where p is a prime number
and g is group generator. Any operation in the protocol is done with modulus p.
Step 2: For any item j = 1, 2, ...,m, user l encrypts using common public key as follows.
E(Rl,j)HE = {grl , gRl,j · Y rl}
where rl denotes secret random number used to encrypt by user l.
Step 3: The user l sends the ciphertext E(Rl,j)HE to query user. The query user performs,
E(Rl,j ·Ru,j)HE = (E(Rl,j)HE)Ru,j
The user l repeats it for all items j and sends them to query user. To compute the similarity,
the query user computes as
E(s(u, l))HE =
m∏
j=1
(E(Rl,j)HE)
Ru,j (4.14)
Where s(u, l) denotes the similarity between user u and l. After computing the encrypted
similarity, the query user sends this ciphertext to RSP
Theorem 7. If user u and l follow the protocol we have that E(s(u, l))HE =
∏m
j=1(E(Rl,j)HE)
Ru,j
Proof.
m∏
j=1
(E(Rl,j)HE)
Ru,j
=
m∏
j=1
(grl , gRl,j · Y rl)Ru,j
=
m∏
j=1
(grl(Ru,j), gRl,j ·Ru,j · Y rl·Ru,j )
=grl
∑
Ru,j , g
∑
Rl,j ·Ru,j · Y rl·
∑
Ru,j
=E(s(u, l))HE
(4.15)
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4.2.6 Predicting Missing Ratings and Item Ranking
4.2.6.1 Setting
From the last section, the RSP holds the encrypted similarity between query user u and l as
E(s(u, l))HE and the encrypted ratings of user l as E(rl,j)HE .
4.2.6.2 Protocol Description
Recall the equation of item prediction, we are interested in ranking the items from the set of
predicted ratings for which the items were not rated by the query user. Therefore, we can
ignore the denominator part of equation 2.13 and rewrite the equation as
Pu,t =
n′∑
l=1
rl,j · s(u, l) (4.16)
where t = 1, 2, ...,m′ are the target items for which we want to predict the ratings. In below
we show the privacy preserving protocol for rating prediction. To facilitate this computation
we adopt the protocol described in [116, 177] where one party holds two homomorphically
encrypted values E(m1)HE and E(m2)HE , and another party who holds the secret key can
collaborate to output E(m1 · m2)HE without any party learning m1 or m2. In our case no
party holds the secret key by its self but all users have their own secret keys and all of them
need to collaborate to decrypt the ciphertext. Therefore we modify the original protocol [177]
to adapt in our scenario so that (1) all parties can collaborate to share their secret keys (no
private information or secret keys are disclosed) and (2) unlike the original protocol, we decrypt
only one ciphertext among the two: E(m1)HE and E(m2)HE . This way we can improve both
the performance and security.
Step 1: All users in the registered group encrypt and send the ratings to RSP except the
query user.
E(rl,j)HE = g
rl , grl,j · Y rl
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Step 2: The RSP selects two uniformly distributed random numbers rs1 and rs2 and performs
homomorphic addition as follows.
E(r1l,j)HE = E(rl,j)HE · E(−rs1)HE
= grl−rs1 , grl,j−rs1Y rl−rs1
E(s1(u, l))HE = E(s(u, l))HE · E(−rs2)HE
= gv−rs2 , gs(u,l)−rs2Y v−rs1
where v = rl
∑
Ru,j , from equation 4.15. The RSP sends these ciphertexts to query user.
Step 3: The query user sends a notification request and broadcasts A = grl−rs1 and B = gv−rs2
to user l so that everybody can contribute to decrypt by sharing their secret keys. The protocol
for sharing the secret keys privately and followed by decryption is described below.
Step 4: The user l performs Axl , Bxl and send them to user u. The user u also performs Axu
and Bxu using his own secret key and decrypt E(s1(u, l))HE as follows (detail proof is shown
theorem 2).
D(E(s1(u, l)))HE = s
1(u, l)
The user u performs E(s1(u, l) · r1u,l)HE = E(r1(l, j))s
1(u,l) homomorphically and sends this
back to RSP.
Step 5: The server computes as follows.
E(s1(u, l) · r1l,j) · E(rl,j)rs2 · E(su,l)rs1 · E(−rs1 · rs2)
= E(s1(u, l) · r1l,j + rl,j · rs2 + su,l · rs1 − rs1rs2)
= E(s(u, l) · rl,j)
Step 6: To predict the missing ratings, the RSP performs,
E(Pu,t) =
n′∏
l
E(s(u, l) · rl,j)
Step 7: The server sends the ciphertext to query user u. Then query user sends another
notification to user l to share the secret key to decrypt the results (similar to step 4).
D(E(Pu,t)) =
n′∑
l
s(u, l) · rl,j
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Theorem 8. If user u and l follow the protocol, we have D(E(s1(u, l))) = s1(u, l).
Proof. According to step 3 and 4, query user sends B = gv−rs2 to user l. User l computes Bxl
using its own secret key and sends back to u. In the mean time user u also computes Bxu .
According to decryption function using ElGamal cryptosystem, the query user decrypts as
D(E(s1(u, l)))HE =
gs(u,l)−rs2Y v−rs1
Bxl ·Bxu
=
gs(u,l)−rs2Y v−rs1
(gv−rs2)xl · (gv−rs2)xu
=
gs(u,l)−rs2(gxl+xu)v−rs1
(gv−rs2)xl · (gv−rs2)xu
=
gs(u,l)−rs2(gxl+xu)v−rs1
(gxl+xu)v−rs1
= gs(u,l)−rs2 = gs
1(u,l)
To retrieve s1(u, l) from gs
1(u,l), the query user computes discrete logarithm as log
(D(E(s1(u,l)))HE)=s
1(u,l)
g .
Remark:The size of s1(u, l) is not large, therefore computing discrete logarithm is not hard.
Theorem 9. If user u and l follow the protocol, we have D(E(Pu,t)) =
∑n′
l s(u, l) · rl,j.
Proof. From homomorphic properties we have that,
E(s1(u, l) · r1u,l)HE
=E(r1(l, j))s
1(u,l)
=gs
1(u,l)(rl−rs1), gs
1(u,l)(rl,j−rs1)Y s
1(u,l)(rl−rs1)
(E(r1l,j)HE)
rs1 = grs2·(rl−rs1), grs2(rl,j−rs1)Y rs2(rl−rs1)
(E(s1(u, l))HE)
rs2 = grs2(p−rs2rs2 , grs2(s(u,l)−rs2)Y rs2(p−rs1)
(E(−rs1rs2)HE) = grs3 , g−rs1rs2Y rs3
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The encrypted prediction is computed by
E(Pu,t) =
n′∏
l
E(s(u, l) · rl,j)
=
n′∏
l
(E(s1(u, l) · r1l,j) · E(rl,j)rs2 · E(su,l)rs1 · E(−rs1 · rs2))
=(gX , g
∑
l s
1(u,l)·r1l,j+rl,j ·rs2+su,l·rs1−rs1rs2Y X)
where X =
∑
l(s
1(u, l)(rl − rs1))(rs2 · (rl − rs1))(rs2(v − rs2rs2)(rs3).
The query user sends gX to user l. The query user and user l performs (gX)xu and (gX)xl
respectively and (gX)xl is received by query user. The u decrypts as follows.
Decryption is performed as follows.
D(E(Pu,t))
=
g
∑
l s
1(u,l)·r1l,j+rl,j ·rs2+su,l·rs1−rs1rs2Y X)
(gX)xl · (gX)xu
=
g
∑
l s
1(u,l)·r1l,j+rl,j ·rs2+su,l·rs1−rs1rs2(gxl+xu)X
(gX)xl+xu
=g
∑n′
l s(u,l)·rl,j
To retrieve
∑n′
l s(u, l) ·rl,j , the query user computes discrete logarithm as log
∑n′
l s(u,l)·rl,j
g =∑n′
l s(u, l) · rl,j .
4.2.7 Privacy Analysis
In this section we analyze the privacy of secure search scheme using DRE as well as secure
similarity and item ranking protocols. The goal is to preserve users’ privacy from server and
any third party intruder.
According to our system the m has to be sufficiently large. For example RSA keys are
required to be at least 1024 bits. It is shown that 1024 bits RSA keys are equally strong as 80-
bit symmetric keys [178]. In our protocol we set m as 100 which is sufficiently large. Moreover
as analysed by [178, 180] we also split the rating vectors. We choose a secret configuration of
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vector bits S1, S2, ..., Sj , ..., Sm, where Sj = {0, 1}. If Si,j = 1, we split r′uj into rua,ja and rub,jb
and set rua,ja = rub,jb. Otherwise we set two random values such that rua,ja + rub,jb = r
′
uj .
This configuration is secretly shared among the users in the group. Since the configuration is
unknown to server, there are in total 2m possible choices and therefore the scheme is 2m costly
for the server to break the system.
The similarity and rating prediction protocol depends on the semantic security of homo-
morphic encryptions. At the beginning all users encrypts their rating vectors using common
public key Y . Note that, each user shares their own gx to form the Y without disclosing the
secret key x. The ciphertexts are sent and stored in server. By using the common public key,
its not possible to decrypt the ciphertext by any one user unless they all collude with each
other. That means we need gxl+xu for both user u and l to decrypt the ciphertext and it is
secure as long as at lest 1 user is honest among n users. Therefore it is not possible for server
or any user to decrypt the ciphertext without sharing all of their secret keys. In the similarity
protocol, the query user received the ciphertext of Rl,j from other user l to calculate the sim-
ilarity homomrophically. This protocol does not disclose any plaintext or private information
of other users to query user while computing similarity.
Then the server performs E(s1(u, l) ·r1l,j) ·E(rl,j)rs2 ·E(su,l)rs1 ·E(−rs1 ·rs2) to get E(s(u, l) ·
rl,j) and finally it performs
∏n′
l E(s(u, l)·rl,j) to get the encrypted prediction or missing rating.
Note that, the server uses homomorphic operations and none of the value was in plaintext or
disclosed to server or any other users. Once the query user receives the encrypted prediction,
all other users are notified and share their secret keys as (gX)xl . Since xl is of 1024 bits, its
very hard to perform discrete log to find xl from this value. This way query user combines
(gX)xu with (gX)xl as (gX)xl+xu by multiplying these two values and decrypts the ciphertext
of predicted rating value. Therefore, the decryption is done without revealing any private
information of any user.
4.2.8 Performance Analysis
We have conducted a set of experiments to evaluate the performance of our protocol. Our
experimental analysis is organized as follows. First, we analyze the computation complexity
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Table 4.3: Notations and descriptions.
Notations Description
e Modular Exponentiation
md Modular Multiplication
de Decryption using Paillier
m′ Number of items that user has not invoked before
md Modular multiplication
dl discrete log operation
for each stage of our protocol. Second, we present the performance of our method on publicly
available dataset Grouplens [172]. We address and analyze the following points.
• The computation complexity of the overall protocol.
• Performance evaluation of the protocol in terms of secure symmetric DRE scheme to
search similar users, privacy preserving similarity and recommendation.
• Scalability of different scheme in terms of increasing the number of users and items.
To conduct the experiments, we use Java 2 SE 8 including cryptographic libraries on a hardware
platform with OS windows 7, 64 bit and 3.6 GHz- core i7 and 8GB CPU unit. For the
performance measurement, the metrices we considered in our experiment are shown in table
4.3.
4.2.8.1 Computation Complexity
In below we present the computational complexities of three different protocols: DRE based
similar user search, user similarity computation and item ranking. Table 4.4 shows the overall
complexities of each protocols.
DRE based Search
This protocol consists of mainly two stages: key generation and secure search operation. The
overall complexity of key generation is O(m+1)×O(m+1) for generating two m+1 invertiable
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Table 4.4: Computation complexity and required time of different entities of the system.
DRE Scheme Similarity Computations item ranking
Computation Complexity
User l (m+ 1)Edre 2(2e+md)m e
User u (m+ 1)Edre mn
′e+ (m− 1)md e+ (md +
√
Te)n′
Server n mn′md + n′md + (3md + 2e)n′ + (n′ − 1)md
Required Time (n = 300,m = 100, n′ = 30)
User l .001s .009s 2× 10−5s
User u .001s .06s .012s
Server 0.48 .019s
metrices, O(m + 1) for generating a vector S and O(m + 1) for generating random numbers,
where m is the total number of items. The DRE search scheme search through O(n) users
to rank the users based on the euclidean distance between query user and other users’ rating
experiences.
Similarity Computation
To compute the similarities between query user and other users, the protocol allows all users to
encrypt their ratings ru,j and Ru,j , and send the encrypted results to the RSP. As the ElGamal
cryptosystem consists of two ciphetrtexts created by performing two modular exponentiations
and one multiplication, the total time to encrypt ru,j and Ru,j for m webs services becomes
4e + 2md. To compute the similarities, the query user performs m modular exponentiations
for m services, and finally performs m − 1 modular multiplications to homomorphically add
the resultant ciphertexts to get the additions in plaintexts. This computations takes total
mne+ (m− 1)md seconds.
Item Ranking
To get the item recommendations, the RSP predicts the missing ratings and sends the encrypted
results to the query user. The RSP holds the ciphertexts of the ratings and similarity between
u and l as s(u, l). According to step 2, the RSP computes E(r1l,j) and E(s
1(u, l)) which take
Privacy Preserving Item Ranking using Efficient Encrypted Search 114
Figure 4.6: (a)Required time of DRE based encryption and its effect on number of items for each
user (n = 300) (b) Required time of nearest neighbor search by DRE scheme and its effect on
increasing number of users (m = 100) (c)Required time for Similarity Computation and rating
Prediction Scheme by increasing the number of items (n′ = 30) (d) Required time for Similarity
Computation and rating Prediction Scheme by increasing the number of similar users (n′ = 30)
(e) item ranking accuracy in terms of different set of items (t = {10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40}).
two modular multiplications i.e, 2md seconds.
The user l performs one modular exponentiation to perform Axl and Bxl which takes
2e seconds in step 3. To perform the decryption of E(s1(u, l)) in step 4, the query user
performs (B)xl · (B)xu (one modular multiplication) and a discrete logarithm which takes total
md +
√
Te seconds, since one discrete logarithm takes
√
Te seconds. Also the user performs
one modular exponentiation e and sends the ciphertexts to RSP. In this step the query user
takes md +
√
Te+ e seconds in total.
In step 5, the server performs three modular multiplications 3md and two modular expo-
nentiation 2e, which takes total 3md + 2e seconds. Finally, to predict the missing ratings, the
RSP has to perform n′ − 1 modular multiplications which takes md(n′ − 1) seconds.
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4.2.8.2 Efficiency
In this section we present the required time of DRE scheme in terms of encryption and secret
search operations. To test the performance of our proposed scheme we reduce the dataset into
300 users and 100 web sesrvices. That means initially we have n = 300 and m = 100. Figure
4.6(a) shows the scalability of encryption interms of the number of items. Since the users can
perform the encryptions in parallel, in our protocol the encryption does not depend on the
number of users, but the number of items. This figure shows the scalability for up to 100
items. Figure 4.6(b) shows the effect of nearest neighbor search in terms of increasing total
number of users up to 300, where the number of items is fixed at 100. The search process uses
a simple linear algorithm by using a heap structure to maintain the n′ closest points to the
query. In our experiment we choose n′ = 30. From figure 4.6(a) and 4.6(b) it is clear that the
DRE scheme performs linearly to the number of items and users in terms of encryption and
nearest neighbor search respectively.
Figure 4.6(c) shows the required time for similarity computation and rating prediction
schemes by varying the number of items and fixing the number of users to 30. On the other side,
the figure 4.6(d) shows the required time of both rating prediction and similarity computation
schemes while varying the number of users and fixing the number of items. For figures 4.6(c) and
4.6(d) it is clear that similarity computation takes longer time than rating predictions except
in the case of varying the number of items. For very small number of items, the similarity
computation is faster than rating prediction scheme but it gradually increases with increasing
the number of items. The reason of consuming higher computation cost of similarity scheme is
that user u has to perform m modular exponentiation and the results are being multiplied as
modular multiplication which is of m−1 times. Therefore it is clear that the protocol depends
on the number of items m and in our case the m is higher than the total number of similar
users n′ = 30.
Table 4.4 shows required time of our protocol in terms of different schemes, users and the
server. Initially the user has to perform very little computations in DRE scheme which takes
0.001 seconds for each user. The server takes only 0.48 seconds to complete the DRE scheme
and to find 30 nearest neighbor users. The users are involved in similarity computations which
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take 0.009 seconds and 0.06 seconds for user l and user u respectively. The main reason to
consume more time for user u than user l is that, most of the computation is done by the
query user side. For rating prediction scheme the server takes on 0.019 seconds to predict one
ratings where the number of nearest users is 30.
4.2.8.3 Recommendation Accuracy
We test the accuracy of proposed privacy preserving item recommendation protocol using
spearman correlation coefficient. Randomly 10 query users are chosen to predict missing rating
for them and we run the prediction on different set of items. Based on the prediction result,
we rank the items as recommendation. We repeat the process for 10 query users and take the
average result. We run same experiment two times: as privacy preserving protocol and without
privacy preserving to check how the privacy preserving system differs from the original one.
Note that we did not contribute to modify or to improve the recommendation system itself
but only privacy preserving part. We choose the items which are already invoked by the query
users, that means the test items have the ratings corresponding to the query user. Concretely,
We randomly select 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40 items for one query user and rank them first based
on available rating. Then we run the proposed privacy preserving recommendation and rank
the items for those 6 different sets. Then we compare the ranking with the available rating
based ranking. We also run the protocol without privacy functionalities to get the rankings
and compare it with available one. Figure 4.6(e) shows the such comparison where we found
that for both cases (with and without privacy functionalities) the system gives almost same
accuracy and the loss of accuracy of privacy preserving protocol is very low. It starts to degrade
when the number of items is more than 20.
4.2.9 Summary
In this work we have proposed a secure item recommendation protocol which is composed of
three sub protocols: secure DRE based search, secure similarity computation and secure rating
prediction followed by recommendations. Finding the similar user based a threshold value in
privacy preserving manner is time consuming and inefficient using homomorphic encryption.
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To overcome this situation we have introduced the DRE based search scheme into item rec-
ommendation to find n′ nearest users based on their rating experience which reduces the total
user space from n to n′, where n′ < n. Then we perform privacy preserving cosine similarity
computations on the reduced space of users n′. Therefore we do not need to perform secure
comparison protocol but at the same time we are able to find similarity weight of the similar
users. The system output of DRE scheme which gives the set of similar users can be used
in other different services rather than only item recommendations where we do not need to
calculate similarity weight. For example if any query user wants to find the places which were
visited by other users with similar preferences. In this kind of scenario we do not need to
calculate the cosine similarity and the protocol would be more efficient interms of computa-
tion complexities. Therefore our protocol has lots of potentiality to use in different privacy
preserving online systems.
4.3 Epilogue
The contributions of this chapter answers the research question RQ-2 by addressing the research
challenges described in section 1.4.2. In this Chapter we have presented two different protocols
for privacy preserving user based recommender systems. The protocol presented in section
4.1 solves some of the privacy issues in existing solutions and able to recommend suitable
items to users without learning any private information. The protocol presented in section
4.2 presents another privacy preserving protocol for user based recommendation system by
applying efficient encrypted search based technique to reduce the user space based on similarity
threshold privately and efficiently as well as solve the privacy issues and challenges in user based
recommendation systems described in section 1.4.2. In next chapter, we will address the privacy
issues in context aware recommendation system since the proposed protocols in Chapter 3 and
4 are not suitable for integrating contextual information into recommender system thus not able
to provide recommendation considering user or item context. Moreover the privacy challenges
and requirements of context aware recommendation system are different than standalone user
or item based recommendation system. Therefore, in next Chapter we investigate the privacy
issues in context aware recommendation system and present an application scenario where our
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proposed privacy preserving context aware recommendation can be applied.
Chapter 5
Privacy Preserving Context Aware
Recommendation System
The privacy preserving techniques for recommendation system we developed so far are useful
for standalone recommendation system where the missing ratings are predicted based on other
available ratings and the similarity between users or items. The developed protocols in earlier
chapters may not be useful in the cases where the users’ choices or preferences depend on
different contextual information. For example, an user is interested for certain type of locations
like restaurants, which are located nearby to his/her home and similar type of people in terms
of preferences have visited those places. For another example, users may be interested on those
places which were visited by his/her close friends only. To facilitate such recommendations,
we not only require users past experiences or choices on those places but also we require to
integrate these contextual information such as social network and geographical locations to
influence the prediction on new places or any items for which the experiences are affected
by contextual information. In Chapter-1 section 1.4.3 we described the challenges in context
aware recommendations. One of the main challenges is integrating contextual information into
recommendation since users’ contextual information are also private such as locations, social
network. To address these challenges in this chapter we develop privacy preserving context
aware recommendation system which also answers the research question RQ-3. Specifically
we choose two different application scenarios: (1) personalized web service recommendation
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where users’ location is important since users’ experience on different web service depends on
their locations and (2) personalized restaurant recommendation where users’ social network
influences their choice of visiting restaurants. So in section 5.1 of this chapter we present the
privacy preserving protocol for location aware web service recommendations and in section 5.2
we present the privacy preserving protocol for location recommendations based on users’ social
network.
5.1 Privacy Preserving Location Aware Web Service
Recommendation
The personalized web service recommendation techniques based QoS [181] is useful in find-
ing the right web services for users which they have not invoked before. Unlike the movie
recommendation, described in earlier chapters the web service recommendation depends on
QoS experience which is different than ratings. One example of QoS is response time of using
any services. The lower the response time, the better the web service is. However, this QoS
experience also depends on users geographical locations os users and web services since QoS
performance is highly influenced by the strength of network connections between Web services
and users. Different users may have different experiences on the same Web service only because
of their geographical location. The recent studies have also shown a great improvement in ac-
curacy of recommendations incorporating the location of users and Web services. Despite the
fact that a location-aware Web service recommender system is a great tool to find a suitable
and more accurate services for a user, a huge drawback is that this relies in their security and
privacy threat to users’ personal information and also for Web service providers. The private
information consists of the QoS values and geographical location information. Moreover, to
generate an effective Web service recommendation, users need to provide as much as informa-
tion they can since the more data available to the server, the more accurate recommendations
can be generated. Usually, third party service providers cannot be trusted. Moreover, security
breaches can happen in two ways. Firstly, the user information stored in the recommender
server may get leaked, either intentionally or unintentionally [84]. For example, leaking the
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Figure 5.1: Personalized Web service ranking for Query User (QU) based on locations and QoS
values by service provider and privacy issues while providing recommendations.
QoS may expose the underlying application configuration and the application providers are not
willing to share these data. Secondly, if the recommender server is malicious, it may misuse
the data by disclosing to a third party. Therefore, it is necessary to build a privacy preserving
Web service recommendation system so that any private information is kept private and at the
same time, the recommendation service provider is able to recommend suitable Web services
to users without disclosing any private information.
5.1.1 Motivation and Contribution
5.1.1.1 Motivational Scenario
The QoS is highly dependent on an important factor: the quality of network connections
established between users and Web Services, which is highly relevant to the locations of the
Web Services and the users. Therefore, it is highly likely that any user’s experiences on a set
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of Web Services are similar to another user if they are located nearby with each other.
Effect of Locations in Web Service Ranking
Fig. 5.1 represents a scenario where different users have already invoked some Web Services.
The QoS is stored in the cloud, which is possibly a service provider that generates recommen-
dations on Web Services. The users and the Web services in this figure are represented as U-1,
U-2,..., U-10 and WS-1, WS-2,...,WS-8 respectively. A Query User (QU) wants the recommen-
dations on Web services which were not invoked before. For instance, QU (from Fig. 5.1) has
not invoked WS-5 and this user wants to find how likely is that QU will experience good QoS
on WS-5. To generate personalized recommendations, it is necessary for the Recommender
Server to find the similarities between QU and other users based on their QoS experiences on
different Web services. From Fig. 5.1, it is clear that both U-4 and U-6 are similar to QU
since all have invoked WS-4. Moreover, both U-4 and U-6 have also invoked WS-5. However,
since QU is located near U-6, it is highly likely that QoS experience of QU on WS-4 is going to
be more similar to U-6 than U-4. Therefore, it is appropriate to eliminate from consideration
those users who are further away in finding their QoS-based similarities.
Privacy Issues
The top part of Fig. 5.1 shows the privacy issues while generating a QoS-based Web service
ranking for QU. Note that the QoS and the locations are private information for both users
and Web service providers. The QoS and the locations have to be stored with any service
providers to get online recommendations on Web services. The system can be compromised by
an intruder, or the servers may try to break the system by learning users private information
while storing such information. Moreover, the servers may try to leak the information or
generate false recommendations. Therefore it is necessary to hide as much private information
as possible from the servers while providing Web service recommendations.
Summary of our Motivation
In summary we can list our main motivations as follows
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• Service users are usually not experts on Web service evaluation. Moreover, it is time-
consuming and impractical for service users to evaluate all the Web service candidates,
since there are a lot of Web services in the Internet.
• Users’ QoS experiences depends on their geo-graphical locations and therefore, location
information effects in Web service recommendation.
• The geographical locations as well as the QoS values are private to users and they usually
do not want to share these information to any third party service provider or other users.
5.1.1.2 Our Contribution
The main goal of this work is to rank the Web services by predicting the missing QoS values
for any particular user QU based on users’ locations and past experiences with other Web
services in a privacy preserving manner. The QoS experiences and locations are encrypted
before sending to the service providers for further processing. Specifically, we have considered
the Round Trip Time (RTT)1 as QoS values in our proposed protocol. This work is also an
extension of our previous work [107], which was published in ICDCS-17. In [107], we proposed
a privacy preserving protocol for generating movie recommendations based on users’ ratings.
In this work we extend the previous protocol by incorporating another sub-protocol where QU
is able to calculate distances with other users and to filter a set of users who are located nearby
or within a given region in a privacy preserving manner. All of the users locations and distances
are kept private while performing this operation. The encrypted QoS values of nearby users are
used to calculate similarity and QoS prediction for QU. Another extension is that the proposed
protocol is investigated on a different scenario, which is the Web service recommendations based
on QoS values and geographical locations of users. To the best of our knowledge, we are the
first to use the geographical locations in creating Web service recommendations and preserving
the privacy of users using cryptography-based techniques. Specifically, our contributions are
as follows:
1The RTT is defined as the time duration between a service user sending a request and receiving a response
from Web service.
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1. For the first time we propose a location-aware Web service recommendations framework
in a privacy preserving manner and users’ privacy are preserved using cryptography-based
techniques.
2. We propose a new privacy preserving user filtering protocol based on the locations where
the users, who are not within a given region can be eliminated, without actually disclosing
their locations. The proposed distance computation and user filtering protocols are not
only useful in providing Web service recommendations but also in other types of location-
based services, where geographical locations are provided in latitude-longitude format.
3. We incorporate the proposed user filtering protocol in Web service recommendations,
so that the QoS prediction can be influenced by the QoS experiences of nearby located
users.
4. Our protocol is able to predict missing QoS for QU without disclosing any private infor-
mation to service providers. Moreover, all the computations are carried out in a privacy
preserving manner.
5.1.2 System Model
In the protocol settings, as shown in Fig. 5.2, we incorporate two service providers: Rec-
ommender Server (RS) and Privacy Server (PS), similar to previously established techniques
[107, 116], where RS is responsible for generating recommendations and PS is responsible for
providing cryptographic primitives such as generating keys and decryption power for public
key encryption. We assume that the participants in the system are honest but curious and that
there is no collusion between them. It is feasible to choose such system with two servers not
colluding with each other since a certification authority2 can certify the servers by providing a
(1) Certification Letter outlining the details of the certification and describing the conditions of
holding certification and (2) Certification Report which provides customers with an overview of
2As an example, in Australia, the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) certifies the cloud services based on
relevant policies (e.g., Australian Government Information Security Manual and Australian Privacy Principles)
and this certification motivates service providers to be honest. More related information can be found in
https://www.asd.gov.au/infosec/irap/certified clouds.htm
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Figure 5.2: System model.
the security aspects which should be considered prior to accreditation. Specifically, the system
model consists of two servers and a total of n users who hold their geographical locations and
QoS values. The protocol is divided into two sections. The first section is privacy preserving
user filtering where the QU filters set of users who are located nearby or within a given region.
The second section is privacy preserving Web service ranking in which the PS generates key
pairs and all users use the public key to encrypt their QoS values which are stored by the RS.
Upon receiving the query, the RS predicts the missing QoS for QU using homomorphic prop-
erties of public key encryptions and sends the resultant ciphertexts to PS. Then PS uses its
decryption power to decrypt the results and returns the ranking of Web services based on the
predictions. At the end of the protocol, the RS and PS retain no private information relating
to any users. According to our protocol, the RS and PS are loosely coupled where the PS can
serve multiple users and RSs for recommendations in different areas.
5.1.3 Preliminaries
5.1.3.1 Notations and Definitions
The following described notations will be used for the rest of the section 5.1.
1. k = 1, 2, ..., n is a set of users and j = 1, 2, ...,m is a set of Web services, where n and m
represents total number of users and Web services respectively. The Query User (QU)
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who wants to get recommendations on unobserved Web services, also represented as u
(we will represent the query user as u or QU throughout the rest of the section 5.1).
2. rk,j represents a QoS value which has been generated by the invocation of user k on Web
service j. rk,j = 0 if the QoS is missing, which means the user k has not invoked the
Web service j.
3. r¯k, r¯u and s(u, k) represent the average QoS values of user k, u and the similarity between
users u and k.
4. Pu,j represents the prediction of missing QoS values for user u on Web service j.
5. A geographical location of a user k is presented as lk = (pk,1, pk,2), where pk,1 and pk,2
represents the latitude and longitude of the location.
6. t represents the distance threshold. The n′ presents the set of users who are not located
within t distance from u.
7. PK and SK define the public and private keys of our cryptographic protocols. Epk(m)
and Dsk(C) present the encryption of a plaintext m and decryption function of ciphertext
C using public and secret key respectively.
5.1.4 Overview of the Proposed Framework
The proposed protocol aims to hide users’ private information from RS, PS and other users
while performing any computation. The private information includes users’ locations, QoS
values, similarities among the users, the QoS predictions as well as any kind of intermediate
computation results. In our protocol, whether or not a user has invoked any Web service is
also kept private. The proposed framework consists mainly of two stages: privacy preserving
user filtering based on location and Web service recommendations.
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5.1.4.1 User Filtering
1. The QU, also denoted as u, generates public and private keys of the Paillier encryption
scheme and encrypts her own location using the public key. QU then sends the encrypted
location along with the distance threshold to another user, k.
2. User k computes her distance with u homomorphically and performs a part of filtering
operation. Then user k returns the encrypted results to QU.
3. The QU decrypts the resultant distance using the secret key of Paillier encryption. If
the user k is located within the given threshold, then the decryption of encrypted result
returns zero and the k is identified as “nearby located user”. Otherwise, the decryption
outputs a noise (long random number) and then k is identified as “not located nearby”.
5.1.4.2 Web Service Recommendations
1. At the initialization phase, all users perform a few pre-computations on their own QoS
vectors locally. Then they encrypt those pre-computation results and QoS values using
the public key of BGN scheme. All ciphertexts are then uploaded to RS.
2. Once QU sends the query to RS, the server returns the ciphertexts of pre-computed
values. Then the QU computes similarity with those users who are located within the
given threshold region and returns the resultant ciphertexts of similarities.
3. RS predicts the missing QoS values homomorphically using the encrypted similarities
and encrypted QoS values. The resultant ciphertexts of prediction are sent to PS for
decryption. The list of resultant ciphertexts on Web service prediction is permuted before
they are sent to PS so that, even after decryption, PS cannot find the corresponding index
of Web services (similar method is used as shown in our previous version [107]).
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5.1.5 Proposed Recommendation Protocol
5.1.5.1 User Filtering
For simplicity, we assume that the users are located on a 2D space and we convert the users
geographical locations (more information about the datasets are described in section 8) into
2D plane [136]. This does not affect the generality since there exists a bijection between spher-
ical locations and Euclidean locations. Using the Euclidean points, it is feasible to compute
homomorphic distances between users rather than computing on latitude-longitude (similar
assumption was made by the authors in [182]). The resultant 2D points are generally float-
ing point numbers and we round the values into next floor integers since the homomorphic
operations does not support floating point numbers.
Settings
The QU computes the public and secret keys of Paillier encryption scheme as PK = {N, g}
and SK = {λ, µ}. For more details about the key generations, please refer to the [113]. The
Query User u and another user k hold their locations as lu = (pu,1, pu,2) and lk = (pk,1, pk,2)
respectively (k is one of the users from set of n).
Distance Computation
Algorithm 1 shows the privacy preserving distance computation between the QU and another
user k. At the beginning of this protocol, the QU generates the public and private keys of
Paillier cryptosystem and sends the public key to k. In step 1 of Algorithm 1, the Query User
u encrypts her location information as follows.
C1u = g
−pu,1 · (r1)N = E(−pu,1)
C2u = g
−pu,2 · (r2)N = E(−pu,2)
(5.1)
C3u = g
(pu,1)2+(pu,2)2 · rN1 = E((pu,1)2 + (pu,2)2) (5.2)
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Algorithm 1: Distance Computation
1 Input: PK, lu,lk, distance threshold T
2 Output: E(du,k) = E((pu,1 − pk,1)2 + (pu,2 − pk,2)2)
3 1. The Query User u encrypts own location information as follows and sends the
ciphertexts to user k
C1u = E(−pu,1), C2u = E(−pu,2)
C3u = E((pu,1)
2 + (pu,2)
2)
2. The Query User u also chooses threshold T and a unit of the distance s, which are
published to user k.
4 3. Query User u broadcasts the ciphertexts C1u, C
2
u and C
3
u to another user k
5 4. After receiving the ciphertexts, the user k computes as follows
C4u,k = (C
1
u)
2pk,1 = E(−pu,1)2pk,1 = E(−2pu,1 · pk,1)
C5u,k = (C
2
u,k)
2pk,2 = E(−pu,2)2pk,2 = E(−2pu,2 · pk,2)
C6k = E((pk,1)
2 + (pk,2)
2)
5. Finally, the user k computes as follows
6
C7u,k = C
3
u · C4u,k · C5u,k · C6k
= E((pu,1 − pk,1)2 + (pu,2 − pk,2)2)
= E(du,k)
return C7u,k
7 6. The list of encrypted distances of all users from set of n are permuted as
perm({C7u,k}k=1 to n) and sent to QU
3In step 2, the QU selects the threshold T and the unit of the distance s, and publishes
the parameters to user k. The user k will create a range of threshold from 1 to T · s as
t = 1 · s, 2 · s, ...T · s such that the range is continuous. All values in this range will be
subtracted from the resultant encrypted distance E(du,k) so that, any distance E(du,k) within
this range [1 · s : s : T · s] will be zero.
In step 4 and 5, the user k computes the distance from QU using the homomorphic property
3For example, u chooses the threshold 30 Km. Then, the T = 3 and s = 10. This is to generalize the
distance computation on any types of unit.
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Algorithm 2: Filtering nearby users
1 Input: C7u,k, T , 124 bit long random number r, SK
2 Output: List of users who are located near to u
3 1. The user k encrypts the range of threshold t = 1 · s, 2 · s, ..., T · s as C8t = E(−t).
4 2. Each user k also generates random number r1k and computes as follows
5 for t=1s to T do
6
C9u,k,z = (C
7
u,k · C8t )r
1
k
= E(du,k − t) · r1k
7 end
8 3. The user k sends E((du,k − t) · r1k) to QU.
9 4.The QU decrypts C9u,k,z received from user k using her own private key as
10 for t=1s to Ts do
11
Distu,k,t = D(C
9
u,k,t, SK) = (du,k − t) · rt,k
if Distu,k,t == 0 then
12 return k;
13 end
14 return
15 end
of Paillier cryptosystem. For instance, user k computes as
C4u,k = (C
1
u)
2pk,1 = (g−pu,1 · rN1 )2pk,1
= (g−pu,1·2pk,1 · rN ·2pk,11
= E(−2pu,1 · pk,1)
(5.3)
and similarly we have,
C5u,k = (C
2
u,k)
2pk,2 = E(−pu,2)2pk,2 = E(−2pu,2 · pk,2) (5.4)
The user k also computes
C6u = g
(pu,1)2+(pu,2)2 · rN1 = E((pu,1)2 + (pu,2)2) (5.5)
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Finally the user k multiplies the ciphertexts C3u, C
5
u, C
6
u and C
7
k to get the distance between
user u and k as follows.
C7u,k = C
3
u · C4u,k · C5u,k · C6k = E(du,k) (5.6)
Note that during this protocol of Algorithm 1, QU’s location information is kept secret to
user k and the user k are not able to decrypt since the secret key is held by QU only. once
the distance computation is done between user u and k, the list of distances is permuted as
perm({C7u,k}k=1,2,...,n) and sent to QU.
Filtering Nearby Users
Algorithm 2 shows how to filter those users who are located within the given threshold region
[1 · s : s : T · s]. In step 1 of Algorithm 2, the user k encrypts the threshold range as E(−1 ·
s), E(−2 ·s), ..., E(−T ·s). Since the k needs to subtract T from the distance and homomorphic
properties does not support subtraction, the user k follows the protocol to encrypt −t and
compute homomorphic addition as described below.
From step 2 of Algorithm 2 of user filtering, we find that the user k subtracts the range
of thresholds t from its distance with QU and multiplies a random number r1k (124 bits of
number) homomorphically as
C9u,k,t = (C
7
u,k · C8t )r
1
k = E(du,k − t)r
1
k
t=1·s to T ·s (5.7)
In the above equation, we may have two different scenarios:
1. If the computed distance du,k between QU (or user u) and user k is actually equal to the
threshold t (from the range [1 ·s : s : T ·s]), i.e., if du,k = t, then the ciphertext C9u,k,t will
return encryption of E(0 · r1k) = E(0). The QU can find du,k (distance with user k) since
the private key and threshold t are known. However, since the list of ciphertext C9u,k,t
is permuted, the QU is not able to identify the corresponding user k with the resultant
distance du,k. Therefore, if decryption of C
9
u,k,t returns zero, it means the permuted user
k is located within the threshold. Hence, the nearby located user is identified and at the
same time the distance and location of user k is preserved
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2. If the computed distance du,k between QU and another user k is more than the threshold
t, the equation will return E(du,k − t)r1k , which is encryption of around 124 bits of noise.
So, the QU can see only the noise after decrypting the ciphertext C9u,k,t. In this case, the
user k is identified as located outside of threshold region without knowing the distance
and location.
Therefore, after receiving C9u,k,t from user k, the QU decrypts as
Distu,k,t = D(C
9
u,k,t, SK) = (du,k − t) · r1k
where t = 1 · s, ..., T · s. Now, the user u checks if Distu,k,t == 0. If the Distu,k,t is zero, then
user k is located within the threshold region and saves the index of k, otherwise discarded.
Theorem 10. If the users u and k follow the protocol, we have that C9u,k,t = E((du,k− t) · r1k).
Proof. From equation 5.6 we have,
C7u,k = C
3
u · C4u,k · C5u,k · C6k
= (g−pu,2 · rN1 ) · (g(pu,1)
2+(pu,2)2 · (r1)N )
(g−pk,2 · rN1 ) · (g(pk,1)
2+(pk,2)
2 · (r1)N )
· (g−pu,2·2pk,1) · (r1)N ·2pk,1) · (g−pk,2·2pu,1) · rN ·2pu,11 )
= g(pu,1−pk,1)
2+(pu,2−pk,2)2 ·R1
= E(du,k)
(5.8)
where R1 = (r1)
2N+2pu,12pk,1N
2
. From equation 5.7 we get,
C9u,k,t = (C
7
u,k · C8t )r
1
k = (g(du,k−t))r
1
k
= E((du,k − t) · r1k)
(5.9)
5.1.5.2 Web Service Recommendations
In this stage all users encrypts necessary information using public key of BGN and send the
ciphertexts to RS.
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Initialization
Settings: All users from set n hold their QoS values. The PS generates the public and
private keys of BGN scheme as PK = {N,G,G1, e, g, h} and SK = q1 respectively. For more
information about the public and private key parameters of BGN, readers are referred to [105].
Protocol Description Algorithm 3 shows initialization phase where the user k encrypts the
QoS information. From step 1 of Algorithm 3, the user k finds Rk,j to make the R
1
k,j (which
Algorithm 3: Initialization
1 Input: PK, R1k,j , R
1
u,j
2 Output: C10k,j = E(Rk,j), C
11
k,j = E(rk,j), C
12
u,j = E(ru,j)
3 1. Using equation 2, the user k computes as follows
4 for j=1 to m do
5
Rk,j =
⌊
R1k,j · a
⌋
, C10k,j = E(Rk,j), C
11
k,j = E(rk,j)
Cavgk = E(r¯k), C
dif
k = E(rk,j − r¯k)
6 end
7 2. The Query User u computes
8 for j=1 to m do
9
Ru,j =
⌊
R1u,j · a
⌋
, C12u,j = E(ru,j), C
avg
u = E(r¯u)
10 end
is practically a fraction number) a round value by multiplying with a positive integer a (for
instance a = 100), since the BGN cryptosystem does not support fraction numbers. Then the
user k encrypts Rk,j and their corresponding QoS values using public key of BGN.
C10k,j = E(Rk,j) = g
Rk,jhwk , C11k,j = E(rk,j) = g
rk,jhxk
where C10k,j , C
11
k,j denote the ciphertexts of Rk,j and rk,j respectively, and wk and xk represent
two random numbers for different encryptions. Once the encryption is done, the user k sends
the list of ciphertexts for all Web services to RS as:
M1,k = {C10k,j , C11k,j}j=1,2,...,m
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In step 2 of Algorithm 3, the QU also computes Ru,j for j = 1, 2, ...,m and encrypts as follows.
C12u,j = E(ru,j) = g
ru,jhxu (5.10)
Similarly, the user u and k also compute Cavgu and C
diff
k respectively.
User Similarity Computation
From user filtering protocol the QU holds the set of users who are located within the given
threshold region t. We assume that there are total n′ users who are located far from the
threshold. Therefore the new set of nearby users can be denoted as k′ = 1, 2, ..., n − n′. As
discussed in the motivation section, it is effective to consider only those user who are located
nearby, the QU computes the similarity with nearby located users as,
s(u, k′) =
m∑
j=1
Rk′,j ·Ru,j (5.11)
where Rk′,j and Ru,j are private information of users k
′ and u respectively. Similar to [107] the
RS sends all ciphertexts of Rk′,j to query user u and the u computes encrypted similarity locally.
Algorithm 4 shows the protocol for similarity calculation by query user u. The difference
between the similarity computation in [107] and Algorithm 4 is that in [107], we considered
all users in the system while computing similarity with the u whereas in Algorithm 4 the u
computes similarity with those users who are located only nearby. As an advantage, Algorithm
4 reduces computation cost since the user space is reduced.
Note that after the initialization of web service recommendation, the RS holds {C10k,j}k=1,2,...,n; j=1,2,...,m.
In step 2 of Algorithm 4, the RS sends only a subset of ciphertexts to u which are belong to
k′ = 1, 2, ..., n− n′ users. Then the u computes the similarity with user k′ as
C14u,k′ =
m∏
j=1
C13u,k′,j =
m∏
j=1
E(Rk′j ·Ru,j) = E(s(u, k′)) (5.12)
where C14u,k′ denotes the ciphertetxs of similarity between u and k
′.
Theorem 11. If all users and server follow the protocol, we have that C14u,k′ = E(s(u, k
′)).
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Algorithm 4: Similarity Computation
1 Initialize: C14u,k′ = 1
2 Input: C10k,j , Ru,j
3 Output: C14u,k′ = E(
∑m
j=1Rk,j ·Ru,j)
4 1. The QU u sends the list of nearby users to RS for computing similarity.
5 2. The RS sends the list of nearby users o QU accordingly
M2 = {C10k′,j}k′=1,2,...,n−n′;j=1,2,...,m
3. The QU computes the similarity with user k′ as
6 for j=1 to m do
7
C13u,k′,j = (C
10
k′,j)
Ru,j
8 end
9 4. Finally the similarity between Query User u and another user k′ can be calculated as
10 for j=1 to m do
11
C14u,k′ = C
14
u,k′ · C13u,k′,j
12 end
13 return C14u,k′ = E(
∑m
j=1Rk,j ·Ru,j)
Proof. In step 3 of Algorithm 4, the u computes,
C13u,k′,j = g
Rk′,j ·Ru,j · hw′k·Ru,j = E(Rk′j ·Ru,j)
where w′k ·Ru,j is a random number. Using the homomorphic properties of BGN cryptosystem,
the RS computes the ciphertexts as
C14u,k′ =
m∏
j=1
C13u,k′,j =
m∏
j=1
E(Rk′j ·Ru,j)
=
m∏
j=1
gRk′,j ·Ru,j · hwk′ ·Ru,j
= g
∑m
j=1Ru,j ·Rk′,j · h
∑m
j=1 wk′ ·Ru,j
= E(
m∑
j=1
Ru,j ·Rk′,j) = E(s(u, k′))
where
∑m
j=1wk′ ·Ru,j is distributed uniformly in ZN . Thus C14u,k′ is also a uniformly distributed
encryption of E(s(ui, uk).
Privacy Preserving Location Aware Web Service Recommendation 136
QoS Prediction
Settings From the last section, RS holds the ciphertexts of all n − n′ users’ QoS values
{C11k′,j}k′=1,2,...,n−n′ and the similarity between the u and k′. The server also holds Cavgu and
Cavgk′ , which denote the ciphertexts of average QoS values of QU and k
′ respectively.
Protocol Description Since we are interested in ranking the Web services based on their
Algorithm 5: QoS Prediction
1 Initialize: C15u = 1, C
17
u = 1
2 Input: C11k′,j , C
14
u,k′ , C
avg
u , C
dif
k′
3 Output:C18u,j
4 1. The server RS computes the sum of similarities homomorphically as follows
5 for k’=1 to n-n’ do
6
C15u = C
15
u · C14u,k′
7 end
8 2. The RS computes first part of encrypted recommendation as
C16u = e(C
avg
u , C
15
u ) · (h1)x
where e() and (h1)
x denote the Bilinear pairing and a public parameter in BGN
scheme.
9 3. The RS also computes the second part of recommendation as
10 for k’=1 to n-n’ do
11
C17u = C
17
u · (e(Cdifk′ , C14u,k′) · hx2)
12 end
13 4. Finally the RS predicts missing QoS as
C18u,j = C
16
u · C17u
return C18u,j
predicted QoS values, Equation 2.12 can be rewritten for user based recommendation by elim-
inating the denominator as
Pu,j = r¯u ·
∑
k′
s(u, k′) +
∑
k′
(rk′,j − r¯k′) · s(u, k′) (5.13)
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where Pu,j denotes the predicted QoS on the web service j which is not invoked by the QU.
Algorithm 5 shows the privacy preserving protocol for missing QoS prediction, then we show
the ranking process based on the prediction results. In step 1 of Algorithm 5, the RS computes
E(
∑
k′ s(u, k
′)) homomorphically as follows.
C15u =
n−n′∏
k′
C14u,k′ = E(
∑
k′
s(u, k′)) (5.14)
In step 2, the RS computes the encryption of r¯u ·
∑
k′ s(u, k
′) as
C16u = e(C
avg
u , C
15
u ) · (h1)x = E(r¯u ·
∑
k′
s(u, k′)) (5.15)
In step 3, the RS computes the encryption of
∑
k′(rk′,j − r¯k′) · s(u, k′) homomorphically as
C17u =
n−n′∏
k′
(e(Cdifk′ , C
14
u,k′) · (h2)x)
= E(
∑
k′
(rk′,j − r¯k′) · s(u, k′))
(5.16)
Finally in step 4, the RS computes missing QoS value as
C18u,j = C
16
u · C17u
= E(r¯u ·
∑
k′
s(u, k′) +
∑
k′
(rk′,j − r¯k′) · s(u, k′))
(5.17)
The RS sends the encrypted recommendation results4 to QU. The QU passes the list of cipher-
texts (which is permuted) to PS, which can be decrypted by
Du,j = (C
18
u,j)
q1 (5.18)
where Du,j represents the decryption of C
18
u,j . The PS performs discrete logarithm[105] to
recover the message as,
Pu,j = loggq1 (Du,j)
= r¯u ·
∑
k′
s(u, k′) +
∑
k′
(rk′,j − r¯k′) · s(u, k′)
(5.19)
where Pu,j denotes the predicted QoS on Web service j, which was not invoked before.
4There is a signature verification protocol run among the RS, QU and the PS [107] to verify that the QU
or the ciphertext is not fake.
Privacy Preserving Location Aware Web Service Recommendation 138
Theorem 12. If the RS follows the protocol we have that C15u = E(
∑
k′ s(u, k
′))
Proof.
C15u =
n−n′∏
k′=1
C14u,k′ =
n−n′∏
k′=1
E(s(u, k′))
=
n−n′∏
k′=1
g
∑m
j=1Ru,j ·Rk′,j · h
∑m
j=1 wk′ ·Ru,j
= g
∑n−n′
k′=1
∑m
j=1Ru,j ·Rk′,j · h
∑n−n′
k′=1
∑m
j=1 wk′ ·Ru,j
= E(
∑
k′
s(u, k′))
Theorem 13. If the user u and all servers follow the protocol, we have that C18u,j = E(r¯u ·∑
k′ s(u, k
′) +
∑
k′(rk′,j − r¯k′) · s(u, k′)).
Proof. From Equation 5.15 the RS homomorphically computes
C16u = e(C
avg
u , C
15
u ) · (h1)x
= e(gr¯u h˙xk , g
∑n−n′
k′=1 s(u,k
′) · h
∑n−n′
k′=1
∑m
j=1 wk′ ·Ru,j ) · (h1)x
= e(gr¯u+αq2·xk , g
∑n−n′
k′=1 s(u,k
′)+αq2·
∑n−n′
k′=1
∑m
j=1 wk′ ·Ru,j )·
(h1)
x
= e(g, g)r¯u·
∑
k′ s(u,k
′)(h1)
xn
= E(r¯u ·
∑
k′
s(u, k′))
where the random number xn = x + αq2 · xk ·
∑m
j=1wk′ · Ru,j , which is uniformly distributed
in ZN. Therefore, C17u is an uniformly distributed encryption of r¯u ·
∑
k′ s(u, k
′). Similarly we
can proof that C18u,j is also an encryption of r¯u ·
∑
k′ s(u, k
′) +
∑
k′(rk′,j − r¯k′) · s(u, k′)
5.1.6 Privacy Analysis
This section provides the privacy analysis for each stage of our protocol.
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Theorem 14. The proposed user filtering protocol is secure and no user is able to learn location
information of other users.
Proof. Initially, QU encrypts its own location information in step 1 of Algorithm 1 along
with the threshold, and sends these ciphertexts to another user k. Then the user k performs
homomorphic multiplication and addition to compute the encrypted distances with QU. During
this protocol, no private information is exchanged between the users except distance threshold
t.
While filtering the nearby users by QU, other users multiply the random numbers with
the resultant distance and the list of resultant distances is permuted so that the QU can not
find her distance with other users after decryption. If the user k is actually located within the
threshold region t given by QU, after decryption, the QU can only identify if the user k is located
within the t distance (since the result is zero in this case) and their resultant distance from
the permuted order (since QU knows t). However, the QU can not identify the corresponding
user (original index) with the resultant distance due the permutation. Otherwise, if the k is
not actually located within t, the QU is not able to find the resultant distances even after
decryption (in this case the resultant distance is not zero) since a random number is multiplied
with the computed distance between u and k, therefore, the decryption outputs a noise. Finally,
these users (for which the decryption outputs noise) are discarded as “not located nearby”.
Therefore the user filtering protocol is secure and no user learns any location information
of other users.
Theorem 15. The privacy preserving Web service recommendation is secure and no user or
server is able to learn any private information of other users.
Proof. At the initialization phase, all users encrypt their own QoS information such as QoS
values, average QoS over all invoked Web services using the public key generated by PS. The
secret key is held by PS and is not disclosed to any users. Prior to encryption, users perform
certain computations on their own QoS values such as computing Rk,j and rounding them to
the next integer. Note that all of these operations are run locally and users only send the
ciphertexts to RS. Therefore, in the initialization phase no user learns anything about other
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users’ QoS values. During the similarity computation, RS sends the ciphertexts E(Rk,j) to
QU. QU uses these ciphertexts to compute the similarity E(s(u, k)) shown in steps 3 and
4 of Algorithm 4. Note that, during the similarity computation, QU is not able to decrypt
E(s(u, k)) or E(Rk,j) since the secret key is held by PS, therefore learns nothing about s(u, k)
and Rk,j . QU sends the resultant E(s(u, k)) to RS for predicting missing QoS. RS also holds the
ciphertexts of other users received in Algorithm 3, initialization. In Algorithm 5, RS predicts
the missing QoS using a homomorphic operation without learning any plaintexts. Further,
during the protocol, no result was disclosed to any participant. The encrypted missing QoSs
are sent to QU which then forwards these ciphertexts to PS for decryption. Therefore, the RS
learns nothing except the ciphertext while performing homomorphic computations. Moreover,
there is no communication between RS and PS. Although PS decrypts, the list of prediction
results are permuted and as a result, PS is unable to identify a corresponding Web service
index from the prediction results. Therefore, from this analysis we can conclude that no
private information was disclosed during this protocol and the Web service recommendation is
secure.
5.1.7 Performance Analysis
Table 5.1: Notations
Notations Description
e Modular Exponentiation
ha Homoomorphic Addition
hm Homomorphic Multiplication
p Pairing using BGN
dp Decryption using Paillier
db Decryption using BGN
m′ Number of Web services that user has not invoked before
We have conducted a set of experiments to evaluate the performance of our protocol.
Since our focus is mostly on a privacy preserving protocol, we present the performance in-
terms of running the computations on ciphertexts, decryption and size of data transmitted
among different parties. We use the publicly available dataset WSDREAM-datatset-1 [183]
to conduct the experiments, which contains the QoS records of service invocations on 5825
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Table 5.2: Computation and communication complexities of User Filtering.
Computation Cost
QU 3(e) + nT (dp)
Other users 2hm + e+ 3ha + T (e+ ha + hm)
Communication Cost
QU l(3 + n)
Other users l(3 + n)
Table 5.3: Computation and communication complexities of Initialization, Similarity and Web
service Recommendations.
Initialization Similarity Recommendation
Computation Cost
QU 4m(e) (n− n′)(hm ·m+ (m− 1)ha) n/a
Other users 2m(e) n/a n/a
RS n/a n/a m′(ha(n− n′ − 1) + (n− n′ − 1)(ha + p) + p+ ha)
PS n/a n/a
√
T 1m′(e)
Communication Cost
QU 2m(l) (nm+m)(l) 2m′(l)
Other users 4m(l) n/a n/a
RS 2mn(l) + 4mn(l) (n− n′)l(1 +m) m′(l)
PS n/a n/a m′(l)
Table 5.4: Computation and communication costs of User Filtering.
Computation Cost
QU 20s
Other users 3.17 · 10−4s
Communication Cost
QU 0.04 MB
Other users 0.04MB
Web services from 339 users and the locations as latitude and longitude format. Specifically,
our experimental analysis is organized as follows. First, we analyze the complexities for each
stage of our protocol. Second, we show the correlation between users’ geographical locations
and their similarities based on QoS values. Finally, we discuss the efficiency of our method
in terms of required time and bandwidth. Note that, in our experiment, we only use RTT
(response time) to test the performance of our protocol. To conduct the experiments, we use
Java 2 SE 8 including cryptographic libraries on a hardware platform with OS windows 7, 64
bit and 3.6 GHz- core i7 and 8GB CPU unit. For the performance measurement, the metrices
we considered in our experiment are shown in table 5.1. The size of each ciphertext and key is
considered as l = 1024 bits while measuring the performance.
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5.1.7.1 Computation Complexity
In below we present the computation cost of our protocol in-terms each stage. Table 5.2
represents the complexity in terms of user filtering and table 5.3 shows the complexity of ini-
tialization, similarity and recommendation protocols respectively. The complexity is described
with the unit of time as seconds.
User Filtering
Filtering nearby users consists of two stages: firstly, distance computation between QU and
other n users and secondly, filtering nearby users based on the distance threshold. According to
our protocol, the Query User u encrypts own location information as shown in equation 5.1 and
15. Since in this stage, there are three different encryption operations, it takes 3(e) seconds to
complete the encryption for QU. Then user k computes the encrypted distances by performing
two homomorphic multiplications, one encryption and three homomorphic additions which
takes 2hm + e+ 3ha seconds (equation 5.3-5.6).
In user filtering, firstly the user k encrypts the values of threshold range which takes T (e)
seconds (in step 1 of Algorithm 2). Then the user k homomorphically subtracts the threshold
with the distance and the result is multiplied with a random number (in step 2 of Algorithm
2). This step takes T (ha + hm) seconds due to one homomorphic multiplication. Finally, after
receiving the encrypted distance from user k, the QU decrypts the encrypted distances for each
T , which takes Tdp seconds and it takes nTdp seconds for all users n. Therefore, the total
computation cost of QU and user k become 3(e) +nT (dp) and 2hm + e+ 3ha +T (e+ha +hm)
seconds respectively.
Web Service Recommendations
In the initialization of generating Web service recommendations, all users including QU encrypt
their QoS experiences and more related information. According to step 1 of Algorithm 3, the
users from set n encrypt four different information for all Web services m, which takes 4m(e)
seconds. In step 2 of that Algorithm, the QU also encrypts two different private information
for m Web services in 2m(e) seconds.
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Table 5.5: Computation and communication cost when n = 338, n− n′ = 102, m = 5825 and
m′ = 98.
Initialization Similarity Recommendation
Computation Cost
QU .47s 15.26s n/a
Other users 0.23s n/a n/a
RS n/a n/a 100s
PS n/a n/a 0.08 s
Communication Cost
QU 1.5MB 252.7MB .03MB
Other users 2.9MB n/a n/a
RS 103MB 76 MB .0125MB
PS n/a n/a .0125 MB
The QU computes the QoS-based similarity with the user k, where the QU performs m− 1
homomorphic additions. This similarity has been computed with the set of users who are
located nearby, which is n−n′. Therefore, the overall process takes (n−n′)(hmm+(m−1)ha)
seconds.
In Algorithm 5 of prediction, firstly, the RS homomorphically adds the similarities of n−n′
users in (n−n′−1)ha seconds. Secondly, the RS computes a part of the missing QoS prediction
where it uses pairing operation to multiply between two private data as E(r¯u ·
∑
k′ s(u, k
′)).
This part takes p seconds, since it consists only one pairing. Thirdly, in step 3, the RS
performs another pairing between E(s(u, k′)) and E(rk′,j − r¯k′) for n − n′ users. Finally
QU gets E(
∑
k′(rk′,j − r¯k′) · s(u, k′)), which takes (n − n′ − 1)(ha + p) seconds. Then the
RS performs homomorphic addition to get E(r¯u ·
∑
k′ s(u, k
′) +
∑
k′ s(u, k)) + rk,j − R¯k) in
ha seconds. Therefore, it takes total (n − n′ − 1)ha + (n − n′ − 1)(ha + p) + ha seconds to
complete one Web service recommendation. The encrypted recommendations are decrypted
by raising the secret key to the power of ciphertexts and computing the discrete logarithm.
One decryption and the discrete logarithm take e and
√
T 1(e) seconds respectively, where T 1
represents the size of the plaintext.
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5.1.7.2 Communication Complexity
User Filtering
In step 1 of Algorithm 1, the QU broadcasts three different ciphertexts which are 3l bits in size
to user k. However, user k is just one user from set of n users and the ciphertexts are need to
be sent to all of them to compute their distances. Therefore total 3ln bits of data is exchanged
between QU and other n users. In Algorithm 2, all n users send their resultant ciphertext of nl
bits to QU i.e, the QU has to receive nl bits. Therefore, the total communication complexity
becomes 3l + nl for both QU and all other users.
Web Service Recommendations
According to step 2 of Algorithm 3, all users n send four different ciphertexts for m Web
services to RS which are of 4lm bits. The QU also sends two ciphertexts for m number of Web
services to RS. Therefore, the communication complexity of QU, all users and RS becomes
2lm, 4lm and 4lmn+ 2lmn bits respectively.
During the similarity computation, firstly, the RS sends C11k,j for each user and Web service
to the QU which are of nml bits. Once the similarity computation is completed, the user u sends
the list of encrypted similarities between her and all other n − n′ users to RS which contains
another (n−n′)l bits. Therefore, the communication complexity becomes (n−n′)l(1 +m) bits
for both u and the RS.
After computing the prediction for missing QoS values for m′ Web services, the RS sends
the resultant ciphertext which are of m′l bits to target user. The QU passes this ciphertexts
to PS for decryption. Therefore, the amount of data exchanged by the RS, the QU and the
PS become m′(l), 2m′(l) and m′(l) bits.
5.1.7.3 Correlation between Geographical Locations and QoS-based Similarities
The [140, 138] have shown that there exists a correlation between users’ locations and their
QoS-based similarities. However, unlike their location assumptions, we use users’ geographical
locations and experimentally we also provide enough evidence that users’ geographical locations
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Figure 5.3: (a) Correlation between QoS-based similarity and user locations. (b) Computa-
tional cost in-terms of number of total users n = 338. (c) Impact of distance threshold T on
computational cost. (d) Impact of the number of Web services with missing QoS m′ on the
performance. (e) Impact of total number of Web services in the system m on performance. (e)
Overall scalability of the system while n = 338, m = 5825, n− n′ = 102 and m′ = 98
.
are indeed related with their QoS-based similarities. To evaluate this relationship we group
the users based on their distances with QU based on different distance thresholds. More
specifically, we randomly choose different QUs and find nearby located users based on different
distance thresholds. Then we find the average similarity between QU and other users in the
group. This process is repeated for each group (we form 10 different groups based on their
distances). Fig. 5.3(a) shows such results where x-axis represents different level of distance
thresholds and y-axis represents average QoS-based similarities between QU and other users in
each group, formed by different distance thresholds. From this figure it is clear that increasing
the distance threshold leads to decrease users’ average QoS-based similarities. Which supports
our claim that the users’ QoS experiences depend on their geographical locations and nearby
located users tend to experience similar QoS.
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5.1.7.4 Efficiency
To check the efficiency of our protocol in terms of different stages, we randomly chose one
user as the QU and find the time required to filter the nearby users, initialization, similarity
computation and, finally, predicting missing QoS values in a privacy preserving manner. We
also present the time required to perform a discrete logarithm for decryption. More specifically,
we choose one user who is located in USA according to its geographical location. Note that we
need to provide a threshold T × s for user filtering. In our experiment, we choose the distance
threshold T × s as 8.5 × 105, where T = 85 and s = 104 and found that there are 102 users
located within this threshold region. Table 5.4 shows the costs of the QU and all other users in
terms of distance computation and filtering nearby users. It is found that the QU takes a total
of 20 seconds from encrypting the locations to decrypting the distances and filtering nearby
users among the total of 338 users based on the distance threshold. Note that all other 338
users take only 3.17× 10−4 seconds altogether to collaborate with QU. In-terms of amount of
data exchanged, QU and all users take a total .08 MB of memory.
Table 5.5 shows the time required to perform initialization of the recommendation phase,
similarity based on filtered users and predicting missing QoS values for a set of Web services
which QU has not previously invoked. In this setting, the total number of users for initialization
and similarity computation is n = 338, the number of total Web services is m = 5825 and the
number of nearby filtered users is n − n′ = 102. For predicting the missing QoS values,
we found that there are m′ = 98 Web services for the chosen QU, who has not previously
invoked the 98 Web services. According to our experimental setup, one single pairing (p),
modular exponentiation (e), homomorphic addition (ha ), homomorphic multiplication (hm )
and decryption using Paillier (dp ) take 0.01, 2× 10−5, 5.7× 10−06, 2× 10−5 and 0.01 seconds
respectively. Based on these results, we show the total computation cost for all users and Web
services.
At the initialization phase, only the users participate and perform some encryption oper-
ations locally where the QU and the user k take 0.47 seconds and 0.23 seconds respectively.
Here the cost of user k is shown only for one user from n set, since they can compute the
operations in parallel. During the similarity computation, only QU participates and computes
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the similarity with other nearby users based on encrypted QoS values (n − n′ = 102), which
takes 15.2 seconds. To predict one missing QoS, the RS takes about 1.02 seconds which results
100 seconds to predict the 98 Web services. The PS takes about 0.08 seconds to decrypt the
98 resultant ciphertexts of QoS predictions. The memory size required for users is very small
for both QU and other users, which are 1.5 MB and 2.9MB respectively. Note that the RS
takes most of the memory size which is around 252MB since it communicates with almost
all participants in the system. The performance of our protocol depends on a few factors at
different stages. For example, during the user-filtering protocol, increasing the total number
of users increases the computation cost of QU. It does not affect the computation cost of other
users. Fig. 5.3(b) presents the scalability of user filtering protocol in terms of computation and
communication cost with increasing the total number of users n in the system. From this figure
it is clear that all other users (except QU) are able to perform the computations in parallel,
therefore the increasing number of n does not affect their performance, however, it affects the
communication costs.
Fig. 5.3(c) shows the effect of choosing the distance threshold on the performance of our
protocol. We show six different threshold levels. We found the number of nearby users of QU
are: 13, 50. 87, 112, 150 and 174 at six different levels of distance threshold t. As the number
of nearby users increases, the burden of QU to compute the similarity also increases. Similarly,
the computation cost of RS also increases since the protocol for predicting missing QoS depends
on the similarity of nearby users. The number of n− n′ also impacts the computation cost of
PS, since the time to decrypt the prediction depends on the size of predicted result and this
size increases with the number of total users in the system. Note that increasing the distance
threshold does not affect the computation cost of the other users n (except QU) in the system.
Fig. 5.3(d) shows the changes of performance in-terms of the number of Web services that
QU has not previously invoked (m′ = 98). Note that the performance of RS and PS depends on
m′ whereas the performance of users does not depend on this number. Again, the performance
of users depends on the total number of Web services in the system, which is m = 5825,
as shown in Fig. 5.3(e). It does not affect the performance of servers while predicting the
missing QoS values by RS or performing the decryption by PS. Fig. 5.3(f) shows an overall
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scalability (computation and communication costs) of the system in terms of increasing total
number of users while generating recommendations for QU. According to our results, at most,
the required time and memory size are 136 seconds and 1.3 × 103MB respectively. The total
cost is shown where the nearby located users n− n′ = 102, number of Web services that user
has not invoked before m′ = 98 and total number of Web services are m = 5825. From this
figure it is clear that increasing total number of user does not affect the overall computation
cost significantly.
5.1.7.5 Recommendation Accuracy
To test the accuracy of our privacy preserving Web service recommender system, we randomly
choose 10 Query Users and different sets of Web services where QoS values are already available.
We generate the predictions on these available QoSs using our proposed method and rank the
corresponding Web services. Then we compare our ranking generated by proposed method with
the available ranking. We compare the predicted ranking with original ranking using Spearman
Correlation and it is repeated for 10 QUs. Finally we take the average results for all QUs. We
randomly select 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30 sets of Web services for one QU and rank them first based
on the available QoS values. Then we run our privacy preserving recommendation technique
to find the ranking and compare with the available ranking. We also run our recommendations
technique without applying the privacy preserving part to test how accurate the system is
without the weight of cryptographic functions. According to Table 5.6, for different sets of Web
services we show the Spearman rank correlation as privacy preserving (PP) and without privacy
preserving (wPP) versions. We repeat both PP and wPP for 10 QUs and take the average
results. The result shows that in both cases the ranking accuracy are excellent (100% accuracy
to rank upto 15 Web services, 95% to rank 20-25 Web services ) except for recommending 30
Web services where the result of PP version degrades slightly.
5.1.8 Summary
In this section 5.1 of this chapter we propose a cryptographic framework to preserve users
privacy while predicting missing QoS values and providing Web service recommendations. We
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Table 5.6: Recommendation accuracy.
Number of WS 5 10 15 20 25 30
PP 100% 100% 100% 95% 95% 90%
wPP 100% 100% 100% 95% 95% 95%
also propose a new protocol to efficiently compute the distances among the users and sorting
a subset of users based on their encrypted locations. Unlike existing works, we conduct the
experimental analysis on users geographical locations for the first time in the field of Web service
recommendations. Our privacy and experimental analyses show the feasibility and effectiveness
of our protocol. In future, we are interested in analyzing and solving more privacy issues in
Web service recommendations and improving the efficiency by developing this research through
distributed and parallel recommendation system to handle the big data.
5.2 Privacy Preserving Location Recommendation based on
Social Network
With the rapid development of web 2 technologies, location recommendations in location based
services have gained much attention by millions of users. These location based services allow
users to find new friends, locations that he/she has not visited before as well as help to share
their locations with friends. Generating recommendations on locations depends on few impor-
tant information of users such as: how many times the user has visited any particular place,
what are the other close-by similar places of one location where an user goes very often, if any
friends of user visited a particular place that the user might want to visit in future. Therefore
it is desired for LBS to make use of these rich information of users to mine their preferences on
different places and suggest new places where they might be interested in. Since any amount
of user information related to location preferences or social relationship are private, releasing
such information to service provider or any other users may lead to serious privacy threats.
Some of the previous works have already shown that the publishing private information actu-
ally cause revealing sensitive information like users’ identity, friendship or social connections to
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other users, home address etc. Therefore it is necessary to obfuscate any sensitive information
related to users and at the same time generate effective location recommendations for users
[184].
5.2.1 Motivation and Contribution
5.2.1.1 Motivational Scenaio
Users and locations are two main entities in any location based social networks. Usually
the users are connected with each other via social relationships such as friendS, co-workers,
neighbors etc. Locations are connected with users via check in activities which reflects users’
tastes on different locations. Consider a scenario where an user wants to visit a restaurant
based on her previous preferences. The intuitive idea to achieve such recommendations is to
find the similar restaurants with high check in frequencies. However, what if the user would like
to add social influence into newly predicted locations such that the recommended locations are
actually influenced by those users who are close friends. Again there could be some locations
which are very similar according to the check-in pattern but not visited by any of the friends.
Therefore our goal is to incorporate users’ friendship network as a weight into recommendation
technique to influence the recommendation results.
We also aim to protect user privacy by means of encrypting their check-in frequencies and
social relationship information using homomorphic encryption while generating recommenda-
tions. The main reason behind using homomorphic encryption is that it is semantically secure
and to find plain text from the corresponding ciphertext is computationally hard without know-
ing the secret key. Moreover, it is possible to run certain computations on the ciphertexts such
as addition and multiplication which give same results if it was computed on plaintexts.
5.2.1.2 Our Contributions
In this section of Chapter 5 we present a privacy preserving location recommendation system
personalizing user preferences and their social connections. Our protocol includes a semi honest
LBS provider as third party which has business interest in generating recommendations. We
assume that the participants in our system are semi honest but curious and do not collude to
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each other. The proposed protocol also takes the users friendship into account to examine the
influence in generating location recommendations. The user check in data and friendship in-
formation with other users are encrypted using homomorphic encryption and the LBS provider
generates location recommendations for users without knowing any private information. User
privacy is preserved from other users and LBS provider. Moreover, our solution is able to
preserve user privacy without compromising recommendation accuracy. To the best of our
knowledge we are first to propose a privacy preserving location recommendation system using
homomorphic encryption where users’ social influence have also been taken into account to
predict suitable locations in privacy preserving manner.
5.2.2 Problem Statement
The main problem solved by our proposed system is as follows: given a set of users, a set of
locations, a set of frequencies of visit by one user to a location and users’ friendship network,
build a privacy preserving location recommendation system for users considering the following
constraints:
• Users are able to learn no information of other users except their own.
• Users do not trust LBS and therefore do not disclose their personal check in data and
friendship network to LBS.
• Only LBS provider is able to generate encrypted recommendations based on the cipher-
texts of check in frequencies and users’ friendship network, and no plaintext should be
exchanged between any participants.
• Only target user who asks for recommendations is able to decrypt his recommendations.
5.2.3 Friendship-based Weighted Slope-one Predictor
Let u = 1, 2, ..., n be the set of all n users and l = 1, 2, ...,m be the set of all m locations in
a recommender system. The check-in frequency matrix is denoted by Mf in which fu,l is the
check-in frequency of user u on location l. The inputs of a recommender system are usually
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arithmetic check-in values (integers) and the missing values are represented as 0. Hence the
primary goal of our system is to predict the check-in frequency for user u on location l which
the user has not visited before in privacy preserving manner. To predict an unknown check-in
Pu,l for user u on location l the weighted slope one-based recommendation technique compute
the check-in frequency prediction according to the following expression,
Pu,l =
∑
l∈Ru(devl,j + fu,j)× |Sl,j |∑
j∈Ru |Sl,j |
(5.20)
where Pu,l and Ru denote the prediction of frequency that user u might visit at location l and
the set of locations visited by user u respectively. The devl,j denotes deviation matrix with size
m×m fu,j represents the number of times user u visited location j. Finally, |Si,j | denotes the
number of times that locations l and j have been co-visited. The deviation can be expressed
as follows:
devl,j =
∑
k∈Sl,j (fk,l − rk,j)
|Sl,j | (5.21)
Note that Equation 5.21 considers all users equally while computing the deviation between two
locations. Hence all users’ preferences will be accounted while generating recommendations.
However, the target user might want to consider only those users who are his friends to influence
his recommendation results. Moreover there could be different level of friendships such as class
mate, colleague, co-worker etc. For instance class mates are different in friendship relation than
co-workers and that’s why the target user might want to provide different weights to different
level of friendship. Therefore we propose to have a weight with deviation as shown in below
equation.
devl,j =
∑
k∈Sl,j (fk,l − rk,j)× wk
|Sl,j | (5.22)
Finally, after replacing devl,j into Equation 5.20, the friendship-based weighted slope one pre-
dictor becomes as follows:
Pu,l =
∑
j∈Ru(
∑
k∈Si,j (fk,l − fk,j).wk + fu,j .|Sl,j |)∑
j∈Ru |Sl,j |
(5.23)
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Figure 5.4: The system model of our proposed protocol.
5.2.4 Proposed Privacy Preserving Location Recommendation
5.2.4.1 System Model
Our framework consists of a LBS provider as recommender server (RS), decryption server (DS),
a set of users and a set of locations. The DS is a trusted party which has processing power
of generating public and private keys, and decryption. Initially the DS sends the public keys
to users and the users encrypt their check-in information which are stored in RS’s database.
Figure 5.4 represents the proposed framework where a target user sends a query to get the
recommendations. The RS is equipped with the processing power of homomorphic property,
where it can compute certain computations over encrypted data only. To get the recommenda-
tion results, the target user mutually computes some operations with RS to incorporate weights
of friendship networks. Finally, the RS processes the encrypted check-in data along with the
friendship network to generate prediction about new locations (which is also encrypted). The
encrypted recommendations are sent to DS for decryption. We also assume that there is no
communication established between RS and DS, and therefore there is no collusion between
them. Before sending for decryption, the target user adds some random values with the en-
crypted recommendations so that even after decryption, the DS is not able to identify accurate
prediction results. Our proposed protocol is divided into two sections: pre-computation and
recommendation. In pre-computation phase, the DS generates public and private key pairs and
sends the public key to users while holds the private key. Users encrypt their check-in data and
send to RS. The RS stores all the encrypted data into it’s own storage. In the recommendation
phase, the target user sends the query to the RS to generate location recommendations. The
target user could be from same set of users of pre-computation phase or he could be a new
user. However, the queried location has to be from the same set of pre-computation phase.
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5.2.4.2 Pre-computation
Settings: The DS chooses two large prime numbers p and q randomly and independently of
each other such that gcd(pq, (p − 1)(q − 1)) = 1 and Compute N = pq, λ = lcm(p − 1, q − 1).
It also selects random integer g and calculates µ. The DS broadcasts the public (encryption)
key pk as (N, g) to users and keeps the private (decryption) key sk as (λ, µ) secret.
Protocol: Algorithm 6 shows the protocol for pre-computation phase. In step 1, the users
Algorithm 6: Pre-computation
1 Input: g, r, N , fu,i
2 Output: E(fu,l)
3 1. Users computes
4 for each user u=1 to n do
5 for each location l=1 to m do
6 if fu,l 6= 0 then
7 Au,l = E(fu,l) = g
fu,l .rN
8 Bu,l = E(−fu,l) = g−fu,l .rN
9 end
10 end
11 end
12 return Au,l and Bu,l
13 2. Each user u sends his encrypted check-in frequency vector to RS
14 3. The RS stores the ciphertexts in its own storage.
encrypt their check-in information two times: one is for positive check-in and another is for
negative check-in5. Note that, the users do not encrypt where there is no check-in data,
i.e the entry is zero. The users runs step 1 in Algorithm 6 to generate the ciphertexts of
their positive and negative check-in information as Au,i and Bu,i respectively for all locations
they visited. Once computed, the users sends these ciphertexts to the RS as message Mu =
{Au,l, Bu,l}l=1,2,...,m. Upon receiving the message Mu, the RS stores the ciphertexts into its
own storage.
5In the Paillier cryptosystem, encryption of a negative integer can be calculated by using its modular additive
inverse, i.e. E(x) = E(nx), so we can treat all x > n
2
to be negative.
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5.2.4.3 Location Recommendation
Settings: In recommendation phase, we assume that the target user u sends the query to
generate reocmmendation on location l (for simplicity, in recommendation phase, all other
users and locations are denoted as k = 1, 2, ..., x and j = 1, 2, ..., y respectively, where x
denotes total number of users and y denotes the total number of locations).
Protocol: Algorithm 7 shows the location recommendation protocol where we divide the
whole tasks into two steps: step 1 and 2 show the privacy preserving calculation of numerator
part and the denominator part respectively. First in step 1.a, the RS computes the ciphertext
of (fk,l − fk,j) as Ck,j . In 1.b, the RS sends the above ciphertext to the target user u and he
inputs the weights of his friends.
The range of the weights is set from 0 to 5, where 0 means no friendship and the values
of weight differ depending on the friendship relations. The target user computes Dk,j =
E((fk,l−fk,j).wk) and sends the ciphertext to RS. The RS calculates Fk,j in step 1.d and these
steps are repeated for each user k who have visited both places l and j. Finally the RS returns
Fk,j = E(
∑
k∈Si,j (fk,l − fk,j).wk) and stores in its own storage. In step 2 of Algorithm 7, the
RS counts the number of users who have visited both locations l and j as |Sl,j |. Then, for
each locations j, the RS raises |Sl,j | to the power of his encrypted check-in frequency Au,l and
computes Gl,j . Then it performs homomorphic addition between Fk,j (from step 1) and Gl,j to
get the encryption of
∑
k∈Si,j (fk,l − fk,j).wk + fu,j .|Sl,j |. The RS continues this operation for
each j location and performs homomorphic additions for all j ciphertexts. Finally it returns
E(
∑
j∈Ru(
∑
k∈Si,j (fk,l − fk,j).wk + fu,j .|Sl,j |)) which is the encryption of numerator part of
equation 5.23. In step 3, the RS sums Sl,j for all locations j,
Algorithm 3 shows the procedures of decryption by DS and target user. After calculating
the ciphertext of numerator part of equation 5.23, the RS sends it to the target user. We assume
only the target user is able to communicate with DS. However, since the DS has the decryption
power, it is able to learn the decryption results. Therefore to prevent DS from learning true
results, the target user multiply a random number with the ciphertext Hu,l, as shown in step
1.b in Algorithm 8. Then the DS decrypt the ciphertext to get P ′u,l which contains the random
number but the number is unknown to DS. Finally the DS sends the result back to the target
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Algorithm 7: Location Recommendation
1 Input: Au,l and Bu,l
2 Initizalize: Ck,j , Dk,j , Fk,j = 1, Gl,j , Hu,l = 1, Il,j = 0
3 Output: E(
∑
j∈Ru(
∑
k∈Si,j (ru,i − ru,j).wk + ru,j .|Sl,j |)), E(
∑
j∈Ru |Sl,j |)
4 1. for j=1 to y do
5 for k=1 to x do
6 if the user k visited both locations l and j then
7 a. The RS calculates Ck,j = Ak,l.Bk,j = E(fk,l).E(−fk,j) = E(fk,l − fk,j)
8 b. The RS sends Ck,j to the target user u.
9 c. The target user computes Dk,j = (Ck,j)
wk = E((fk,l − fk,j).wk)
10 d. The target user u sends the ciphertext Dk,j back to the RS.
Fk,j = Fk,j .Dk,j = Fk,j .E((fk,l − fk,j).wk)
11 end
12 end
13 return Fk,j =
∏
k∈Si,j E((fk,l − fk,j).wk) = E(
∑
k∈Si,j (fk,l − fk,j).wk)
14 e The RS computes
15
Gl,j = (Au,l)
|Sl,j | = E(fu,j .|Sl,j |)
Hu,l = Hu,l.(Fk,j .Gl,j) = Hu,l.(E(
∑
k∈Si,j
(fk,l − fk,j).wk).E(fu,j .|Sl,j |))
= Hu,l.E(
∑
k∈Si,j
(fk,l − fk,j).wk + fu,j .|Sl,j |)
16 end
17 return Hu,l = E(
∑
j∈Ru(
∑
k∈Si,j (fk,l − fk,j).wk + fu,j .|Sl,j |))
18 3. The RS initializes Il,j = 0
19 for j=1 to y do
20 if Both of fu,l and fu,j are rated then
21 Il,j = Il,j + Sl,j
22 end
23 end
24 return Il,j =
∑
j∈Ru Sl,j
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Algorithm 8: Decryption
1 Input: Hu,l, Il,j , sk = (λ, µ),
∑
j∈Ru Sl,j
2 Output: Pu,l =
∑
j∈Ru (
∑
k∈Si,j (fk,l−fk,j).wk+fu,j .|Sl,j |)∑
j∈Ru |Sl,j |
3 Initizalize: P ′u,l
4 1. for each recommendation query do
5 a. The RS signs Hu,l and sends the signed message and
∑
j∈Ru Sl,j to the target user
u
6 b. The target user multiply a random number tl homomorohically with Hu,l
H ′u,l = (Hu,l)
tl
7 c. The target user sends H ′u,l to DS for decryption.
8 d. The DS verifies the message and computes,
P ′u,l = Decrypt(H
′
u,l, SK) = tl.(
∑
j∈Ru
(
∑
k∈Si,j
(fk,l − fk,j).wk + fu,j .|Sl,j |))
9 e. The DS sends the decryption result P ′u,l to the target user u.
10 f. The target user finally computes the recommendation as
Pu,l =
P ′u,l/tl∑
j∈Ru |Sl,j |
=
∑
j∈Ru(
∑
k∈Si,j (fk,l − fk,j).wk + fu,j .|Sl,j |)∑
j∈Ru |Sl,j |
11 end
12 return Pu,l
user and he removes the random number tl from P
′
u,l to achieve final recommendation Pu,l
(note that the target user already holds the denominator part of equation 5.23 from step 1.a,
in Algorithm 8).
Theorem 16. If the RS and target user follow the protocol, we have Hu,l = E(
∑
j∈Ru(
∑
k∈Si,j (fk,l−
fk,j).wk + fu,j .|Sl,j |))
Proof. From Algorithm 2, step 1.a, we have
Ck,j = Ak,l.Bk,j = (g
fk,l .rn1 ).(g
−fk,j .rn2 ) = (g
fk,l−fk,j ).(r1.r2)n
= E(fk,l − fk,j)
(5.24)
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Therefore,
Dk,j = (Ck,j)
wk = (gfk,l−fk,j ).(r1.r2)n)wk = g(fk,l−fk,j).wk .(r1.r2)n.wk
= E((fk,l − fk,j).wk)
(5.25)
From above two equations, we calculate Fk,j as follows:
Fk,j =
∏
k∈Si,j
E((fk,l − fk,j).wk) =
∏
k∈Si,j
g(fk,l−fk,j).wk .(r1.r2)n.wk
= E(
∑
k∈Si,j
(fk,l − fk,j).wk)
(5.26)
The RS holds Fk,j and computes Gl,j = E(fk,j .|Sl,j |). Therefore it calculates Hu,l as follows,
Hu,l =
∏
j∈Ru
E(
∑
k∈Si,j
(fk,l − fk,j).wk).E(fu,j .|Sl,j |)
=
∏
j∈Ru
(g(fk,l−fk,j).wk .(r1.r2)n.wk)(g(fu,j .|Sl,j .(r3.r4)n.Sl,j )
= E(
∑
j∈Ru
(
∑
k∈Si,j
(fk,l − fk,j).wk + fu,j .|Sl,j |))
(5.27)
5.2.5 Privacy Analysis
Our privacy preserving protocol consists of a set of users, check-in information of users on
different locations and two servers. We assume that all the participants in our system are
semihonest and there is no collusion among them. The main private information includes the
check-in frequency and the friendship network of users. The users do not want to disclose
these information to server and other users. The check-in information are encrypted using
the public key of Paillier cryptosystem PK. The Paillier encryption scheme provides semantic
security against chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-CPA). The ability to successfully distinguish the
challenge ciphertext essentially amounts to the ability to decide composite residuosity. The
semantic security of the Paillier encryption scheme was proved under the decisional composite
residuosity (DCR) assumptionthe DCR problem is intractable. In below we discuss the privacy
protection in detailed against different parties in the system.
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Target User: We assume that the target user in our system is different than other users
from the pre-computation phase. The target user sends the query to RS to generate location
recommendations. Note that, if the target user is a new user then he needs to send the
encrypted check-in data to RS as well along with the query. To incorporate the friendship
network while calculating the deviation between the locations, the RS sends Ck,j to the target
user, which is encryption of difference between two check-in frequency of other users (step
1.c, Algorithm 7). The target user multiplies the weights for different friends by raising the
weight wk to the power of Ck,j . Thus the target user is able to influence the check-in frequency
deviation using his friendship network without knowing the other users preferences including
his friends. At the end of step 2 of Algorithm 7, the target user receives Hu,l. Since the
target user sends this ciphretxts to DS for decryption, the resultant plaintext does not contain
any information related to other users check-in frequency. Also the target user is not able
to act maliciously since the RS signs the encrypted recommendations which is verified by
DS. Therefore, although the target user receives Ck,j from previous steps, he can not get the
decryption results from DS.
Other Users: During the pre-computation phase, all users encrypt their check-in information
as Au,l and send to RS. Thus the personal check-in data is not revealed to other users.
Recommender Server: In the pre-computation phase the RS receives only the encryption
of check-in frequency from different users. In the recommendation phase, the RS calculates
Ck,j , Dk,j (with the help of target user), Fk,j , Gl,j , Hu,l homomorphically without learning any
true information related to users’ check-in frequency 6. Since the received ciphertexts by RS
are encrypted using the public key of Paillier cryptosystem, which is proven to be semantically
secure, therefore it is computationally hard to find the plaintext from those ciphertexts.
Decryption Server: The DS only receives H ′u,l from target user in step 1.c in Algorithm 8.
Note that, the target user multiplies a random number with original ciphertext from previous
step so that even after decryption the DS is not able to identify the true result. According to
our protocol, the DS does not receive any other messages or ciphertexts, therefore it is not able
to learn any private information related to users’ preferences on different locations or friendship
6In this research we only focus on preserving check-in frequency on different location. We leave preserving
users’ visit on different locations as future work
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network.
5.2.6 Performance Analysis
To conduct the experiments, we use Java 2 SE 8 including cryptographic libraries on a hardware
platform with OS windows 7, 64 bit and 3.6 GHz- core i7 and 8GB CPU unit. We have
evaluated our method using publicly available data by Gowalla [185]. It is shown that about
74% of locations are only visited once and only about 3% of locations are visited more than
10 times. This means that users usually visit several important places, e.g., home, office, and
some stores or bars, with very high frequency, while most of other places are seldom visited.
Overall, these places are around several centers. Since we are focusing on the performance
of our proposed privacy protocol, for simplicity we reduce the dataset into 200 users and
400 locations. Most of the locations are taken from that 3% where users visited more than 10
times. We also remove those entries where users visited more than 20 times and keep some zero
entries where users have not visited any location. Finally our dataset contains total 948 check-in
frequencies of users on all locations and 47 check-in frequencies of target user on 400 locations.
To study the effectiveness of our proposed protocol, we use mainly two metrices: computation
and communication cost. To measure the computation cost we consider the time required for
encryption (e), decryption (d), homomorphic multiplication (hm) and homomorphic addition
(ha) using our protocol. Finally to analyse the communication cost we measure the amount
of ciphertexts exchanged among different parties (the size of one ciphertext is set to b = 1024
bits in our experiment).
Table 5.7: Computation and communication cost of the proposed model.
Computations Computation Cost Communication Cost
User RS DS User RS DS
Pre-computation 2lm(e) 2lm(b) bits 2lmn(b) bits
Recommendation y.kj .hm 2kjyha + hm(2y − 1) (b)(2kjy + 1) bits (b)(2kjy + 1) bits
Decryption hm d (b) bits (b) bits
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Table 5.8: Performance of our protocol: time in seconds and bandwidth in MB.
Computations Computation Cost Communication Cost
User RS DS User RS DS
Pre-computation 0.36 .0768 15.36
Recommendation 0.2 0.23 .51 .51
Decryption 10−4 .01 1.2× 10−4 1.2× 10−4
Table 5.7 shows the computation and communication cost by different parties in different
stages of computations. In the precomputation phase only users participate to encrypt their
location frequencies. Since they can compute this operation in parallel, the total cost is 2lm(e)
seconds, where lm represents the maximum number of visited locations among all users. The
target user and RS participate in recommendation phase where they take y.kj .hm and 2kjyha+
hm(2y − 1) seconds respectively, where kj denotes number of users who have visited both
locations l and j. In the decryption phase the target user jointly performs with DS and their
computation costs are hm and d seconds respectively. From above analysis we found that the
total costs depends on few factors: number of users who have actually visited both locations l
and j, the number of locations actually visited by user u and the number of locations visited
by all users. Table 5.8 shows the performance of our protocol on the specific dataset that we
choose for experiment. Since the performance depends on those factors, we construct another
dataset where the missing check-ins are filled with random numbers so that every users visited
all locations and so the target user. In this way we are able to test our protocol in the worst
case where there is no missing check-in data. Figure 5.5 shows such performance (from table
1, number of users who have visited both locations kj = 200, number of locations visited by
target user y = 400 and number of locations visited by each user lm = 400) where right hand
side figure shows the computation cost of RS and target user to generate a recommendation.
The figure on the left side shows the amount of data exchanged by RS and DS.
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Figure 5.5: Computation (left) and communication (right) cost in worst case scenario.
5.2.7 Summary
This section 5.2 of this chapter introduces privacy preserving protocol for location recommen-
dations where users’ check-in information are preserved using homomorphic encryption. This
protocol is able to incorporate users’ social relationship while generating recommendations
without revealing any friendship information. More specifically users are able to choose their
friends’ for whom they want their recommendations to be influenced. During this process users
are also not aware of friends’ preferences, i.e all users’ check-in information were hidden against
other users as well as servers. Security analysis and performance results show that our method
is secured as well as practical.
5.3 Epilogue
The contributions of this chapter address the research question RQ-3 and the research chal-
lenges described in section 1.4.3. Here we developed the privacy preserving protocols for context
aware recommendations on two specific applications: location aware web service recommen-
dations and friendship aware new location recommendations. By developing the protocols in
this chapter including the protocols described in earlier chapter (Chapter 3, 4 and 5) we ad-
dressed the privacy issues in different areas of centralized dataset based recommendations. As
discussed in Chapter 1 and RQ-4, the partitioned dataset based recommendation is practical
where the dataset are distributed among multiple organizations and they are reluctant to share
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their own data to other due to the privacy concerns which could have helped to improve the
recommendation accuracy. In this case the proposed protocols are not suitable and therefore
we need to investigate the privacy requirements specifically for partitioned dataset based rec-
ommendation and develop the privacy preserving protocol accordingly which is described in
next chapter.
Chapter 6
Privacy Preserving
Recommendations on Partitioned
Datasets
The recommendation systems developed so far in Chapter 3, 4 and 5 present the privacy
preserving protocol in terms of item based, user based and context aware recommendations
where each of the Chapters solves different privacy issues and challenges described in Sections
1.4.1, 1.4.2 and 1.4.3, as well as the research questions RQ-1, RQ-2 and RQ3 respectively. The
main issue with these recommender systems is that they work on centralized dataset, which
means the protocols are suitable if the users’ information are stored in centralized server.
However there are many applications like cloud based services, it is very common that users’
information may distributed over multiple organizations. For example, there are organizations
A, B and C where they hold same set of users but different set of cloud services or different
items since users may have accounts or registered with different service providers to get the
services from products like cloud or any similar product. In this case organizations are bound
to make sure that users’ confidential information are not leaked to other parties due to the
privacy issues. On the contrary, if any user has not invoked any services or products from
any organization, sharing these information may boost the accuracy to find how likely the
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user is going to use the product or the service. Although the developed privacy preserving
protocols are able to generate recommendations on encrypted ratings, they may not be useful
in case of distributed or partitioned datasets. Therefore, in this Chapter we develop a privacy
preserving recommendation system which is able to generate recommendation on partitioned
dataset without disclosing any amount of private information which also answers the RQ-4 by
addressing the challenges described in Section 1.4.4.
6.1 Motivation and Contribution
6.1.1 Motivation
Usually, a recommender system is more successful and is able to provide more accurate rec-
ommendation when sufficient data are available. One of the common scenarios in applying
a recommender system involves distributing data among several different organizations. To
generate a recommendation for a specific user, ratings from only one organization might not
be adequate to predict accurate recommendations. Hence it is necessary to integrate data
held by different organizations. However, the challenges arise when different data holders are
reluctant to disclose their own data to other sites. Therefore to encourage them to take advan-
tage of each other’s data for the sake of quality recommendations, privacy and confidentiality
constraints for personal information have to be satisfied. The partitioning of the data can be
horizontal, vertical or arbitrary. A horizontal partitioning occurs when multiple organizations
contains different sets of users but the same set of attributes or items, while vertical partition-
ing distributes different sets of items but the same set of users among several sites. In arbitrary
partitioning organizations hold disjoint sets of both users and items. Previous research has
shown that vertical and arbitrary partitioning are more common and more difficult to handle
than horizontal partitioning. It remains an open problem to generate accurate and secure
recommendations for vertically partitioned data [100].
The main contributions of this chapter are devoted to generating secure recommendations
for vertically partitioned datasets. To solve this important open problem, we propose a new
protocol named Privacy-preserving Weighted Slope One Predictor for Vertically Partitioned
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Data (PWSOP-VPD). It makes private information secure by means of homomorphic encryp-
tion, so that the true ratings become computationally indistinguishable from the ciphertexts
and simultaneously the method is able to generate accurate recommendations using all data
from distributed sets.
6.1.2 Contributions
We propose a new protocol PWSOP-VPD which is able to generate recommendations privately
for users while the ratings data are distributed in different parties vertically. One of the steps
of the operation of our system applies BGN cryptography (Boneh Goh Nissim) [105] to hide
the original records while integrating different data from multiple organizations as well as
generating recommendations. Another significant improvement achieved by our new system is
that it eliminates the need in any collaborative discussions or direct exchanges of data between
different participating organizations. Note that all previous systems proposed by other authors
for solutions to simpler related problems required the participants to collaborate and exchange
data. More details on previous related work of other authors is given in the following sections.
Our protocol proceeds as follows: firstly, the organizations encrypt their ratings and send the
ciphertexts to the server. In our novel solution, only the recommender server is authorized to
have access to encrypted data and generate encrypted recommendations for target user, while
all other users or organizations are not allowed to access final recommendations or may even
remain oﬄine. The server finally sends the ciphertexts of recommendations to target user once
the process is completed.
The novel contributions of this chapter are summarized here:
• We build a new protocol PWSOP-VPD to generate recommendation for vertically par-
titioned datasets where only one server is enough to serve the purpose, collaboration
among the organizations is not necessary. This reduces the computation and communi-
cation overhead for data holders and furthermore only the recommender server has to
be online during recommendation generation instead of all parties participating in the
system.
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• We apply BGN cryptosystem for the first time in privacy-preserving WSOP by which
the server is able to achieve secure multiplication between two private records. By this
process the server can compute the cardinality securely (eliminating those users who have
not rated both items).
• We prove that our protocol is able to ensure user privacy from any participants in the
system as well as make any intruders unable to guess any part of the true information.
In the sections on security analysis and experiments we show that our proposed method is
secure as well as efficient.
6.1.3 Challenges
A vertical partitioning of ratings occurs when multiple organizations contain completely dis-
joint sets of items but the same set of users. It is shown that vertically partitioned datasets are
likely to be more challenging for generating recommendations using WSOP-based approach.
This approach works in mainly three steps. First, it calculates item deviations (average differ-
ences between pairwise item ratings). Second, it computes cardinalities, which are calculated
by counting numbers of users who have rated both items. Finally, it calculates the predictions,
which are generated by applying the metrics indicated above to the rating vector of target user
(a particular user who asks for recommendation). The main challenge of generating recom-
mendations in vertically partitioned datasets is in computing the deviation and the cardinality
of two specific items if those items are shared by two different data holders who are not usu-
ally intended to disclose their information to each other. Figure 6.1 shows an example, which
describes two different organizations containing same set of users but different sets of items,
having privacy issues in sharing their data.
6.1.4 Statement of the Main Problem
The main problem solved by our proposed system is:
Given a set of users and a set of multiple organizations holding different items, build
PWSOP-VPD considering the following constraints.
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Figure 6.1: Privacy threats in sharing data between different organizations.
• Users are able to learn no information about other users data except their own.
• No organization containing disjoint set of items communicates with each other.
• Only recommender server is able to generate encrypted recommendations based on the
submitted ciphertexts of user ratings and no plaintexts should be exchanged between
server and any other participants.
• Only target user is able to decrypt the ciphertexts of recommendation which is generated
for him without revealing any private information.
6.2 Preliminaries
Let 1, 2, ..., i, ..., n be the set of users, and let 1, 2, ..., k, ...,m be the set of items in a recom-
mender system, where n and m denote the total number of users and items, respectively. We
assume that the items are distributed among multiple organizations 1, 2, ..., j, ..., δ and each
organization j has the data about mj items and
∑
jmj = m. A rating provided by user i on
item k in organization j denoted as ri,j,k. The inputs of a recommender system are usually
arithmetic rating values and the scale ranges from 1 to 5. The missing rating is denoted by 0
(zero) for which the users are interested to get recommendations.
6.2.1 WSOP for Vertically Partitioned Datasets
Let ri,j,k and ru,j,k the ratings given on item k in organization j by any particular user i and
target user u (note that the target user u could be a new user or could be any user from the
set of n users). Let Pu,j,k the prediction for target user u, on item k of organization j and Ru
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the set of items which are actually rated by the target user. Rewriting the equation of original
WSOP (Menezes et al. 2013) for vertically partitioned data we get,
Pu,j,k =
∑
k′∈Ru
(∑
i∈Rk,k′ (ri,j,k − ri,j,k′) + |Rk,k′ | · ru,j,k′
)
∑
k′∈Ru |Rk,k′ |
(6.1)
where
∑
i∈Rk,k′ (ri,j,k − ri,j,k′) denotes deviation between two items k and k
′ (k 6= k′), |Rk,k′ |
denotes the cardinality or the total number of users who have co-rated both items k and k′.
Furthermore, k′ /∈ Ru and i /∈ Rk,k′ denote the set of those items which were actually rated
and set of those users who have co-rated both items respectively.
6.3 Proposed PWSOP-VPD
Our proposed protocol consists of two servers: a Recommender Server (RS) and a Decryption
Server (DS). The RS is a participant which has business interest in generating recommenda-
tions. Its main task is to generate recommendations homomorphically without learning any
true information. The DS (the idea of placing DS is similar to (Erkin et al. 2012)) generates
public key for organizations to encrypt their data and a secret key to decrypt the results for
target user. Note that although the DS owns the secret key, it is unable to learn the true rat-
ings or recommendation results (we will prove it in methodology and security analysis section).
We assume that the servers are semi-honest but curious and usually do not collude with any
other participant in the system. In this protocol, no organization holding different datasets
communicates with each other except with RS. Furthermore no true information is exchanged
between them except ciphertexts. The main private information, which are intended to be
hidden include user ratings and generated recommendations or any kind of intermediate com-
putation results. We also hide other possible private information such as the number of items
that any user has rated, item deviation, cardinality etc. According to Figure 6.2, our proposed
scheme is divided into two phases: initialization and recommendation generation phase. At
the initialization phase,
1. The DS generates public and private key. The public key is distributed among all orga-
nizations.
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Figure 6.2: General architecture of proposed model.
2. All of the user ratings are encrypted by their corresponding organizations using the public
key and the resultant ciphertexts are sent back to RS.
At the recommendation generation phase,
3. The target user communicates with RS to get recommendations. Before generating rec-
ommendations, the RS initiates an authentication operation to verify if the target user
is malicious or not.
4. Once the verification is completed, the RS generates recommendations for the target user
and sends the resultant ciphertexts of recommendations.
5. The target user masks the encrypted recommendations before sending to DS, so that the
DS is unable to learn true results even decrypts (if does not follow the protocol).
6. Once the decryption is completed, the DS returns the decrypted results to target user.
6.3.1 Initialization
6.3.1.1 Settings
We assume that each organization j holds their ratings with same set of users and different
sets of items. The DS chooses two large prime numbers q1 and q2, and generates a cyclic
group G of order N = q1q2, also picks two random generators g, u from G and sets h = u
q2 .
Then h is a random generator of the subgroup of G of order q1. The public key is defined
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by PK = {N,G,GT , e, g, h} which is broadcasted to all organizations and secret key which is
stored for decryption.
6.3.1.2 Protocol Description
At the initial stage, all organizations have to encrypt mainly three different values for each rat-
ing: the rating itself, the negative value of original rating and the flag (1 if rating, 0 otherwise).
The reason behind encrypting negative rating is that the PWSOP-VPD needs to calculate item
deviation which is done by subtracting one rating from another and homomorphic cryptosystem
is able to perform only addition. Therefore we are able to achieve ri,k + (−ri,k′) = rj,k − ri,k′ ,
which is deviation between item k and k′. Encrypting flags will help the protocol to securely
eliminate those ratings which are missing or actually not rated. The detailed steps are described
below.
Step 1
Once DS broadcasts the public key, all organizations encrypt their ratings ri,j,k, negative rating
of the original −ri,j,k and the flag fi,j,k as
Ai,j,k = E(ri,j,k) = g
ri,j,khwb ,
Bi,j,k = E(−ri,j,k) = gN−ri,j,khwb ,
Ci,j,k = E(fi,j,k) = g
fi,j,khwb
(6.2)
where Ai,j,k, Bi,j,k and Ci,j,k denote the ciphertexts of rating, negative of original rating and
the flag from organization j, user i and item k. Note that the negative integer can be calculated
by using its modular additive inverse, i.e. E(−x) = E(N − x) · ri,j,k, N − ri,j,k and fi,j,k are
integers in the set {0, 1, ..., T}, T must not be large and T  q2 ·wb denotes the random number
used to encrypt by each organization Sb.
Step 2
After completing encryption, all organizations send the message M1,j,k containing all cipher-
texts to RS as M1,j,k = {Ai,j,k, Bi,j,k, Ci,j,k}i=1,2,...,n;k=1,2,...,m.
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Figure 6.3: Example of proposed deviation computation in plaintexts.
6.3.1.3 Generating Recommendations
In our proposed work, we consider the scenario where the target user wants to find best suitable
item among some similar or any set of items M . Therefore, the set of items are ranked based
on the prediction. Below, we show privacy preserving version of equation (6.3) for vertically
partitioned data sets step by step. Note that the RS verifies the target user if malicious or not
by running an authentication protocol between them [186].
Step 1
Firstly, we introduce the privacy preserving version of item deviation:
∑
i∈Rk,k′ (ri,j,k − ri,j,k′).
Note that we have to eliminate those item pairs which are not rated both. Here both of the
item rating ri,j,k and ri,j,k′ are private, and so they need to be encrypted. Using homomorphic
properties, the RS computes as follows
Dk,k′ =
∏
i
e(Ai,j,k, Ci,j,k′) · e(Bi,j,k′ , Ci,j,k)
=
∏
i
e(E(ri,j,k), E(fi,j,k′)) · e(E(−ri,j,k′), E(fi,j,k))
= E(
∑
i∈Rk,k′
(ri,j,k − ri,j,k′))
where Dk,k′ denotes the Ciphertext of item deviation between k and k
′. The operation e()
denotes pairing which provides homomorphic multiplication between two private data using
BGN cryptosystem. Note that we multiply the rating of k with the flag of k′ and vice versa.
In this way, any of the missing rating will be eliminated from the calculation. Figure 6.3 shows
an example of such computation in plaintexts (in Figure 6.3, r1, r2 and f1 , f2 denote ratings
and corresponding flags, respectively).
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Step 2
In this step we show how to compute |Rk,k′ | · ru,j,k′ in privacy preserving manner. Here, ru,j,k
and Rk,k′ denote ratings of target user and cardinality (total number of users who have rated
both item k and item k′ ), respectively. Note that both information are private and the server
does not know which items actually are rated by the target user. In this case the RS computes
encrypted |Rk,k′ | homomorphically as follows for all k′ = 1, 2, ..., k − 1, k + 1, ...,m.
Fk,k′ =
∏
i
e(Ci,j,k, Ci,j,k′)h
Z3
1 = E(
∑
i
fi,j,k · fi,j,k′) = E(|Rk,k′ |) (6.3)
where Fk,k′ denotes the ciphertexts of E(|Rk,k′ |), which is encrypted cardinality between two
items. Ci,j,k and Ci,j,k′ denote the encrypted flags (from equation (6.2)), respectively. The main
reason of pairing between the flags (multiplication in plaintexts) from two different ratings is
that if any of the ratings is zero, the result will be zero or otherwise, is one. Finally to get the
cardinality between two items, homomorphically the RS adds the results of pairing between
two flags for all users.
Once completed, the RS sends the ciphertexts Fk,k′ to the target user asM2 = {Fk,k′}k′=1,2,...,k−1,k+1,...,m.
After receiving the message, for all k′, the target user computes homomorphically as follows
Gu,j,k′ = (Fk,k′)
ru,j,k′ = E(|Rk,k′ |)ru,j,k′ = E(|Rk,k′ | · ru,j,k′) (6.4)
In this way ratings which are zeros are also being multiplied as well as encrypted and the server
is not able to identify which items were actually rated by the target user. Once completed,
target user returns the ciphertexts to the server.
Step 3
Finally the RS homomorphically computes the recommendations as follows.
Hu,j,k =
∏
k′
Dk,k′ ·Gu,j,k′ = E(
∑
k′
(
∑
i∈Rk,k′
(ri,j,k − ri,j,k′) + |Rk,k′ | · ru,j,k′)) (6.5)
Iu,j,k =
∏
k′
Fk,k′ = E(
∑
k′∈Ru
|Rk,k′ |) (6.6)
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The RS sends the ciphertexts Hu,j,k to target user u. The user masks the recommendation
results before sending to DS by adding some random number x with size of η bits ((Erkin et
al. 2012)). Then, the DS decrypts by raising the private key q1 to the power of ciphertexts as,
d1u,j,k = (Hu,j,k)
q1 , d2u,j,k = (Iu,j,k)
q1 (6.7)
where du,j,k denotes the decryption result. The output is g
m where m is the final results. To
recover the message m, target user suffices to compute discrete logarithm of du,j,k to the base
gq1 .
P 1u,j,k = loggq1 (d
1
u,j,k) = x+
∑
k′∈Ru
(
∑
i∈k,k′
(ri,j,k − ri,j,k′) + |Rk,k′ | · ru,j,k′) (6.8)
P 2u,j,k = loggq1 (d
2
u,j,k) = x+
∑
k′∈Ru
|Rk,k′ | (6.9)
where P 1u,j,k and P
2
u,j,k represent the final plaintexts of numerator and denominator of equation
(6.1), which still contains the random number. Once received, the target user subtracts x
and divides equation (6.8) by (6.9) to get final prediction. The final prediction is calculated
for a set of item (k = 1, 2, ...,M) where M denotes the set of items that target user asks for
recommendations.
Theorem 17. If all users and the server follow the protocol, we have Dk,k′ = E(
∑
k′∈Rk,k′ (ri,j,k−
ri,j,k′)).
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Proof. From equation (6.3), the RS homomorphically computes as follows.
Dk,k′ =
∏
i
e(Ai,j,k, Ci,j,k′)h
Z1
1 · e(Bi,j,k′ , Ci,j,k)hZ21
=
∏
i
e(gri,j,khwb , gfi,j,k′hwb)hZ11 · e(g
N−ri,j,k′ hwb , gfi,j,khwb)hZ21
=
∏
i
e(gri,j,k+αq2wb , gfi,j,k′+αq2wb)hZ11 · e(g
N−ri,j,k′+αq2wb , gfi,j,k+αq2wb)hZ21 (6.10)
=
∏
i
(e(g, g)ri,j,k·fi,j,k′ · hZ1+fi,j,k′wb+ri,j,kwb+αq2w
2
b
1 ) · (e(g, g)N−ri,j,k′ ·fi,j,k · h
Z1+fi,j,kwb+ri,j,k′wb+αq2w2b
1 ))
=
∏
i
(e(g, g)ri,j,k·fi,j,k′−ri,j,k′ ·fi,j,k · hZ1+fi,j,kwb+ri,j,k′wb+Z2+fi,j,k′wb+ri,j,kwb+2αq2w
2
b
1 )
= E(
∑
i
(ri,j,kfi,j,k′ − ri,j,k′fi,j,k)) = E(
∑
i∈Rk,k′
(ri,j,k − ri,j,k′))
where Z1 and Z2 denote random numbers generated for two pairing operations. the value
Z1 + fi,j,kwb + ri,j,k′wb +Z2 + fi,j,k′wb + ri,j,kwb + 2αq2w
2
b is uniformly distributed in ZN . Thus
Dk,k′ is an uniformly distributed encryption of
∑
i∈Rk,k′ (ri,b,j − ri,b,k). Note that
∑
i changes
to
∑
i∈Rk,k′ after the flags are being multiplied with ratings, in other words, summation of the
results for all users becomes the summation of those results, where the users i have actually
rated both items i ∈ Rk,k′ .
Theorem 18. If the target user and the server follow the protocol we have Gu,j,k′ = E(|Rk,k′ | ·
ru,j,k′) and Hu,j,k = E(
∑
k∈Ru(
∑
i∈Rk,k′ (ri,j,k − ri,j,k′) + |Rk,k′ | · ru,j,k′)).
Proof. From equation (6.3) we have,
Fk,k′ =
∏
i
e(Ci,j,k, Ci,j,k′)h
Z3
1 =
∏
i
e(gfi,j,khwb , gfi,j,k′hwb)hZ31
=
∏
i
e(gfi,j,k+αq2wb , gfi,j,k′+αq2wb)hZ31
=
∏
i
e(g, g)fi,j,k·fi,j,k′ · hZ3+fi,j,kwb+fi,j,k′wb+αq2w
2
b
1
= E(
∑
i
fi,j,k · fi,j,k′) = E(|Rk,k′ |)
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where the value Z3 + fi,j,kwb + fi,b,k′wb + αq2w
2
b is uniformly distributed in ZN and Fk,k′
is a uniformly distributed encryption of E(|Rk,k′ |). Therefore, from equation (6.4) we get,
Gu,j,k′ = (Fk,k′)
ru,j,k′ = E(|Rk,k′ |)ru,j,k′ = E(|Rk,k′ | · ru,j,k′).
From equation (6.5) we have,
Hu,j,k =
∏
k′
Dk,k′ ·Gu,j,k′ =
∏
k′
E(
∑
i∈Rk,k′
(ri,j,k − ri,j,k′)) · E(|Rk,k′ | · ru,j,k′)
=
∏
k′
(g
∑
i∈Rk,k′
(ri,j,k−ri,j,k′ ) · hr1)(g|Rk,k′ |·ru,j,k′ · hr2) (6.11)
=
∏
k′
(g
∑
i∈Rk,k′
(ri,j,k−ri,j,k′ )+|Rk,k′ |·ru,j,k′
hr1+r2)
= E(
∑
k′∈Ru
(
∑
i∈Rk,k′
(ri,j,k − ri,j,k′) + |Rk,k′ | · ru,j,k′))
where r1+r2 denotes the random numbers and is uniformly distributed in ZN . Therefore, Hu,j,k
is a uniformly distributed encryption of E(
∑
k′∈Ru(
∑
i∈Rk,k′ (ri,j,k−ri,j,k′)+ |Rk,k′ | ·ru,j,k′)).
6.4 Security Analysis
We assume that the participants in our system are semi-honest and do not collude to each other.
They follow the protocol however, try to collect the information and estimate more results from
it. The main private information in our system includes user ratings, flags, number of users
actually rated the items and finally the recommendation results. In the below analysis we show
that our proposed protocol is secured and none of the above information is disclosed during
recommendation process.
6.4.1 Privacy Protection against Users
6.4.1.1 Target User
The target user is the participant who asks for recommendations to RS on different items.
At the initialization phase the target user is no different to other users if from the same set.
However, is different if a new user. During recommendation process the target user receives
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two kinds of ciphertexts: Fk,k′ , which is total cardinality between two items and Pu,j,k which is
prediction results. Note that the target user is not able to decrypt these ciphertexts since the
private key is held by DS. Due to the authentication operations, the target user is not able to
act maliciously. Even if the target user acts maliciously, he/she only learns the value of Fk,k′
which does not contain any private record of other users. Therefore the target user learns no
information during recommendation process except own ratings.
6.4.1.2 Other User
At the initialization phase, all organizations encrypt their ratings including negative ratings
and flags using the public key and the ciphertexts are sent to the server. The secret key is
kept private to DS which is only possible way to decrypt these ciphertexts. Therefore no user
is able to decrypt or learn any information of other users except their own ratings.
6.4.2 Privacy Protection against Servers
6.4.2.1 RS
The main task of RS is to generate encrypted recommendations for target user using the
ciphertexts of other user ratings, flags, cardinality and item deviations. Note that according
to equation (6.8), the RS generates recommendations using only two different ciphertexts
Dk,k′ and Gu,j,k′ . Therefore, it is clear that the RS learns no records about any ratings or
plaintexts. All of its operations are conducted on ciphertexts only (equation (6.3) to equation
(6.6)). Since the BGN encryption is semantically secure and both of these ciphertexts are
generated using under the public key of BGN encryption, there ciphertexts are computationally
indistinguishable from uniformly random numbers.
6.4.2.2 DS
The main purpose of DS is to generate public and private keys, and decryption of the encrypted
recommendations for target user. Note that although it has the decryption key, still not able
to learn any true information. Firstly, there is no communication established between RS and
DS. We also assume that there is no collusion between any participants. Therefore, DS is not
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able to get any ciphertexts from RS, as results cannot learn any private information. Secondly,
before sending the ciphertexts of recommendation results, target user masks them by adding
random values. Therefore, even the DS decrypts the encrypted recommendations, is not able
to get original results.
6.4.3 Privacy Protection against Adversaries
To enhance the security for our protocol, the private key of DS can be distributed into δ orga-
nizations so that SK1 + · · ·+SKδ = SK and when it is necessary to decrypt, all organizations
may collaborate with DS. In this case, even if an adversary hacks δ − 1 secret keys, still not
able to decrypt any ciphertext.
6.5 Performance Analysis
To conduct the experiment testing the efficiency of our proposed method, we use Java 2 SE 8
platform with OS Windows 7, 64 bit and 3.6 GHz- core i7, 8GB CPU unit. Java cryptographic-
based libraries are also used for our experiment. The proposed method is evaluated using
publicly available data provided by GroupLens [172]. We reduced the data sets by choosing
200 users and 500 items randomly to test the viability of our proposed method and split the
items randomly into 5 different sets as organizations. At first we show the computation and
communication cost of our proposed method and then we present the efficiency in time. We as-
sume the target user wants recommendation for one specific item, therefore the evaluations are
shown in-terms of generating one recommendation instead of M . We also compare our method
with other existing solutions in-terms of computation and communication complexities. To
compute the computation and communication cost we consider the time (in seconds) required
for computing modular exponentiations, multiplications and pairing which are denoted as (e),
(mul) and (p) respectively. The size of the ciphertexts is considered to be l = 1024 bits in our
experiments. We do not consider the required time to perform any computation on plaintext
since it is too small compared to any computation on ciphertexts.
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Table 6.1: Computation cost of different participants.
Computation Cost
Target user RS DS Organizations
Initialization 3mjn · (e)
Recommendation (m− 1)(e) (m− 1)(3(p)n+ (n− 1)(mul)) + (mul(2m− 3))
Decryption 2
√
T (e)
6.5.1 Computation Cost
Table 6.1 shows the computation cost for target user, RS, DS and all organizations in different
phases of generating recommendations. At the initialization phase each organization j com-
putes the ciphertexts for mj items and n users in 3mjn · (e) seconds. This computation can
be done in parallel and therefore it is shown for one organization only. In recommendation
generation phase, the RS computes the ciphertexts of Dk,k′ , Fk,k′ and Hu,j,k′ . The total com-
putation time of these ciphertexts is (m− 1)(3(p)n+ (n− 1)(mul)) + (mul(2m− 3)) seconds
for n users and m items (total items from all organizations). In the meantime, the target user
computes Gu,j,k′ and sends to RS, which takes (m− 1)(e) seconds. In the final stage, the DS
decrypts the ciphertexts of recommendations using equation (6.7) and computes discrete loga-
rithm using equation (6.8) and (6.9), which takes 2
√
T (e) seconds. The total computation cost
for generating recommendations (in case of both target user and RS) increases by M , which is
selected by the target user. Figure 6.4(a) shows the accuracy of the proposed method in terms
of recommendation generation and decryption. In terms of accuracy the proposed PWSOP-
VPD takes 2× 10−5s, 5× 10−6s and 0.01s for one modular exponentiation (e), multiplication
between two ciphertexts and one pairing, respectively.
6.5.2 Communication Cost
The communication cost in our protocol depends on the size of the data exchanged between
any two participants. Table 6.2 shows the communication cost between target user, RS, DS
and different organizations. At the initialization phase each organization sends 3mjn · (l) bits
to RS once they encrypt their ratings. However, the RS receives 3mjn · (l) bits since it has to
get the data of all items from different organizations. During the computation of Fk,k′ , the RS
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Table 6.2: Communication cost of different participants.
Communication Cost
Target user RS DS Organizations
Initialization 2(m− 1)(l) + (l) 3mjn · (l)
Recommendation 2(m− 1)(l) + (l) 2(m− 1)(l) + (l)
Decryption 2(l + η) l + η
Figure 6.4: (a) Accuracy of the PWSOP-VPD in terms of Recommendation Generation and
Decryption for 500 Items and 200 Users. (b) Comparison with (Basu et al. 2011(a)) in terms
of Average Computations of - 1. Encryption, 2. Decryption 3. Homomorphic Addition 4.
Homomorphic Multiplication.
sends (m− 1)(l) bits for (m− 1) items to target user. Once the user finishes the computation,
returns another (m − 1)(l) bits to RS. Therefore, total communication cost to calculate Fk,k′
becomes 2(m − 1)(l) bits. Note that after generating encrypted recommendations, the RS
sends the ciphertexts of (l) bits to target user (recommendation for one item). The same
ciphertexts are sent to DS for decryption purpose by adding a random value of size η. Since
the recommendations are generated for M items (selected by target user), the communication
overhead also increases by M .
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6.5.3 Comparison with Existing Solutions
Among the existing cryptographic solutions for WSOP for vertically partitioned datasets, [99]
showed that their overall complexity reaches O(mn2) to where the complexity of proposed
PWSOP-VPD is up to O(mn). Unlike them we avoid pairwise calculation of item deviation
at the initialization phase by calculating it for other m− 1 items while generating recommen-
dations. The total complexity to generate recommendations for M items reaches to O(mnM).
Comparison in terms of accuracy is shown in figure 6.4(b) where it is shown that proposed
PWSOP-VPD takes .02 ms, .03 ms, .006 ms, .005 ms for one average: encryption, decryption,
homomorphic addition (multiplication between two ciphertexts) and homomorphic multiplica-
tion (without pairing). This result clearly outperforms existing solution. To calculate deviation
between two items from different data holders, [100] showed a privacy preserving protocol where
a rating is split into k shares. All parties holding these shares need to communicate with each
other to get difference between any two ratings. Problem arises if the size of k becomes large.
On the other side, our protocol does not need to share the ratings nor any collaboration but still
is able to calculate any operation (addition, subtraction and multiplication) on the encrypted
data using only one server.
6.6 Summary
This chapter presents a new privacy-preserving protocol PWSOP-VPD for vertically parti-
tioned datasets to protect user privacy and generating recommendations based on encrypted
data. We conduct significant amount of experiments using publicly available datasets and find
that the proposed method outperforms the existing solutions in-terms of efficiency. Further-
more, we show that the proposed protocol is secure in terms of hiding original data while
generating recommendations. In future, we are interested to extend our protocol to handle
arbitrary partitioned datasets.
Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
The main aim of this thesis is to develop privacy preserving recommendation systems to pre-
serve users’ privacy while providing user personalized recommendations. After studying various
types of recommendation techniques and approaches we identified that the existing recommen-
dation approaches can be divided into centralized and partitioned dataset based recommenda-
tions. In centralized dataset based recommendation, the dataset with users’ ratings and other
related information are stored with server. The recommendation is provided on behalf of the
company or organizations in which the products belong. From a vast set of recommendation
areas, we have identified key techniques which belong to centralized dataset based recommen-
dation such as user based CF, item based CF and context aware recommendation system. In
partitioned dataset based recommendation the dataset is distributed among various organi-
zations where they hold similar set of users but different set of items or vice versa. In this
thesis we only focused on vertically partitioned dataset based recommendation and the other
types of partitioned based recommendation are left for future work. After identifying these key
recommendation approaches and areas, we developed privacy preserving protocols for each and
every recommendation techniques. The reason behind building the privacy preserving proto-
cols for each recommendation technique is that each and every approach is different than other
in terms of privacy requirements, techniques and other similar challenges. Because of different
challenges the privacy preserving protocols also become different for various recommendation
approaches. More specifically, we have developed the research questions based on the research
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challenges in privacy preserving recommendations and we answer the questions by addressing
the challenges in each chapter of this thesis for each research questions.
The first research question RQ-1 was answered in Chapter 3 where we developed privacy
preserving item based recommendation system using item similarity. More specifically we pre-
sented the privacy preserving protocol for item similarity, rating average computation and
recommendation generation. We preserved users’ privacy from server and any third party
entities by means of encrypting the ratings using homomorphic encryption. Using our pro-
posed protocol the users are able to share the secret keys and later can combine the secret
keys to decrypt the results which are required for common purposes like item similarity and
item’s average ratings privately. The server can provide recommendations on the encrypted
data without learning any private information. We tested our proposed protocol on publicly
available dataset and presented extensive experimental analysis. We also compared our pro-
posed method with existing ones and showed that our method outperforms them in terms of
computation cost. We also presented the privacy analysis of our protocol and proved that
the proposed method is private and leaks no confidential information related to users while
generating recommendations.
The second research question RQ-2 was answered in Chapter 4 where we presented privacy
preserving user based recommendation system using the similarity between the users. We in-
vestigated the existing protocols and found certain privacy issues which were solved by our
method. More specifically we presented a new protocol to perform recommendations where
both the ratings and similarity are private information. Using existing approach, the server
has to collaborate with trusted decryption server to perform some intermediate decryptions
to achieve secure multiplication between two private numbers like ratings and user similarity.
Our proposed system overcomes this limitations by eliminating decryption server’s assistance
to perform secure multiplication operations while predicting new ratings by introducing BGN
cryptosystem with the central server. This improves the recommendation system in terms of
privacy significantly. We have also presented another protocol based on symmetric key en-
crypted search to improve the efficiency of overall protocol. Unlike previous protocol, using
encrypted search the server can find the similar users very quickly which overcome the limi-
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tations of computation cost for privacy preserving similarity computation and finding similar
users using homomorphic encryptions. By finding the similar users the total user space was
reduced to improve the computation overhead in recommendation generations.
The third research question RQ-3 was addressed in Chapter 5 in which two privacy pre-
serving protocols for context aware recommendation systems were proposed. We presented two
different sections as two applications on context aware recommendation system. In first section
we presented an application on web service recommendation and in second section we presented
another application on location recommendations. As first application in first section of Chap-
ter 5, we presented privacy preserving location aware web service recommendations where the
user location were used as context information which were used along with the QoS values to
generate recommendations on web services. In the same section of this chapter, we presented
privacy preserving user filtering protocol where the users can be filtered based on their loca-
tions. More specifically, the query user, who wants to get recommendations, can perform this
protocol to filter those users who are located nearby to him/her. The based on the filtered users
the recommendations are generated using QoS values of invoked web services without revealing
any private information. We tested the protocol on publicly available dataset based on web
services and users locations called WSDREAM-1 and showed extensive experimental analysis
to show the computation and communication overhead. In the second section we presented
friendship aware location recommendations where the system is able to recommend new places
to users based on his/her friends’ choice and own history of visited locations. In this method
we presented the users’ context information as their friendship network and showed how to
incorporate the friendship information along with the recommendation protocol to influence
the prediction results by the server without actually knowing any information. We showed the
privacy analysis and showed that our method does not reveal any information while integrating
the context information as well as performing recommendation for users. We have also con-
ducted experimental analysis using publicly available dataset called Gowalla which contains
users check in information and their friendship network. Our experimental results show that
the proposed method is practical.
The fourth research question RQ-4 was answered in Chapter 6 where we developed privacy
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preserving recommendation on partitioned dataset. In our proposed method different orga-
nizations are able to share their information which are confidential and related to users with
other organizations without actually hampering the confidentiality to increase the recommen-
dation accuracy. We have investigated the existing works on privacy preserving partitioned
dataset based recommendation and found that due to collaborating with many organizations
the communication cost increases. To address this problem we developed a centralized model
where a central server can manage all the process to collect the encrypted information from
different organizations and provide accurate and meaningful recommendations to users with-
out revealing any private information. More specifically we presented a new privacy-preserving
protocol based on weighted slope one predictor for vertically partitioned datasets to protect
user privacy and generating recommendations based on encrypted data. We conduct significant
amount of experiments using publicly available datasets and found that the proposed method
outperforms the existing solutions in-terms of efficiency. Furthermore, we showed using privacy
analysis that the proposed protocol is secure in terms of hiding original data while generating
recommendations.
Limitations and Future Work
This thesis has focused on development of privacy preserving recommendation system on
different areas like user based CF, item based CF, context aware recommendation and par-
titioned dataset based recommendations which preserve users’ privacy while performing the
recommendations for users without learning or revealing any confidential information. Homo-
morphic cryptosystems are applied for secure data processing by encrypting the ratings and
other related information before sending them to recommendation server. The main reason
behind using homomorphic based encryption is that they are semantically secure and it is hard
to distinguish the true message from its ciphertext. Also it is effective to perform recommen-
dations on encrypted data without having any knowledge about it. The theoretical analysis,
privacy analysis and performance analysis of our proposed methods in each chapter show the
viability in terms of both practicality and privacy. However, there exists some notable limi-
tations and there are some potential areas to improve the models which would open up the
pathways for future research. In below we describe some of the limitations of this thesis which
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we are interested to investigate in future.
• Firstly, one of the main limitations of our proposed models is efficiency. Although we
focused on mainly privacy aspects of recommendations system, efficiency is equally im-
portant in terms of the practicality of the proposed systems. The possible solutions to
improve the efficiency could be using distributed or parallel computing paradigm such
as map reduce or similar technologies. Another potential solution could be building
lightweight but secure cryptographic techniques.
• Secondly, another limitation of this thesis is that the proposed models are not adaptable
to different techniques. For example, we proposed different cryptographic protocols for
different types of recommendations. It would be worthy to conduct research on developing
intelligent cryptographic approach which can adapt with the types of recommendation
and predict the missing ratings or generate recommendations for users without revealing
any private information.
• Thirdly, we have only focused on developing privacy preserving protocols but we did
not consider to authenticate user while interacting with the recommender server. It is
usual that an user can act maliciously and possibly misuse the system by providing false
ratings. Proper authentication based techniques and investigating the zero knowledge
proof in the recommendation systems to verify if the user is honest enough to provide
true information would be a good solution, which is left for our future work.
Apart from above limitiations there are also some other areas where our proposed models
can be improved. For instance, in this thesis we explicitly chose four different scenarios of
recommendations which are user based recommendation, item based recommendation, context
aware recommendations and vertically partitioned dataset based recommendations. There are
other important areas of recommendations such as knowledge based recommendations where
the knowledge of recommendations system is updated privately. Also privately selecting the
proper demographic information in case of demographic based recommendations. Therefore
tackling other scenarios in terms of privacy in other areas of recommendations system is left
as our future work.
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In this thesis we preserved users’ privacy using mainly homomorphic based encryptions.
Although they have been proven to be effective to preserve privacy while generating recommen-
dations, still they are limited to perform certain computations like addition and multiplication.
To work on more complex recommendation system efficiently like using Singular Value Decom-
position, Matrix factorization it would be helpful to investigate on how to perform division
on encrypted data to facilitate more accurate recommendations. Also the homomorphic en-
cryptions are always not efficient. So with reducing the computation overhead by making the
computation parallel how to reduce the overall complexity can be another area of research in
future.
In summary along with our proposed model, in future we intend to explore the applicability
of building more advanced privacy preserving recommendation systems that are more efficient,
accurate and secure.
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